### Role of the ballot

#### Role of the ballot’s to simulate enactment of the plan –

Policy simulation doesn’t hurt agency—key to force changes in bureaucracy

Hager, 92 [Carol, J, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-7]

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and implement an alternative politics. The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a substantive policy discussion. Now, some activists turned to the parliamentary arena as a possible forum for an energy dialogue. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have an institutional lever with which to pry apart the bureaucracy and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list. These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen move-ment. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affect-ing local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored indus-trial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political system as a whole, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the necessary change would require a degree of political restructuring that could only be accomplished through their direct participation in parliamentary politics. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to participate directly in politics themselves; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48 Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishmento f a temporary parliamentaryco mmissiont o studye nergyp olicy,w hichf or the first time would draw all concernedp articipantst ogetheri n a discussiono f both short-termc hoicesa nd long-termg oals of energyp olicy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49T hese commissionsg ave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernizationa nd technicali nnovation in energy policy. Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurizationd evices. With proddingf rom the energyc ommission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and by producing a modernization plan itself, the combined citizen initiative and AL forced bureaucratic authorities to push the utility for improvements. They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection. III. Conclusion The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmen-tally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the objections against particular projects was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general. One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simul-taneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protec-tion of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggra-vate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at *Systemkritik*.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitima-tion dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more prob-lematic. Parliamentary Politics In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to formulate an alternative politics, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry. Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program. This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. On the other hand, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The lively debate stimulated by grassroots groups and parties keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda. Technical Debate In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of the energy issue forced citizen activists to become both participants in and critics of the policy process. In order to defeat the plant, activists engaged in technical debate. They won several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often proving to be more informed than bureaucratic experts themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators. The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria. Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic. In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56 In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the contribution of grassroots environmental groups has been significant. As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues has been tremendous.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 Policy concessions and new legal provisions for citizen participation have not quelled grassroots action. The attempts of the established political parties to coopt "green" issues have also met with limited success. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

#### Intellectualism without specific action is NOT an alternative—voting neg is a self-serving gesture

Ally 2k5 (Shireen, “Oppositional intellectualism as reflection, not rejection, of power: Wits Sociology, 1975-1989” Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa, 59, 2005, pp. 66-97

But, an opposing tradition suggests that intellectuals, far from exercising their critical independence from the state, actually exist in a relationship of .ideological subservience. to structures of authority. Marx pronounced that intellectuals are mainly allies or members of the ruling elite, while Weber too identified intellectuals as the group .predestined. to ally with those who control the polity (Weber 1968). Mills continued this line of thought arguing that .there is a close connection between the prestige of culture and the prestige of power. (Gerth and Mills 1946:448), and Shils has argued that there is always a mutual interdependence between the intellectuals and the powerful: .The powerful require the intellectual and the intellectual requires and constantly finds himself beguiled by the powerful. (1972:22). In one of the more intriguing explanations of this seeming tendency for intellectuals to ally with the powerful, Bauman argues that there is a mutually gratifying love affair between the professors and their employer, the state. They need each other: power without knowledge is headless, knowledge without power is toothless. Far from being natural enemies of power (a dominant, high-handed, intolerant power), the educated classes need power to perform their duty as defined by the nature of their competence and social function. (Bauman 1987:83-84, 91) Karabel, therefore, importantly concludes that: what needs to be explained is less why intellectuals reach accommodations with the status quo than what it is that causes some of them, at certain historical moments, to rebel. (1996:209; emphasis added)

#### Voting against us for “poor scholarship” changes nothing—only the perm captures the critical dialogue their ev prescribes

Wagner 2k5 (Anne, “Unsettling the academy: working through the challenges of anti-racist pedagogy” Race Ethnicity and Education Vol. 8, No. 3, September 2005, pp. 261–275)

Another way in which the pedagogue may begin to establish the climate of the class involves stressing the importance of both acknowledging fears and anxieties and of speaking from one’s own experiences. A working assumption may be that racism affects everyone and dealing with the impact of racism is a lifelong process, one with which the educator, too, is still engaged (Romney et al., 1992). Hence, as many people are only learning to overcome the racism with which they have been socialized their entire lifetime, scathing critiques and aggressive attacks will not be rewarded by the professor. Too often in academia, students equate such practices with superior scholarship, as they have never truly learned how to engage in meaningful critical dialogue. As Paulo Friere (1970) has written, dialogue is central to the project of education. Only through such an exchange of ideas can we hope to work towards transformative change. However, as noted previously, we can not taker for granted the fact that students will enter the classroom with such skills. Often, attacks are motivated by a desire to demonstrate one’s mastery of antiracism, which is demonstrated by verbally eviscerating another student. In such instances, it becomes an individual pursuit of ‘excellence’, where one may seek to demonstrate their competence by undermining and attacking another. Clearly, such practices hinder the development of a collaborative learning project and may unalterably affect individual student’s willingness to take further risks, causing some to retreat into silence as a protective measure. In fact, numerous researchers have reported that concerns about being labeled ‘racist’ have resulted in a culture of fear, which leaves many students feeling estranged and silenced (Martin, 2000; Schick, 2000). Hence, I suggest that misconceptions regarding academic dialogue and debate need to be explicitly addressed at the outset, to avoid such problematic encounters. Given the contentious nature of the material, it is crucial that we prepare students to succeed in the class. All too often, I have witnessed scenes in classrooms where students are ill-equipped to deal with differing perspectives and the resulting recriminations and emotionally charged confrontations result in permanent rifts, which cause some students to withdraw, either in anger or fear, often in an attempt to protect themselves from what they perceive to be the potential for further attacks. Aggressive critiques are not only unproductive, they also quickly dissolve any sense of community which may have been established. Consequently, explicating expectations for classroom behaviour will also be an important tool for establishing a sense that a communal project is being undertaken. In this way, the process of learning is framed as being of utmost importance, rather than transcending all tensions and contradictions, to arrive at universal truths.

#### Don’t be an academic—their framework dooms the alt

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Yet the audacious adepts of “theory” constitute themselves the equivalent of a vanguard party—laying out propositions to be admired for their audacity rather than their truth, defending themselves when necessary as victims of stodgy and parochial old-think, priding themselves on their cosmopolitan majesty. “Theory” dresses critical thought in a language that, for all its impenetrability, certifies that intellectuals are central and indispensable to the ideological and political future. The far right might be firmly in charge of Washington, but Foucault (and his rivals) rules the seminars. At a time of political rollback, intellectual flights feel like righteous and thrilling consolations. Masters of “theory,” left to themselves, could choose among three ways of understanding their political role. They could choose the more-or-less Leninist route, flattering themselves that they are in the process of reaching correct formulations and hence (eventually) bringing true consciousness to benighted souls who suffer from its absence. They could choose the populist path, getting themselves off the political hook in the here and now by theorizing that potent forces will **some day,** willy-nilly, gather to upend the system. Or they could reconcile themselves to Frankfurt-style futilitarianism, conceding that history has run into a cul-de-sac and making do nevertheless. In any event, practitioners of “theory” could carry on with their lives, practicing politics by publishing without perishing, indeed, without having to set foot outside the precincts of the academy. As the revolutionary tide has gone out, a vanguard marooned without a rearguard has made the university into an asylum. As many founders and masters of “theory” pass from the scene, the genre has calcified, lost much of its verve, but in the academy verve is no prerequisite for institutional weight, and so the preoccupation and the style go on and on.

#### Method focus causes scholarly paralysis

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(Patrick Thadeus, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, p. 57-59)

Perhaps the greatest irony of this instrumental, decontextualized importation of “falsification” and its critics into IR is the way that an entire line of thought that privileged disconfirmation and refutation—no matter how complicated that disconfirmation and refutation was in practice—has been transformed into a license to worry endlessly about foundational assumptions. At the very beginning of the effort to bring terms such as “paradigm” to bear on the study of politics, Albert O. Hirschman (1970b, 338) noted this very danger, suggesting that without “a little more ‘reverence for life’ and a little less straightjacketing of the future,” the focus on producing internally consistent packages of assumptions instead of actually examining complex empirical situations would result in **scholarly paralysis.** Here as elsewhere, Hirschman appears to have been quite prescient, inasmuch as the major effect of paradigm and research programme language in IR seems to have been a series of debates and discussions about whether the fundamentals of a given school of thought were sufficiently “scientific” in their construction. Thus we have debates about how to evaluate scientific progress, and attempts to propose one or another set of research design principles as uniquely scientific, and inventive, “reconstructions” of IR schools, such as Patrick James’ “elaborated structural realism,” supposedly for the purpose of placing them on a firmer scientific footing by making sure that they have all of the required elements of a basically Lakatosian19 model of science (James 2002, 67, 98–103).

The bet with all of this scholarly activity seems to be that if we can just get the fundamentals right, then scientific progress will inevitably ensue . . . even though this is the precise opposite of what Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos argued! In fact, all of this obsessive interest in foundations and starting-points is, in form if not in content, a lot closer to logical positivism than it is to the concerns of the falsificationist philosophers, despite the prominence of language about “hypothesis testing” and the concern to formulate testable hypotheses among IR scholars engaged in these endeavors. That, above all, is why I have labeled this methodology of scholarship neopositivist. While it takes much of its self justification as a science from criticisms of logical positivism, in overall sensibility it still operates in a visibly positivist way, attempting to construct knowledge from the ground up by getting its foundations in logical order before concentrating on how claims encounter the world in terms of their theoretical implications. This is by no means to say that neopositivism is not interested in hypothesis testing; on the contrary, neopositivists are extremely concerned with testing hypotheses, but only after the fundamentals have been soundly established. Certainty, not conjectural provisionality, seems to be the goal—a goal that, ironically, Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos would all reject.

### 4th off - paths of glory

#### Their Hamblet evidence is about lashout – that link is empirically denied

Havi Carel 6, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of the West of England, “Life and Death in Freud and Heidegger”, googlebooks

Secondly, the constancy principle on which these ideas are based is incompatible with observational data. Once the passive model of the nervous system has been discarded, there was no need for external excitation in order for discharge to take place, and more generally, "the behavioural picture seemed to negate the notion of drive, as a separate energizer of behaviour" {Hcbb. 1982. p.35). According to Holt, the nervous system is not passive; it does not take in and conduct out energy from the environment, and it shows no tendency to discharge its impulses. 'The principle of constancy is quite without any biological basis" (1965, p. 109). He goes on to present the difficulties that arise from the pleasure principle as linked to a tension-reduction theory. The notion of tension is "conveniently ambiguous": it has phenomenological, physiological and abstract meaning. But empirical evidence against the theory of tension reduction has been "mounting steadily" and any further attempts to link pleasure with a reduction of physiological tension are "decisively refuted" (1965, pp. 1102). Additionally, the organism and the mental system are no longer considered closed systems. So the main arguments for the economic view collapse, as does the entropic argument for the death drive (1965, p. 114). A final, more general criticism of Freud's economic theory is sounded by Compton, who argues, "Freud fills in psychological discontinuities with neurological hypotheses" (1981, p. 195). The Nirvana principle is part and parcel of the economic view and the incomplete and erroneous assumptions about the nervous system (Hobson, 1988, p.277). It is an extension ad extremis of the pleasure principle, and as such is vulnerable to all the above criticisms. The overall contemporary view provides strong support for discarding the Nirvana principle and reconstructing the death drive as aggression.

#### Util is good – all lives are infinitely valuable

Cummiskey 90 – Professor of Philosophy, Bates (David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor, AG)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

#### Every study of credible social theories concludes consequentialism is good---Scientific studies of biology, evolution, and psychology prove that deontological proclivities are only illogical layovers from evolution

**Greene 2010** – Joshua, Associate Professor of Social science in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University (The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, accessed: www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf)

What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstood what Kant and like-minded deontologists are all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological, though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process. Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get characteristically deontological answers. Some will be tautological: "Because it's murder!" Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.

#### Their link is inevitable and not unique offense -

Datschefski 4 (Edwin – BioThinking International, “Consumption is Good ? !”, January, http://www.biothinking.com/consume.pdf)

It seems that it's natural to use energy, and the more the better. Ecologists like Lotka (1922) and Odum and Pinkerton (1955) suggested that the **biological systems that survive are those that develop the most power inflow and u se it to best meet their needs for survival**. Schneider and Kay (1994) proposed that a better description of these "power laws" would be that biological systems develop in a manner as to "increase their degradation rate, and that biological growth, ecosystem development and evolution represent the development of new dissipative pathways." As ecosystems develop or mature they tend to increase their total dissipation, and develop more complex structures with greater diversity, more cycling, more energy flow and more hierarchical levels. So ecological theory shows us that a complex adaptive system **like the current industrial system will** inherently evolve to maximise throughput of energy **and materials**. I'm not disputing the benefits of efficiency, or the limits to growth. But there does seem to be a lot of (in my view) **futile effort directed at encouraging people to consume l ess**. People are natural-born shoppers. I defy anyone reading this to claim that they have deprived themselves of that hifi, boat, shoes, camera, etc. that they really fancied. **You also** can't solve environmental problems **by simply using less.** There is a fundamental package of food and goods that a household requires, and while it's possible to make the footprint of that package smaller, we're still looking at about 7 tonnes of stuff per household per year, which is about 140 tonnes including embodied energy and mass. You can avoid this shooting up to 10 or 15 tonnes of stuff by renting and buying durable products and so on, but even the thriftiest household will still have a basic consumption requirement. The focus for improvement must therefore be on **changing product and process design so that materials flow is more systemic**. All products are ultimately disposable. We just need all of them to be designed to go back and become food for another system. So don't feel guilty about buying the products you have to get. Buy with caution and respect for the materials used. And divert the energy of your concerns into action -- tell the manufacturer of your new camera / car / bed etc. about how they can make it better. Most manufacturers think they are doing perfectly OK if they are complying with the law and have no -one demonstrating outside their head office. Going 100% cyclic solar and safe simply isn't on the agenda yet. So what if every member of every environment group (that's about 5 to 50% of the population, depending what country you live in) asked the manufacturers of the myriad of products that they

#### The alternative is coal—kills thousands every year

Zelman 11 Joanna, The Huffington Post, "Power Plant Air Pollution Kills 13,000 People Per Year, Coal-Fired Are Most Hazardous: ALA Report", 3/15, www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/14/power-plant-air-pollution-coal-kills\_n\_833385.html

The American Lung Association (ALA) recently released a new report on the dramatic health hazards surrounding coal-fired power plants.¶ The report, “Toxic Air: The Case For Cleaning Up Coal-Fired Power Plants,” reveals the dangers of air pollution emitted by coal plants.¶ One of the starkest findings in the report claims, “Particle pollution from power plants is estimated to kill approximately 13,000 people a year.”¶ So what's the biggest culprit?¶ “Coal-fired power plants that sell electricity to the grid produce more hazardous air pollution in the U.S. than any other industrial pollution sources.” According to the report details, over 386,000 tons of air pollutants are emitted from over 400 plants in the U.S. per year. Interestingly, while most of the power plants are located in the Midwest and Southeast, the entire nation is threatened by their toxic emissions.¶ An ALA graph shows that while pollutants such as acid gases stay in the local area, metals such as lead and arsenic travel beyond state lines, and fine particulate matter has a global impact. In other words, while for some workers the pollution may be a tradeoff for employment at a plant, other regions don’t reap the same benefits, but still pay for the costs to their health.¶ The report connected specific pollutants with their health effects. According to the ALA, 76% of U.S. acid gas emissions, which are known to irritate breathing passages, come from coal-fired power plants. Out of all industrial sources, these plants are also the biggest emitter of airborne mercury, which can become part of the human food chain through fish and wildlife -- high mercury levels are linked to brain damage, birth defects, and damage to the nervous system. Overall, air pollutants from coal plants can cause heart attacks, strokes, lung cancer, birth defects, and premature death.¶ The American Lung Association isn’t the only group to connect coal plants with death and illness. A recent study released in the Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences found that, due in large part to health problems, coal costs the U.S. $500 billion per year. Specifically, the study found that the health costs of cancer, lung disease, and respiratory illnesses connected to pollutant emissions totaled over $185 billion per year.

### Risk

#### Public debate solves fear-mongering—rejecting predictions cedes the political to technocratic planning

**Kurasawa 4** – Prof Sociology, York (Fuyuki, Cautionary Tales, Constellations 11.4, AG)

State and market institutions may seek to produce a culture of fear by deliberately stretching interpretations of reality beyond the limits of the plausible so as to exaggerate the prospects of impending catastrophes, or yet again, by intentionally promoting certain prognoses over others for instrumental purposes. Accordingly, regressive dystopias can operate as Trojan horses advancing political agendas or commercial interests that would otherwise be susceptible to public scrutiny and opposition. Instances of this kind of manipulation of the dystopian imaginary are plentiful: the invasion of Iraq in the name of fighting terrorism and an imminent threat of use of ‘weapons of mass destruction’; the severe curtailing of American civil liberties amidst fears of a collapse of ‘homeland security’; the neoliberal dismantling of the welfare state as the only remedy for an ideologically constructed fiscal crisis; the conservative expansion of policing and incarceration due to supposedly spiraling crime waves; and so forth. Alarmism constructs and codes the future in particular ways, producing or reinforcing certain crisis narratives, belief structures, and rhetorical conventions. As much as alarmist ideas beget a culture of fear, the reverse is no less true. If fear-mongering is a misappropriation of preventive foresight, resignation about the future represents a problematic outgrowth of the popular acknowledgment of global perils. Some believe that the world to come is so uncertain and dangerous that we should not attempt to modify the course of history; the future will look after itself for better or worse, regardless of what we do or wish. One version of this argument consists in a complacent optimism perceiving the future as fated to be better than either the past or the present. Frequently accompanying it is a self-deluding denial of what is plausible (‘the world will not be so bad after all’), or a naively Panglossian pragmatism (‘things will work themselves out in spite of everything, because humankind always finds ways to survive’).37 Much more common, however, is the opposite reaction, a fatalistic pessimism reconciled to the idea that the future will be necessarily worse than what preceded it. This is sustained by a tragic chronological framework according to which humanity is doomed to decay, or a cyclical one of the endless repetition of the mistakes of the past. On top of their dubious assessments of what is to come, alarmism and resignation would, if widely accepted, undermine a viable practice of farsightedness. Indeed, both of them encourage public disengagement from deliberation about scenarios for the future, a process that appears to be dangerous, pointless, or unnecessary. The resulting ‘depublicization’ of debate leaves dominant groups and institutions (the state, the market, techno-science) in charge of sorting out the future for the rest of us, thus effectively producing a heteronomous social order. How, then, can we support a democratic process of prevention from below? The answer, I think, lies in cultivating the public capacity for critical judgment and deliberation, so that participants in global civil society subject all claims about potential catastrophes to examination, evaluation, and contestation.

#### Scenario planning is good – allows us to make better choices

Han, 10 [ Dong-ho Han, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, , “Scenario Construction and Implications for IR Research: Connecting Theory to a Real World of Policy Making,” http://www.allacademic.com/one/isa/isa10/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished\_manuscript&file\_index=1&pop\_up=true&no\_click\_key=true&attachment\_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=3e890fb59257a0ca9bad2e2327d8a24f

How do we assess future possibilities with existing data and information? Do we have a systematic approach to analyze the future events of world politics? If the problem of uncertainty in future world politics is increasing and future international relations are hard to predict, then it is necessary to devise a useful tool to effectively deal with upcoming events so that policy makers can reduce the risks of future uncertainties. In this paper, I argue that the scenario methodology is one of the most effective methods to connect theory to practice, thereby leading to a better understanding of future world events. The purpose of this paper is to introduce the scenario methodology to the field of IR in a more acceptable fashion and to explore its implications for a real policy world. To achieve this goal, I will explain the scenario methodology and why it is adequate to provide a better understanding of future world events. More specifically, I will clarify what the scenario method is and what its core components are and explain the importance and implications of the scenario method in IR by analyzing existing IR literature with an emphasis on security studies that primarily provide the prospect of future security issues. 1. Introduction How do we assess future possibilities with existing data and information? Do we have a systematic approach to analyze the future events of world politics? Given various theoretical ideas for predicting and analyzing future events in the field of international relations (IR), to understand these events properly it is important both to cast out all plausible outcomes and to think through a relevant theory, or a combination of each major theory, in connection with those outcomes. This paper aims to explain the scenario methodology and why it is adequate to provide a better understanding of future world events. After clarifying the scenario methodology, its core components, and its processes and purposes, I will explore other field’s use of this methodology. Then I will explain the importance and implications of the scenario method in the field of IR. I will conclude with summarizing the advantage of the scenario method in a real world of policy making. 2. What is the Scenario Methodology? This section begins with one major question – what is the scenario methodology? To answer this, some history regarding the development of this method should be mentioned.1 Herman Kahn, a pioneer of the scenario method, in his famous 1962 book Thinking about the Unthinkable, argued that the decision makers in the United States should think of and prepare for all possible sequences of events with regard to nuclear war with the Soviet Union.2 Using scenarios and connecting them with various war games, Kahn showed the importance of thinking ahead in time and using the scenario method based upon imagination for the future.3 According to Kahn and his colleagues, scenarios are “attempts to describe in some detail a hypothetical sequence of events that could lead plausibly to the situation envisaged.”4 Similarly, Peter Schwartz defines scenarios as “stories about the way the world might turn out tomorrow, stories that can help us recognize and adapt to changing aspects of our present environment.”5 Given a variety of definitions of scenarios,6 for the purpose of this research, I refer to the scenario-building methodology as a means by which people can articulate different futures with trends, uncertainties, and rules over a certain amount of time. Showing all plausible future stories and clarifying important trends, scenario thinking enables decision makers to make an important decision at the present time. Key Terms in the Scenario Methodology The core of the scenario method lies in enabling policy makers to reach a critical decision at the present time based on thinking about all plausible future possibilities. Key concepts in the scenario method include: driving forces, predetermined elements, critical uncertainties, wild cards and scenario plot lines.7 Driving forces are defined as “the causal elements that surround a problem, event or decision,” which could be many factors, including those “that can be the basis, in different combinations, for diverse chains of connections and outcomes.”8 Schwartz defines driving forces as “the elements that move the plot of a scenario, that determine the story’s outcome.”9 In a word, driving forces constitute the basic structure of each scenario plot line in the scenario-making process. Predetermined elements refer to “events that have already occurred or that almost certainly will occur but whose consequences have not yet unfolded.”10 Predetermined elements are “givens” which could be safely assumed and understood in the scenario-building process. Although predetermined elements impact outcomes, they do not have a direct causal impact on a given outcome. Critical uncertainties “describe important determinants of events whose character, magnitude or consequences are unknown.”11 Exploring critical uncertainties lies at the heart of scenario construction in the sense that the most important task of scenario anaysts is to discover the elements that are most uncertain and most important to a specific decision or event.12 Wild cards are “conceivable, if low probability, events or actions that might undermine or modify radically the chains of logic or narrative plot lines.”13 In John Peterson’s terms, wild cards are “not simple trends, nor are they byproducts of anything else. They are events on their own. They are characterized by their scope, and a speed of change that challenges the outermost capabilities of today’s human capabilities.”14 Wild cards might be extremely important in that in the process of scenario planning their emergence could change the entire direction of each scenario plot line. A scenario plot line is “a compelling story about how things happen” and it describes “how driving forces might plausibly behave as they interact with predetermined elements and different combinations of critical uncertainties.”15 Narratives and/or stories are an essential part of the scenario method due to the identical structure of analytical narratives and scenarios: “both are sequential descriptions of a situation with the passage of time and explain the process of events from the base situation into the situation questioned.”16 Process and Purpose of Scenario Analysis Scenario analysis begins with the exploration of driving forces including some uncertainties. However, scenario building is more than just organizing future uncertainties; rather, it is a thorough understanding of uncertainties, thereby distinguishing between something clear and unclear in the process of decision making.17 As Pierre Wack has pointed out, “By carefully studying some uncertainties, we gained a deeper understanding of their interplay, which, paradoxically, led us to learn what was certain and inevitable and what was not.” In other words, a careful investigation of raw uncertainties helps people figure out more “critical uncertainties” by showing that “what may appear in some cases to be uncertain might actually be predetermined – that many outcomes were simply not possible.”18 Exploring future uncertainties thoroughly is one of the most important factors in scenario analysis. Kees van der Heijden argues that in the process of separating “knowns” from “unknowns” analysts could clarify driving forces because the process of separation between “predetermineds” and uncertainties demands a fair amount of knowledge of causal relationships surrounding the issue at stake.19 Thus, in scenario analysis a thorough understanding of critical uncertainties leads to a well-established knowledge of driving forces and causal relations.20 Robert Lempert succinctly summarized the scenario-construction process as follows: “scenario practice begins with the challenge facing the decisionmakers, ranks the most significant driving forces according to their level of uncertainty and their impact on trends seemingly relevant to that decision, and then creates a handful of scenarios that explore different manifestations of those driving forces.”21

#### Scenario planning sovles predictive failure

Han, 10 [ Dong-ho Han, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, , “Scenario Construction and Implications for IR Research: Connecting Theory to a Real World of Policy Making,” http://www.allacademic.com/one/isa/isa10/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished\_manuscript&file\_index=1&pop\_up=true&no\_click\_key=true&attachment\_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=3e890fb59257a0ca9bad2e2327d8a24f]

In addition to providing the eclectic foundation for using multiple theoretical lenses in the field, the building of scenarios in analyzing world events could solve the difficulty of the matter of prediction in social science research. Predicting the future is not an easy task. In the field of IR, researchers making predictions tend to focus on their parsimonious assumptions and arguments drawn from a specific school of thought in which they are engaged. They present the rigor of their theoretical explanations by refuting other theoretical perspectives and make a prediction based on the victory of their theories over other approaches. The problem, however, is that making a prediction based on established theories and approaches can easily be disrupted as unexpected contingencies like wild cards occur.83 In other words, in a real world of politics too many uncertain factors are engaged and thus politics can be understood as a non-linear process toward unpredictable outcomes.84 There are many real cases of the difficulty of prediction in social science. The failure to predict the end of the Cold War is one of them.85 During the Cold War era, many scholars explored the causes of U.S.-Soviet confrontation and predicted that the Cold War would last quite a long time.86 Other scholars’ arguments for a quicker end to the Cold War were simply dismissed along with such upcoming events as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991.¶ Despite the difficulty of prediction in world politics some factors are relatively clear and easy to figure out, regardless of one’s theoretical background. For instance, it is hard to deny that U.S. power and influence is one of the critical factors in understanding the present world. In this sense, Robert Jervis is right when he argues that “Since the United States is the most influential power in the world, to predict the future of world politics requires us to predict the future of American foreign policy.”87 When it comes to the study of a specific region in world politics, though, things are more complicated. While understanding important variables such as U.S. foreign policy helps us to analyze more accurately the future course of international politics in general, in order to predict the future dynamics of regional politics in particular something more is needed.88 Given the complexity of regional issues making a prediction is still not an easy task.¶ Given this backdrop some scholars argue that prediction in the social sciences could be possible if we had some critical information regarding specific issues.89 Among others, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita makes his case for the possibility of prediction, arguing that if we know some information concerning identified policy makers with some stakes, their policy preferences (i.e. what they say they want), how salient the issue at stake is among these actors, and how influential these policy makers are in terms of changing and shaping the outcomes, then we can predict upcoming policy decisions and thus overall political outcomes based upon these “influential” policy makers’ strategic interactions with one another.90 Bueno de Mesquita’s prediction comes from the logic of how decision makers make various policy decisions in a game-theoretic term, with the support of a computer-based simulate model. In other words, by using mathematical techniques such as computer simulation models in predicting the future Bueno de Mesquita’s argument is mostly dependent on rational choice theory which assumes “self-interested” people and dictates their “strategic interactions.”91¶ Even if Bueno de Mesquita’s efforts could partially work and tend to be successful in predicting some emerging properties, it cannot be denied that various predictive efforts are limited and – for the most part – even impossible when dealing with surprising events and unexpected contingencies.92 Moreover, these predictions may sometimes be just estimates which are hard to project for the long term.93 The scenario method seems to be a good fit particularly in this regard; that is, in order to cope effectively with upcoming surprises and uncertainties it is essential to rehearse as many future possibilities as one can and scenario thinking facilitates this reasoning process. Despite sharing some similarities with other predicting tools such as a computer simulation model, the scenario method is fundamentally different from these methods. As one advocate for scenario analysis points out, scenarios are “more than just the output of a complex simulation model. Instead they attempt to interpret such output by identifying patterns and clusters of the millions of possible outcomes a computer simulation might generate…Hence, scenarios go beyond objective analyses to include subjective interpretations.”94

#### Environmental reps good

Kurasawa 4– Prof Sociology, York (Fuyuki, Cautionary Tales, Constellations 11.4, AG)

And yet dystopianism need not imply despondency, paralysis, or fear. Quite the opposite, in fact, since the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain traction against their determinist and absolutist counterparts. Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any course of action produces both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene before they strike becomes compelling. From another angle, dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their own nightmare scenarios (‘Frankenfoods’ and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale for Western feminism, McWorld and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action, spurring citizens’ involvement in the work of preventive foresight.

#### They’re wrong—its key to effective movements

Dabelko 97 – director, Environmental Change and Security Project (Geoffrey, Environment and Security, SAIS Review 17.1, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais\_review/v017/17.1dabelko.html)

Undoubtedly, environment and security research, rhetoric, and activities--and the sobering statistics and trenchant analyses of environment and population dynamics that accompany them--have significantly raised the profile of many environmental concerns. They have also generated many useful discussions and new ways of thinking among a diverse set of experts, including those who previously considered the environment peripheral or unimportant to their interests. At the same time, there are serious limitations to the environment and security conceptual and linguistic framework. As convincing as certain security-related arguments may be, they are not the only reasons why the American public, decisionmakers, and other nations should care about the environment. Value-oriented considerations about the aesthetics of nature, human responsibility for global stewardship, and humanitarian concerns are also important. These considerations [End Page 141] can greatly enhance the process of **formulating effective solutions and winning sustained public attention** **and support for** international **environmental action**. Policymakers might therefore be best served by framing international environmental priorities in terms of a broad set of interests, including, but not limited to, security concerns. They should resist the temptation, common in security analyses, to examine environmental problems solely in terms of crises and "threats." Though helpful in setting priorities, threat-based analyses can have the unintentional effect of encouraging decisionmakers to pay attention to issues only when crises are imminent, by which time it is often too late for effective interventions and corrective measures. Examining how environmental preservation will enhance security and other interests over time might lead decisionmakers to adopt more appropriate long-term strategies to address the underlying causes of problems. International environmental issues will be most effectively addressed in the decades to come through a combination of conceptual clarity, a pragmatic and multidisciplinary approach to problem solving, an emphasis on long-term strategies, and an improved willingness and ability among leaders to explain the complexity of environmental change. As the debates on environment and security continue, environmentalists' arguments will be strengthened if they resist the temptation to place all their priorities under the attention-grabbing security rubric. Meanwhile, skeptical foreign policy experts will benefit from recognizing the real and potential effects of environmental change and their relevance to many critical interests. As the United States considers security expenditures and priorities for the twenty-first century, the vibrant debates concerning environment and security matters will continue to be instructive.

#### **Complexity theory is wrong - linear solutions empirically are effective - the alternative dooms the world**

Kurasawa 4 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

Moreover, keeping in mind the sobering lessons of the past century cannot but make us wary about humankind’s supposedly unlimited ability for problemsolving or discovering solutions in time to avert calamities. In fact, the historical track-record of last-minute, technical ‘quick-fixes’ is hardly reassuring. What’s more, most of the serious perils that we face today (e.g., nuclear waste, climate change, global terrorism, genocide and civil war) demand complex, sustained, long-term strategies of planning, coordination, and execution. On the other hand, an examination of fatalism makes it readily apparent that the idea that humankind is doomed from the outset puts off any attempt to minimize risks for our successors, essentially condemning them to face cataclysms unprepared. An a priori pessimism is also unsustainable given the fact that long-term preventive action has had (and will continue to have) appreciable beneficial effects; the examples of medical research, the welfare state, international humanitarian law, as well as strict environmental regulations in some countries stand out among many others. The evaluative framework proposed above should not be restricted to the critique of misappropriations of farsightedness, since it can equally support public deliberation with a reconstructive intent, that is, democratic discussion and debate about a future that human beings would freely self-determine. Inverting Foucault’s Nietzschean metaphor, we can think of genealogies of the future that could perform a farsighted mapping out of the possible ways of organizing social life. They are, in other words, interventions into the present intended to facilitate global civil society’s participation in shaping the field of possibilities of what is to come. Once competing dystopian visions are filtered out on the basis of their analytical credibility, ethical commitments, and political underpinnings and consequences, groups and individuals can assess the remaining legitimate catastrophic scenarios through the lens of genealogical mappings of the future. Hence, our first duty consists in addressing the present-day causes of eventual perils, ensuring that the paths we decide upon do not contract the range of options available for our posterity.42 Just as importantly, the practice of genealogically inspired farsightedness nurtures the project of an autonomous future, one that is socially self-instituting. In so doing, we can acknowledge that the future is a human creation instead of the product of metaphysical and extra-social forces (god, nature, destiny, etc.), and begin to reflect upon and deliberate about the kind of legacy we want to leave for those who will follow us. Participants in global civil society can then take – and in many instances have already taken – a further step by committing themselves to socio-political struggles forging a world order that, aside from not jeopardizing human and environmental survival, is designed to rectify the sources of transnational injustice that will continue to inflict needless suffering upon future generations if left unchallenged.

#### Even if predictions aren’t perfect acting on relative confidence of scenarios materializing is good---the alt is etiher political paralysis or pure reaction

**Ulfelder 11** Jay Ulfelder is Research Director for the Political Instability Task Force, Science Applications International Corporation "Why Political Instability Forecasts Are Less Precise Than We’d Like (and Why It’s Still Worth Doing)" May 5 dartthrowingchimp.wordpress.com/2011/05/05/why-political-instability-forecasts-are-less-precise-than-wed-like-and-why-its-still-worth-doing/

If this is the best we can do, then what’s the point? Well, consider the alternatives. For starters, we might decide to skip statistical forecasting altogether and just target our interventions at cases identified by expert judgment as likely onsets. Unfortunately, those expert judgments are probably going to be an even less reliable guide than our statistical forecasts, so this “solution” only exacerbates our problem.

Alternatively, we could take no preventive action and just respond to events as they occur. If the net costs of responding to crises as they happen are roughly equivalent to the net costs of prevention, then this is a reasonable choice. Maybe responding to crises isn’t really all that costly; maybe preventive action isn’t effective; or maybe preventive action is potentially effective but also extremely expensive. Under these circumstances, early warning is not going to be as useful as we forecasters would like.

If, however, any of those last statements are false–if responding to crises already underway is very costly, or if preventive action is (relatively) cheap and sometimes effective–then we have an incentive to use forecasts to help guide that action, in spite of the lingering uncertainty about exactly where and when those crises will occur.

Even in situations where preventive action isn’t feasible or desirable, reasonably accurate forecasts can still be useful if they spur interested observers to plan for contingencies they otherwise might not have considered. For example, policy-makers in one country might be rooting for a dictatorship in another country to fall but still fail to plan for that event because they don’t expect it to happen any time soon. A forecasting model which identifies that dictatorship as being at high or increasing risk of collapse might encourage those policy-makers to reconsider their expectations and, in so doing, lead them to prepare better for that event.

Where does that leave us? For me, the bottom line is this: even though forecasts of political instability are never going to be as precise as we’d like, they can still be accurate enough to be helpful, as long as the events they predict are ones for which prevention or preparation stand a decent chance of making a (positive) difference.

#### Predictions and scenario building are valuable for decision-making, even if they’re not perfect

**Garrett 12** [Banning, In Search of Sand Piles and Butterflies, director of the Asia Program and Strategic Foresight Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

http://www.acus.org/disruptive\_change/search-sand-piles-and-butterflies]

“Disruptive change” that produces “strategic shocks” has become an increasing concern for policymakers, shaken by momentous events of the last couple of decades that were not on their radar screens – from the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 9/11 terrorist attacks to the 2008 financial crisis and the “Arab Spring.” These were all shocks to the international system, predictable perhaps in retrospect but predicted by very few experts or officials on the eve of their occurrence. This “failure” to predict specific strategic shocks does not mean we should abandon efforts to foresee disruptive change or look at all possible shocks as equally plausible. Most strategic shocks do not “come out of the blue.” We can understand and project long-term global trends and foresee at least some of their potential effects, including potential shocks and disruptive change. We can construct alternative futures scenarios to envision potential change, including strategic shocks. Based on trends and scenarios, we can take actions to avert possible undesirable outcomes or limit the damage should they occur. We can also identify potential opportunities or at least more desirable futures that we seek to seize through policy course corrections. We should distinguish “strategic shocks” that are developments that could happen at any time and yet may never occur. This would include such plausible possibilities as use of a nuclear device by terrorists or the emergence of an airborne human-to-human virus that could kill millions. Such possible but not inevitable developments would not necessarily be the result of worsening long-term trends. Like possible terrorist attacks, governments need to try to prepare for such possible catastrophes though they may never happen. But there are other potential disruptive changes, including those that create strategic shocks to the international system, that can result from identifiable trends that make them more likely in the future—for example, growing demand for food, water, energy and other resources with supplies failing to keep pace. We need to look for the “sand piles” that the trends are building and are subject to collapse at some point with an additional but indeterminable additional “grain of sand” and identify the potential for the sudden appearance of “butterflies” that might flap their wings and set off hurricanes. Mohamed Bouazizi, who immolated himself December 17, 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, was the butterfly who flapped his wings and (with the “force multiplier” of social media) set off a hurricane that is still blowing throughout the Middle East. Perhaps the metaphors are mixed, but the butterfly’s delicate flapping destabilized the sand piles (of rising food prices, unemployed students, corrupt government, etc.) that had been building in Tunisia, Egypt, and much of the region. The result was a sudden collapse and disruptive change that has created a strategic shock that is still producing tremors throughout the region. But the collapse was due to cumulative effects of identifiable and converging trends. When and what form change will take may be difficult if not impossible to foresee, but the likelihood of a tipping point being reached—that linear continuation of the present into the future is increasingly unlikely—can be foreseen. Foreseeing the direction of change and the likelihood of discontinuities, both sudden and protracted, is thus not beyond our capabilities. While efforts to understand and project long-term global trends cannot provide accurate predictions, for example, of the GDPs of China, India, and the United States in 2030, looking at economic and GDP growth trends, can provide insights into a wide range of possible outcomes. For example, it is a useful to assess the implications if the GDPs of these three countries each grew at currently projected average rates – even if one understands that there are many factors that can and likely will alter their trajectories. The projected growth trends of the three countries suggest that at some point in the next few decades, perhaps between 2015 and 2030, China’s GDP will surpass that of the United States. And by adding consideration of the economic impact of demographic trends (China’s aging and India’s youth bulge), there is a possibility that India will surpass both China and the US, perhaps by 2040 or 2050, to become the world’s largest economy. These potential shifts of economic power from the United States to China then to India would likely prove strategically disruptive on a global scale. Although slowly developing, such disruptive change would likely have an even greater strategic impact than the Arab Spring. The “rise” of China has already proved strategically disruptive, creating a potential China-United States regional rivalry in Asia two decades after Americans fretted about an emerging US conflict with a then-rising Japan challenging American economic supremacy. Despite uncertainty surrounding projections, foreseeing the possibility (some would say high likelihood) that China and then India will replace the United States as the largest global economy has near-term policy implications for the US and Europe. The potential long-term shift in economic clout and concomitant shift in political power and strategic position away from the US and the West and toward the East has implications for near-term policy choices. Policymakers could conclude, for example, that the West should make greater efforts to bring the emerging (or re-emerging) great powers into close consultation on the “rules of the game” and global governance as the West’s influence in shaping institutions and behavior is likely to significantly diminish over the next few decades. The alternative to finding such a near-term accommodation could be increasing mutual suspicions and hostility rather than trust and growing cooperation between rising and established powers—especially between China and the United States—leading to a fragmented, zero-sum world in which major global challenges like climate change and resource scarcities are not addressed and conflict over dwindling resources and markets intensifies and even bleeds into the military realm among the major actors. Neither of these scenarios may play out, of course. Other global trends suggest that sometime in the next several decades, the world could encounter a “hard ceiling” on resources availability and that climate change could throw the global economy into a tailspin, harming China and India even more than the United States. In this case, perhaps India and China would falter economically leading to internal instability and crises of governance, significantly reducing their rates of economic growth and their ability to project power and play a significant international role than might otherwise have been expected. But this scenario has other implications for policymakers, including dangers posed to Western interests from “failure” of China and/or India, which could produce huge strategic shocks to the global system, including a prolonged economic downturn in the West as well as the East. Thus, looking at relatively slowly developing trends can provide foresight for necessary course corrections now to avert catastrophic disruptive change or prepare to be more resilient if foreseeable but unavoidable shocks occur. Policymakers and the public will press for predictions and criticize government officials and intelligence agencies when momentous events “catch us by surprise.” But unfortunately, as both Yogi Berra and Neils Bohr are credited with saying, “prediction is very hard, especially about the future.” One can predict with great accuracy many natural events such as sunrise and the boiling point of water at sea level. We can rely on the infallible predictability of the laws of physics to build airplanes and automobiles and iPhones. And we can calculate with great precision the destruction footprint of a given nuclear weapon. Yet even physical systems like the weather as they become more complex, become increasingly difficult and even inherently impossible to predict with precision. With human behavior, specific predictions are not just hard, but impossible as uncertainty is inherent in the human universe. As futurist Paul Saffo wrote in the Harvard Business Review in 2007, “prediction is possible only in a world in which events are preordained and no amount of actions in the present can influence the future outcome.” One cannot know for certain what actions he or she will take in the future much less the actions of another person, a group of people or a nation state. This obvious point is made to dismiss any idea of trying to “predict” what will occur in the future with accuracy, especially the outcomes of the interplay of many complex factors, including the interaction of human and natural systems. More broadly, the human future is not predetermined but rather depends on human choices at every turning point, cumulatively leading to different alternative outcomes. This uncertainty about the future also means the future is amenable to human choice and leadership. Trends analyses—including foreseeing trends leading to disruptive change—are thus essential to provide individuals, organizations and political leaders with the strategic foresight to take steps mitigate the dangers ahead and seize the opportunities for shaping the human destiny. Peter Schwartz nearly a decade ago characterized the convergence of trends and disruptive change as “inevitable surprises.” He wrote in Inevitable Surprises that “in the coming decades we face many more inevitable surprises: major discontinuities in the economic, political and social spheres of our world, each one changing the ‘rules of the game’ as its played today. If anything, there will be more, no fewer, surprises in the future, and they will all be interconnected. Together, they will lead us into a world, ten to fifteen years hence, that is fundamentally different from the one we know today. Understanding these inevitable surprises in our future is critical for the decisions we have to make today …. We may not be able to prevent catastrophe (although sometimes we can), but we can certainly increase our ability to respond, and our ability to see opportunities that we would otherwise miss.

#### Despite uncertainty, predictions are still necessary and accurate

**Cowen 4** – Economics, George Mason (Tyler, The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute Consequentialism, http://www.gmu.edu/jbc/Tyler/Epistemic2.pdf, AG)

If we know for sure which remedy works, obviously we should apply that remedy. But imagine now that we are uncertain as to which remedy works. The uncertainty is so extreme that each remedy may cure somewhere between three hundred thousand and six hundred thousand children. Nonetheless we have a slight idea that one remedy is better than the other. That is, one remedy is slightly more likely to cure more children, with no other apparent offsetting negative effects or considerations. Despite the greater uncertainty, we still have the intuition that we should try to save as many children as possible. We should apply the remedy that is more likely to cure more children. We do not say: “We are now so uncertain about what will happen. We should pursue some goal other than trying to cure as many children as possible.” Nor would we cite greater uncertainty about longer-run events as an argument against curing the children. We have a definite good in the present (more cured children), balanced against a radical remixing of the future on both sides of the equation. The definite upfront good still stands firm. Alternatively, let us assume that our broader future suddenly became less predictable (perhaps genetic engineering is invented, which creates new and difficult-to-forecast possibilities). That still would not diminish the force of our reason for saving more children. The variance of forecast becomes larger on both sides of the equation – whether we save the children or not – and the value of the upfront lives remains. A higher variance of forecast might increase the required size of the upfront benefit (to overcome the Principle of Roughness), but it would not refute the relevance of consequences more generally. We could increase the uncertainty more, but consequentialism still will not appear counterintuitive. The remedies, rather than curing somewhere in the range of three to six hundred thousand children, might cure in the broader range of zero to all one million of the children. By all classical statistical standards, this new cure scenario involves more uncertainty than the previous case, such as by having a higher variance of possible outcomes. Yet this higher uncertainty lends little support for the view that curing the children becomes less important. We still have an imperative to apply the remedy that appears best, and is expected the cure the greater number of children. This example may appear excessively simple, but it points our attention to the non- generality of the epistemic critique. The critique appears strongest only when we have absolutely no idea about the future; this is a special rather than a general case. Simply boosting the degree of background generic uncertainty should not stop us from pursuing large upfront benefits of obvious importance.

#### Focusing on deliberation in the debate forum challenges elite hold to power, and maintains critical perspective

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(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and implement an alternative politics. The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a substantive policy discussion. Now, some activists turned to the parliamentary arena as a possible forum for an energy dialogue. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have an institutional lever with which to pry apart the bureaucracy and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list.

These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen move-ment. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affect-ing local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored indus-trial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political system as a whole, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the necessary change would require a degree of political restructuring that could only be accomplished through their direct participation in parliamentary politics. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to participate directly in politics themselves; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48

Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishmento f a temporary parliamentaryco mmissiont o studye nergyp olicy,w hichf or the first time would draw all concernedp articipantst ogetheri n a discussiono f both short-termc hoicesa nd long-termg oals of energyp olicy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49T hese commissionsg ave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernizationa nd technicali nnovation in energy policy.

Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurizationd evices. With proddingf rom the energyc ommission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and by producing a modernization plan itself, the combined citizen initiative and AL forced bureaucratic authorities to push the utility for improvements. They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection.

III. Conclusion

The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmen-tally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the objections against particular projects was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general.

One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simul-taneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protec-tion of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggra-vate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at *Systemkritik*.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitima-tion dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more prob-lematic.

Parliamentary Politics

In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to formulate an alternative politics, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry.

Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program.

This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. On the other hand, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The lively debate stimulated by grassroots groups and parties keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda.

Technical Debate

In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of the energy issue forced citizen activists to become both participants in and critics of the policy process. In order to defeat the plant, activists engaged in technical debate. They won several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often proving to be more informed than bureaucratic experts themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators.

The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria.

Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic.

In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56

In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the contribution of grassroots environmental groups has been significant. As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues has been tremendous.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 Policy concessions and new legal provisions for citizen participation have not quelled grassroots action. The attempts of the established political parties to coopt "green" issues have also met with limited success. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

### Nuclear Kritik

#### The 1ac’s approach to nuclear power is beneficial --- our 1ac accounts for the entire history of nuclear power

Nordhaus 11, chairman – Breakthrough Instiute, and Shellenberger, president – Breakthrough Insitute, MA cultural anthropology – University of California, Santa Cruz, 2/25/‘11

(Ted and Michael, <http://thebreakthrough.org/archive/the_long_death_of_environmenta>)

Tenth, we are going to have to get over our suspicion of technology, especially nuclear power. There is no credible path to reducing global carbon emissions without an enormous expansion of nuclear power. It is the only low carbon technology we have today with the demonstrated capability to generate large quantities of centrally generated electrtic power. It is the low carbon of technology of choice for much of the rest of the world. Even uber-green nations, like Germany and Sweden, have reversed plans to phase out nuclear power as they have begun to reconcile their energy needs with their climate commitments. Eleventh, we will need to embrace again the role of the state as a direct provider of public goods. The modern environmental movement, borne of the new left rejection of social authority of all sorts, has embraced the notion of state regulation and even creation of private markets while largely rejecting the generative role of the state. In the modern environmental imagination, government promotion of technology - whether nuclear power, the green revolution, synfuels, or ethanol - almost always ends badly. Never mind that virtually the entire history of American industrialization and technological innovation is the story of government investments in the development and commercialization of new technologies. Think of a transformative technology over the last century - computers, the Internet, pharmaceutical drugs, jet turbines, cellular telephones, nuclear power - and what you will find is government investing in those technologies at a scale that private firms simply cannot replicate. Twelveth, big is beautiful. The rising economies of the developing world will continue to develop whether we want them to or not. The solution to the ecological crises wrought by modernity, technology, and progress will be more modernity, technology, and progress. The solutions to the ecological challenges faced by a planet of 6 billion going on 9 billion will not be decentralized energy technologies like solar panels, small scale organic agriculture, and a drawing of unenforceable boundaries around what remains of our ecological inheritance, be it the rainforests of the Amazon or the chemical composition of the atmosphere. Rather, these solutions will be: large central station power technologies that can meet the energy needs of billions of people increasingly living in the dense mega-cities of the global south without emitting carbon dioxide, further intensification of industrial scale agriculture to meet the nutritional needs of a population that is not only growing but eating higher up the food chain, and a whole suite of new agricultural, desalinization and other technologies for gardening planet Earth that might allow us not only to pull back from forests and other threatened ecosystems but also to create new ones. The New Ecological Politics The great ecological challenges that our generation faces demands an ecological politics that is generative, not restrictive. An ecological politics capable of addressing global warming will require us to reexamine virtually every prominent strand of post-war green ideology. From Paul Erlich's warnings of a population bomb to The Club of Rome's "Limits to Growth," contemporary ecological politics have consistently embraced green Malthusianism despite the fact that the Malthusian premise has persistently failed for the better part of three centuries. Indeed, the green revolution was exponentially increasing agricultural yields at the very moment that Erlich was predicting mass starvation and the serial predictions of peak oil and various others resource collapses that have followed have continue to fail. This does not mean that Malthusian outcomes are impossible, but neither are they inevitable. We do have a choice in the matter, but it is not the choice that greens have long imagined. The choice that humanity faces is not whether to constrain our growth, development, and aspirations or die. It is whether we will continue to innovate and accelerate technological progress in order to thrive. Human technology and ingenuity have repeatedly confounded Malthusian predictions yet green ideology continues to cast a suspect eye towards the very technologies that have allowed us to avoid resource and ecological catastrophes. But such solutions will require environmentalists to abandon the "small is beautiful" ethic that has also characterized environmental thought since the 1960's. We, the most secure, affluent, and thoroughly modern human beings to have ever lived upon the planet, must abandon both the dark, zero-sum Malthusian visions and the idealized and nostalgic fantasies for a simpler, more bucolic past in which humans lived in harmony with Nature.

#### Engagement with technocracy is more effective than passive rejection

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(Maria-Pilar and Cristina, “Knowledge producers or knowledge consumers? Argumentation and decision making about environmental management,” International Journal of Science Education Vol. 24, No. 11, p. 1171–1190)

If science education and environmental education have as a goal to develop **critical thinking and** to promote **decision making**, it seems that the acknowledgement of a variety of experts and expertise is of relevance to both. **Otherwise citizens could be unable to challenge a common view** that places economical issues and technical features over other types of values or concerns. As McGinn and Roth (1999) argue, citizens should be prepared to participate in scientific practice, to be involved in situations where science is, if not created, at least used. The assessment of environmental management is, in our opinion, one of these, and citizens do not need to possess all the technical knowledge to be able to examine the positive and negative impacts and to weigh them up. The identification of instances of scientific practice in classroom discourse is difficult especially if this practice is viewed as a complex process, not as fixed ‘steps’. Several instances were identified when it could be said that students acted as a knowledge-producing community in spite of the fact that the students, particularly at the beginning of the sequence, expressed doubts about their capacities to assess a project written by experts and endorsed by a government office. Perhaps these doubts relate to the nature of the project, a ‘real life’ object that made its way into the classroom, into the ‘school life’. As Brown et al. (1989) point out, there is usually a difference between practitioners’ tasks and stereotyped school tasks and, it could be added, students are not used to being confronted with the complexity of ‘life-size’ problems. However, as the sequence proceeded, **the students assumed the role of experts**, exposing inconsistencies in the project, offering alternatives and discussing it with one of its authors. The issue of expertise is worthy of attention and it needs to be explored in different contexts where the relationships among technical expertise, values hierarchies and possible biases caused by the subject matter could be unravelled. One of the objectives of environmental education is to **empower people with the capacity of decision making**; for this purpose the acknowledging of multiple expertise is crucial.

#### Nuke war outweighs structural violence – prioritizing structural violence makes preventing war impossible

Boulding 78 [Ken, is professor of economics and director, Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan, “Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1978), pp. 342-354]

Galtung is very legitimately interested in problems of world poverty and the failure of development of the really poor. He tried to amalga- mate this interest with the peace research interest in the more narrow sense. Unfortunately, he did this by downgrading the study of inter- national peace, labeling it "negative peace" (it should really have been labeled "negative war") and then developing the concept of "structural violence," which initially meant all those social structures and histories which produced an expectation of life less than that of the richest and longest-lived societies. He argued by analogy that if people died before the age, say, of 70 from avoidable causes, that this was a death in "war"' which could only be remedied by something called "positive peace." Unfortunately, the concept of structural violence was broadened, in the word of one slightly unfriendly critic, to include anything that Galtung did not like. Another factor in this situation was the feeling, certainly in the 1960s and early 1970s, that nuclear deterrence was actually succeeding as deterrence and that the problem of nuclear war had receded into the background. This it seems to me is a most dangerous illusion and diverted conflict and peace research for ten years or more away from problems of disarmament and stable peace toward a grand, vague study of world developments, for which most of the peace researchers are not particularly well qualified. To my mind, at least, the quality of the research has suffered severely as a result.' The complex nature of the split within the peace research community is reflected in two international peace research organizations. The official one, the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), tends to be dominated by Europeans somewhat to the political left, is rather, hostile to the United States and to the multinational cor- porations, sympathetic to the New International Economic Order and thinks of itself as being interested in justice rather than in peace. The Peace Science Society (International), which used to be called the Peace Research Society (International), is mainly the creation of Walter Isard of the University of Pennsylvania. It conducts meetings all around the world and represents a more peace-oriented, quantitative, science- based enterprise, without much interest in ideology. COPRED, while officially the North American representative of IPRA, has very little active connection with it and contains within itself the same ideological split which, divides the peace research community in general. It has, however, been able to hold together and at least promote a certain amount of interaction between the two points of view. Again representing the "scientific" rather than the "ideological" point of view, we have SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, very generously (by the usual peace research stand- ards) financed by the Swedish government, which has performed an enormously useful service in the collection and publishing of data on such things as the war industry, technological developments, arma- ments, and the arms trade. The Institute is very largely the creation of Alva Myrdal. In spite of the remarkable work which it has done, how- ever, her last book on disarmament (1976) is almost a cry of despair over the folly and hypocrisy of international policies, the overwhelming power of the military, and the inability of mere information, however good, go change the course of events as we head toward ultimate ca- tastrophe. I do not wholly share her pessimism, but it is hard not to be a little disappointed with the results of this first generation of the peace research movement. Myrdal called attention very dramatically to the appalling danger in which Europe stands, as the major battleground between Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union if war ever should break out. It may perhaps be a subconscious recognition-and psychological denial-of the sword of Damocles hanging over Europe that has made the European peace research movement retreat from the realities of the international system into what I must unkindly describe as fantasies of justice. But the American peace research community, likewise, has retreated into a somewhat niggling scientism, with sophisticated meth- odologies and not very many new ideas. I must confess that when I first became involved with the peace research enterprise 25 years ago I had hopes that it might produce some- thing like the Keynesian revolution in economics, which was the result of some rather simple ideas that had never really been thought out clearly before (though they had been anticipated by Malthus and others), coupled with a substantial improvement in the information system with the development of national income statistics which rein- forced this new theoretical framework. As a result, we have had in a single generation a very massive change in what might be called the "conventional wisdom" of economic policy, and even though this conventional wisdom is not wholly wise, there is a world of difference between Herbert Hoover and his total failure to deal with the Great Depression, simply because of everybody's ignorance, and the moder- ately skillful handling of the depression which followed the change in oil prices in 1-974, which, compared with the period 1929 to 1932, was little more than a bad cold compared with a galloping pneumonia. In the international system, however, there has been only glacial change in the conventional wisdom. There has been some improvement. Kissinger was an improvement on John Foster Dulles. We have had the beginnings of detente, and at least the possibility on the horizon of stable peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, indeed in the whole temperate zone-even though the tropics still remain uneasy and beset with arms races, wars, and revolutions which we cannot really afford. Nor can we pretend that peace around the temper- ate zone is stable enough so that we do not have to worry about it. The qualitative arms race goes on and could easily take us over the cliff. The record of peace research in the last generation, therefore, is one of very partial success. It has created a discipline and that is something of long-run consequence, most certainly for the good. It has made very little dent on the conventional wisdom of the policy makers anywhere in the world. It has not been able to prevent an arms race, any more, I suppose we might say, than the Keynesian economics has been able to prevent inflation. But whereas inflation is an inconvenience, the arms race may well be another catastrophe. Where, then, do we go from here? Can we see new horizons for peace and conflict research to get it out of the doldrums in which it has been now for almost ten years? The challenge is surely great enough. It still remains true that war, the breakdown of Galtung's "negative peace," remains the greatest clear and present danger to the human race, a danger to human survival far greater than poverty, or injustice, or oppression, desirable and necessary as it is to eliminate these things. Up to the present generation, war has been a cost and an inconven- ience to the human race, but it has rarely been fatal to the process of evolutionary development as a whole. It has probably not absorbed more than 5% of human time, effort, and resources. Even in the twenti- eth century, with its two world wars and innumerable smaller ones, it has probably not acounted for more than 5% of deaths, though of course a larger proportion of premature deaths. Now, however, advancing technology is creating a situation where in the first place we are developing a single world system that does not have the redundancy of the many isolated systems of the past and in which therefore if any- thing goes wrong everything goes wrong. The Mayan civilization could collapse in 900 A.D., and collapse almost irretrievably without Europe or China even being aware of the fact. When we had a number of iso- lated systems, the catastrophe in one was ultimately recoverable by migration from the surviving systems. The one-world system, therefore, which science, transportation, and communication are rapidly giving us, is inherently more precarious than the many-world system of the past. It is all the more important, therefore, to make it internally robust and capable only of recoverable catastrophes. The necessity for stable peace, therefore, increases with every improvement in technology, either of war or of peacex

#### Prefer util

Cummiskey 90 – Professor of Philosophy, Bates (David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor, AG)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

#### The squo is structurally improving

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Although global population is no longer growing exponentially, it has quadrupled since 1900. Concurrently, affluence (or GDP per capita) has sextupled, global economic product (a measure of aggregate consumption) has increased 23-fold and carbon dioxide has increased over 15-fold (Maddison 2003; GGDC 2008; World Bank 2008a; Marland et al. 2007).4 But contrary to Neo- Malthusian fears, average **human well-being,** measured by any objective indicator, **has never been higher**. Food supplies, Malthus’ original concern, are up worldwide. Global food supplies per capita increased from 2,254 Cals/day in 1961 to 2,810 in 2003 (FAOSTAT 2008). This helped reduce hunger and malnutrition worldwide. The proportion of the population in the developing world, suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37 percent to 17 percent between 1969–71 and 2001–2003 despite an 87 percent population increase (Goklany 2007a; FAO 2006). The reduction in hunger and malnutrition, along with improvements in basic hygiene, improved access to safer water and sanitation, broad adoption of vaccinations, antibiotics, pasteurization and other public health measures, helped reduce mortality and increase life expectancies. These improvements first became evident in today’s developed countries in the mid- to late-1800s and started to spread in earnest to developing countries from the 1950s. The infant mortality rate in developing countries was 180 per 1,000 live births in the early 1950s; today it is 57. Consequently, global life expectancy, perhaps the single most important measure of human well-being, increased from 31 years in 1900 to 47 years in the early 1950s to 67 years today (Goklany 2007a). Globally, average **annual per capita incomes tripled** since 1950. The proportion of the world’s population outside of high-income OECD countries living in absolute poverty (average consumption of less than $1 per day in 1985 International dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity), fell from 84 percent in 1820 to 40 percent in 1981 to 20 percent in 2007 (Goklany 2007a; WRI 2008; World Bank 2007). Equally important, the world is more literate and better educated. Child labor in low income countries declined from 30 to 18 percent between 1960 and 2003. In most countries, people are freer politically, economically and socially to pursue their goals as they see fit. More people choose their own rulers, and have freedom of expression. They are more likely to live under rule of law, and less likely to be arbitrarily deprived of life, limb and property. Social and professional mobility has never been greater. It is easier to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth in the lottery of life. People work fewer hours, and have more money and better health to enjoy their leisure time (Goklany 2007a). Figure 3 summarizes the U.S. experience over the 20th century with respect to growth of population, affluence, material, fossil fuel energy and chemical consumption, and life expectancy. It indicates that population has multiplied 3.7-fold; income, 6.9-fold; carbon dioxide emissions, 8.5-fold; material use, 26.5-fold; and organic chemical use, 101-fold. Yet its life expectancy increased from 47 years to 77 years and infant mortality (not shown) declined from over 100 per 1,000 live births to 7 per 1,000. It is also important to note that not only are people living longer, they are healthier. The disability rate for seniors declined 28 percent between 1982 and 2004/2005 and, despite better diagnostic tools, major diseases (e.g., cancer, and heart and respiratory diseases) occur 8–11 years later now than a century ago (Fogel 2003; Manton et al. 2006). If similar figures could be constructed for other countries, most would indicate qualitatively similar trends, especially after 1950, except Sub-Saharan Africa and the erstwhile members of the Soviet Union. In the latter two cases, life expectancy, which had increased following World War II, declined after the late 1980s to the early 2000s, possibly due poor economic performance compounded, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, by AIDS, resurgence of malaria, and tuberculosis due mainly to poor governance (breakdown of public health services) and other manmade causes (Goklany 2007a, pp.66–69, pp.178–181, and references therein). However, there are signs of a turnaround, perhaps related to increased economic growth since the early 2000s, although this could, of course, be a temporary blip (Goklany 2007a; World Bank 2008a). Notably, in most areas of the world, the healthadjusted life expectancy (HALE), that is, life expectancy adjusted downward for the severity and length of time spent by the average individual in a less-than-healthy condition, is greater now than the unadjusted life expectancy was 30 years ago. HALE for the China and India in 2002, for instance, were 64.1 and 53.5 years, which exceeded their unadjusted life expectancy of 63.2 and 50.7 years in 1970–1975 (WRI 2008). Figure 4, based on cross country data, indicates that contrary to Neo-Malthusian fears, both life expectancy and infant mortality improve with the level of affluence (economic development) and time, a surrogate for technological change (Goklany 2007a). Other indicators of human well-being that improve over time and as affluence rises are: access to safe water and sanitation (see below), literacy, level of education, food supplies per capita, and the prevalence of malnutrition (Goklany 2007a, 2007b).

#### No impact - Techno optimism isn’t responsible for violence --- this arg cuts both ways because if complexity and causality is inherently complex then they can’t attribute the harms of the 1ac to an external mono cause

#### Abandoning nature causes extinction

Soulé 95– Natural Resources Professor, California (Michael and Gary Lease, Reinventing Nature?, p 159-60, AG)

The decision has already been made in most places. Some of the ecological myths discussed here contain, either explicitly or implicitly, the idea that nature is self-regulating and capable of caring for itself. This notion leads to the theory of management known as benign neglect—nature will do fine, thank you, if human beings just leave it alone. Indeed, a century ago, a hands-off policy was the best policy. Now it is not. Given nature's current fragmented and stressed condition, neglect will result in an accelerating spiral of deterioration. Once people create large gaps in forests, isolate and disturb habitats, pollute, overexploit, and introduce species from other continents, the viability of many ecosystems and native species is compromised, resiliency dissipates, and diversity can collapse. When artificial disturbance reaches a certain threshold, even small changes can produce large effects, and these will be compounded by climate change.' For example, a storm that would be considered normal and beneficial may, following widespread clearcutting, cause disastrous blow-downs, landslides, and erosion. If global warming occurs, tropical storms are predicted to have greater force than now. Homeostasis, balance, and Gaia are dangerous models when applied at the wrong spatial and temporal scales. Even fifty years ago, neglect might have been the best medicine, but that was a world with a lot more big, unhumanized, connected spaces, a world with one-third the number of people, and a world largely unaffected by chain saws, bulldozers, pesticides, and exotic, weedy species. The alternative to neglect is active caring—in today's parlance, an affirmative approach to wildlands: to maintain and restore them, to become stewards, accepting all the domineering baggage that word carries. Until humans are able to control their numbers and their technologies, **management is the only viable alternative** to massive attrition of living nature.

#### The system’s sustainable

#### Kaletsky ’10

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The world did not end. Despite all the forebodings of disaster in the 2007– 09 financial crisis, the first decade of the twenty-first century passed rather uneventfully into the second. The riots, soup kitchens, and bankruptcies predicted by many of the world’s most respected economists did not materialize— and no one any longer expects the global capitalist system to collapse, whatever that emotive word might mean. Yet the capitalist system’s survival does not mean that the precrisis faith in the wisdom of financial markets and the efficiency of free enterprise will ever again be what it was before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. A return to decent economic growth and normal financial conditions is likely by the middle of 2010, but will this imply a return to business as usual for politicians, economists, and financiers? Although globalization will continue and many parts of the world will gradually regain their prosperity of the precrisis period, the traumatic effects of 2007– 09 will not be quickly forgotten. And the economic costs will linger for decades in the debts squeezing taxpayers and government budgets, the disrupted lives of the jobless, and the vanished dreams of homeowners and investors around the world. For what collapsed on September 15, 2008, was not just a bank or a financial system. What fell apart that day was an entire political philosophy and economic system, a way of thinking about and living in the world. The question now is what will replace the global capitalism that crumbled in the autumn of 2008. The central argument of this book is that global capitalism will be replaced by nothing other than global capitalism. The traumatic events of 2007– 09 will neither destroy nor diminish the fundamental human urgesthat have always powered the capitalist system— ambition, initiative, individualism, the competitive spirit. These natural human qualities will instead be redirected and reenergized to create a new version of capitalismthat will ultimately be even more successful and productive than the system it replaced. To explain this process of renewal, and identify some of the most important features of the reinvigorated capitalist system, is the ambition of this book. This transformation will take many years to complete, but some of its consequences can already be discerned. With the benefit of even a year’s hindsight, it is clear that these consequences will be different from the nihilistic predictions from both ends of the political spectrum at the height of the crisis. On the Left, anticapitalist ideologues seemed honestly to believe that a few weeks of financial chaos could bring about the disintegration of a politico-economic system that had survived two hundred years of revolutions, depressions, and world wars. On the Right, free-market zealots insisted that private enterprise would be destroyed by government interventions that were clearly necessary to save the system— and many continue to believe that the crisis could have been resolved much better if governments had simply allowed financial institutions to collapse. A balanced reassessment of the crisis must challenge both left-wing hysteria and right-wing hubris. Rather than blaming the meltdown of the global financial system on greedy bankers, incompetent regulators, gullible homeowners, or foolish Chinese bureaucrats, this book puts what happened into historical and ideological perspective. It reinterprets the crisis in the context of the economic reforms and geopolitical upheavals that have repeatedly transformed the nature of capitalism since the late eighteenth century, most recently in the Thatcher-Reagan revolution of 1979– 89. The central argument is that capitalism has never been a static system that follows a fixed set of rules, characterized by a permanent division of responsibilities between private enterprise and governments. Contrary to the teachings of modern economic theory, no immutable laws govern the behavior of a capitalist economy. Instead, capitalism is an adaptive social system that mutates and evolves in response to a changing environment. When capitalism is seriously threatened by a systemic crisis, a new version emerges that is better suited to the changing environment and replaces the previously dominant form. Once we recognize that capitalism is not a static set of institutions, but an evolutionary system that reinvents and reinvigorates itself through crises, we can see the events of 2007– 09 in another light: as the catalyst for the fourth systemic transformation of capitalism, comparable to the transformations triggered by the crises of the 1970s, the crises of the 1930s, and the Napoleonic Wars of 1803– 15. Hence the title of this book.

#### Sustainable technology development to solve climate change is the best common ground. Total critiques of development undermine political freedom and provide no path forward.

Chris SNEDDON Geography @ Dartmouth ET AL ‘6 “Sustainable development in a Post-Brundtland World” *Ecological Economics* 57 p. 259-263

Mainstream SD has proceeded apace since the advent of the Brundtland Report. While the risk of cooptation and abuse of SD, often entailing a watering down of its more radical prescriptions for enhancing sustainability, has been repeatedly noted (see Le´le´, 1991; Luke, 1995; Sneddon, 2000; Fernando, 2003), the concept is now firmly entrenched within many government offices, corporate boardrooms, and the hallways of international NGOs and financial institutions. At the very least, the staying power of SD can be explained by its propensity for providing some common ground for discussion among a range of developmental and environmental actors who are frequently at odds (Pezzoli, 1997). Its strongest boosters–for example, those in international environmental NGOs and intergovernmental agencies– thus feel fairly comfortable advancing a concept that is most effective in bringing former adversaries to the table even while accomplishing precious little in the way of concrete outcomes. Supporters of SD at these levels continue to advocate reform of existing institutions to better accommodate SD principles. Conversely, critics of the mainstream position advocate more radical societal changes, and have comprehensively and incisively deconstructed SD’s [sustainable development’s] basic contradictions (e.g., Redclift, 1987; J. O’Connor, 1994) and its power-laden, problematic assumptions (e.g., Escobar, 1995). However, they have left little more than ashes in its place. We can agree with Escobar, that the bBrundtland Report, and much of the sustainable development discourse, is a tale that a disenchanted (modern) world tells itself about its sad condition (Escobar, 1996, pp. 53–54). At the same time, we argue as well for a resurrection of SD into a more conceptually potent and politically effective set of ideas and practices that comprise an empowering tale. We advocate a middle and pragmatic path, one that takes seriously calls for radical changes in our ideas and institutions dealing with sustainable development, while also holding out the possibility that genuine reform of current institutions may be possible. Partial reform may pre-empt necessary radical change, but it may also make it easier in the future7. Our first intervention is to declare a truce among the epistemological and methodological schisms that separate the defenders of sustainable development from critics of the concept. For its advocates–identified most closely with development practitioners situated in a variety of United Nations offices (e.g., Untied Nations Development Program), government agencies (e.g., ministries and departments of natural resources and environment), and corporate boardrooms (e.g., the Business Council for Sustainable Development)–sustainable development as laid out by the WCED (broadly) remains the most tenable principle of collective action for resolving the twin crises of environment and development. For many academics–particularly those associated with ecological economics and related fields (see Soderbaum, 2000; Daly and Farley, 2004)–sustainable development offers an attractive, perhaps the only, alternative to conventional growth-oriented development thinking. However, for some of its socio-cultural critics (e.g., Escobar, 1995; Sachs, 1999; Fernando, 2003), mainstream SD is a ruse, yet another attempt to discount the aspirations and needs of marginalized populations across the planet in the name of green development. Other critics, while broadly sympathetic towards its goals, point out SD’s fundamental lack of attention to the powerful political and economic structures of the international system that constrain and shape even the most well-intentioned policies (e.g., Redclift, 1987, 1997)8. For critics grounded in the ecological sciences (e.g., Frazier, 1997; Dawe and Ryan, 2003), SD is unforgivably anthropocentric and thus unable to dissolve the false barriers between the human sphere of economic and social activities and the ecological sphere that sustains these activities9. These divisions reflect more than simply different value positions and attendant political goals. Proponents of a mainstream version of SD tend to see knowledge production (epistemology) and research design (methodology) in very specific terms. At the risk of caricature, this position demonstrates tendencies towards individualism, economism and technological optimism in assessing how knowledge about the social world is brought into being (Faber et al., 2002; Robinson, 2004). SD advocates also place a great deal of faith in quantitative representations of complex human-environment relations, in part because of a desire to present generalizable knowledge to policy makers. Conversely, critics of SD are for the most part social constructivist in perspective, arguing that knowledge of the world always represents a series of mediations among human social relations and individual identities (see Robinson, 2004, pp. 379–380; Demeritt, 2002). Critics are also more apt to stress the historical contingency of development processes, and undertake qualitative studies grounded in a case study methodology. Perhaps most importantly, while advocates of a conventional SD continue to perceive the policy process as a genuine pathway towards reform, critics have largely given up on state-dominated institutions as a means of change. Despite these substantial differences in perspective, our intimation is that both advocates and critics would agree that a socially just and ecologically sustainable world, or even an approximation, would be a desirable end. 3.2. Embracing pluralism: ecological economics, political ecology and freedom-oriented development We argue that we can move beyond the ideological and epistemological straightjackets that deter more cohesive and politically effective interpretations of SD, in order to operationalize the aforementioned truce, by embracing pluralism. We argue that ecological economics, as an explicitly transdisciplinary enterprise, in tandem with political ecology, freedom oriented development, and deliberative democracy, offer important means for advancing our understandings of the local–global politics of sustainability. Recent discussions within ecological economics have highlighted the need for the field to expand its methodological and epistemological purview (Gale, 1998; Peterson, 2000; Nelson, 2001; Muradian and MartinezAlier, 2001; Martinez-Alier, 2002) to engage more directly with a wide variety of non-academic political actors (Meppem, 2000; Shi, 2004; Norgaard, 2004) and to confront its future direction as either a more specialized, if somewhat narrow normal science or a more integrative, creative bpost-normalQ science (Mu ller, 2003). Ecological economics has also introduced a series of innovative methodological approaches for interpreting and assessing sustainability. Some of these include calculations of intergenerational equity (Howarth, 1997, 2003; Padilla, 2002), differentiations of bweakQ versus bstrongQ sustainability (in essence debates over the substitutability of ecosystem-derived resources) (Norton and Toman, 1997; Neumayer, 2003), the valuation of ecosystem services (Costanza et al., 1997; Spash, 2000), broadening our interpretation of environmental bvaluesQ (Bukett, 2003) and the burgeoning work on sustainability indicators (e.g., Bell and Morse, 1999). Taken as a whole, ecological economics may be understood as an attempt to refine and implement the broad vision of SD advanced by Brundtland. It has done so, largely thus far, by providing a bridge between economics and ecology (see Norton and Toman, 1997). We contend that additional bridges need further development. For example, the role of power, from local to global scales, needs to be more consistently incorporated into ecological economics. The analysis of power relationships is a central concern of political ecology, particularly power as expressed through the discourse and practices of multiple actors (including households, nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], social movements, communities, capitalist enterprises, and state agents and institutional networks) who cooperate and come into conflict over specific development projects or other state-and market-mediated activities (Peluso and Watts, 2001, p. 25). Key contributors to political ecology including Joan Martinez-Alier (2002), Martin O’Connor (1994a,b), and Ramachandra Guha (Guha and Martinez-Alier, 1999; Guha, 2000) have provided leadership and intellectual fuel to ecological economics, yet the vast majority of articles in the journal Ecological Economics do not address the social and ecological implications of power relations. The field of political ecology has also attracted an array of anthropologists, geographers, environmental historians and associated social scientists united by efforts to clarify the ways in which resource degradation and conflicts are derived from particular political and economic processes (Emel and Peet, 1989). Political ecologists also stress the need to take seriously recent insights from ecological theory, particularly those associated with nonlinearity and complexity (Zimmerer, 1994), and undertake research that seeks to link a rigorous characterization of ecological transformation to the local, national and global processes (cultural, political– economic) that are driving such changes (see Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003). The result has been a series of case studies–mostly but not exclusively focused on third-world contexts (see McCarthy, 2001; Walker, 2003)–detailing the varying ways that environmental conflicts (over forests, water, fisheries, agroecosystems, biodiversity and other socioecological entities) are constituted through struggles over access to resources and the benefits accruing from resource exploitation (Peluso, 1992; Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Additionally, both ecological economics and political ecology have offered potent critiques of development theory and practice (see M. O’Connor, 1994a; Peet and Watts, 1996). At a general level, these are by now well-rehearsed. Indeed, anti-development narratives have progressed to the point where a fairly welldefined field–post-development studies–is emergent (see Rahnema and Bawtree, 1997). In spite of, and in some ways because of, the numerous and varied deconstructions of ddevelopmentT (see Ekins and Max-Neef, 1992; Crush, 1995; Sachs et al., 1998), we argue that the linkage of dsustainabilityT with the vilified concept of ddevelopmentT need not be the death-knell of sustainable development that many have taken it to be. Again, in the interests of reconstructing the conceptual landscape of sustainable development, we argue that some politically savvy and ethically defensible semblance of development is salvageable. And a useful place to start is found in the work of Amartya Sen (1999). Development as Freedom is an incisive and comprehensive analysis of the myriad ways in which economic and social debates about bdevelopmentQ have failed to struggle with fundamental issues regarding ethics, human rights and individual freedoms. These are issues that concerned the political economists of the 18th and 19th centuries. Recovering these concerns, Sen uses freedom as a lens to interrogate the traditional foci of development studies and practice such as poverty, food production, women’s role in development, market versus state institutions, welfare and culture. We contend that Sen’s approach peels back a great deal of the posturing, reification and instrumentalism found in the development literature. It does so by making the normative claim that development is ultimately about freedom (e.g., political rights and responsibilities, economic and social opportunities, transparency guarantees in social interactions), in contrast to a narrowly defined yet widely adopted identification of development with aggregate economic growth. If there is one noticeable gap in Sen’s analysis, it is a lack of concern with the environment and ecological changes. One of Sen’s most important contributions is the way he uses a freedom-based understanding of development to confront narrower versions focused solely on aggregate levels of economic growth. In a related work, Anand and Sen (2000; see also Brekke and Howarth, 2002) provide a trenchant critique of what they call the opulence-oriented approach to development10. As they put it, the bfundamental difficulty with the approach of wealth maximization and with the tradition of judging success by overall opulence of a society is a deep-seated failure to come to terms with the universalist unbiasedness needed for an adequate understanding of social justice and human developmentQ (Anand and Sen, 2000, p. 2031). In Sen we can begin to see a way to radically alter the general orientation of development, away from its obsession with an aggregate, ill-defined wealth towards a rigorously defined notion of freedom that builds on ideals of social justice and human dignity. Taken together, the three approaches sketched above offer a wide range of methodologies, normative positions, and ways of understanding human-environment relations from which to approach sustainable development discourses and practices in the postBrundtland era. Table 1 summarizes the contributions of these approaches to a pluralistic, transdisciplinary strategy for confronting sustainability11. We argue that such an approach can begin a conversation about critical aspects of sustainability that hitherto have been overlooked in the numerous debates about the subject. It is our sense that the normative underpinnings of sustainable development (e.g., ethical commitments across generations, development as enhanced freedoms) and the political programs that might follow have received some treatment in the context of SD debates, but have never been satisfactorily used together. It is our hope that the socio-theoretical and normative tools sketched above be used to (1) continue the ongoing interrogation of sustainable development as a policy discourse and development practice, and (2) reconstruct a normative vision of sustainable development that is simultaneously attuned to the danger of cooptation on the part of powerful actors hoping to give unsustainable activities a bsustainableQ veneer and the need for a sustainability politics that transcends calls for the overhaul of everything. In a postBrundtland world, decisions over environmental governance (e.g., the deployment of ecologically deleterious technologies, economic development pathways and human consumption patterns) are a function of both fragmenting and integrating forces occurring at multiple scales. Our vision of pluralistic sustainability research and praxis calls for recognition of the inherently political nature of the conflicts that arise from such forces, for example, over Third World states’ desire to construct massive hydroelectric schemes or industrialized countries’ relative inaction on climate change. Advocates of sustainable development might wrestle with these conflicts in any number of ways–by inserting oneself as facilitator, advocate or witness into discussions over specific projects, or by researching and calling for a decision-making process that incorporates multiple perspectives–but it is our sense that this is how we must proceed for any advancement of SD policies and politics.

### T

#### We meet – natural gas drilling is energy production

CMP No Date (Conservation Measures Partnership, “3 Energy Production & Mining,” *Threats & Actions Taxonomies*, http://www.conservationmeasures.org/initiatives/threats-actions-taxonomies/threats-taxonomy/3-energy-production-mining)

3 Energy Production & Mining

Definition: Threats from production of non-biological resources

Exposition: Various forms of water use (for example, dams for hydro power) could also be put in this class, but these threats seemed more related to other threats that involve alterations to hydrologic regimes. As a result, they should go in 7.2 Dams & Water Management/Use.

3.1 Oil & Gas Drilling

Definition: Exploring for, developing, and producing petroleum and other liquid hydrocarbons

Exposition: Oil and gas pipelines go into 4.2 Utility & Service Lines. Oil spills that occur at the drill site should be placed here; those that come from oil tankers or pipelines should go in 4. Transportation & Service Corridors or in 9.2 Industrial & Military Effluents, depending on your perspective.

Examples:

oil wells

deep sea natural gas drilling

3.2 Mining & Quarrying

Definition: Exploring for, developing, and producing minerals and rocks

Exposition: It is a judgment call whether deforestation caused by strip mining should be in this category or in 5.3 Logging & Wood Harvesting – it depends on whether the primary motivation for the deforestation is access to the trees or to the minerals. Sediment or toxic chemical runoff from mining should be placed in 9.2 Industrial & Military Effluents if it is the major threat from a mining operation.

Examples:

coal strip mines

alluvial gold panning

gold mines

rock quarries

sand/salt mines

coral mining

deep sea nodules

guano harvesting

dredging outside of shipping lanes

3.3 Renewable Energy

Definition: Exploring, developing, and producing renewable energy

Exposition: Hydropower should be put in 7.2 Dams & Water Management/Use.

Examples:

geothermal power production

solar farms

wind farms (including birds flying into windmills)

tidal farms

#### Counter-interpretation – Energy production is the extraction or capture of energy from natural sources

DOCC 8 (Australian Government’s Department of Climate Change, “National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Guidelines,” http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/~/media/publications/greenhouse-report/nger-reporting-guidelines.ashx)

Energy Production

‘Energy production’ is defined in r. 2.23:

Production of energy, in relation to a facility, means any one of the following:

a. the extraction or capture of energy from natural sources for **final consumption** by or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in operation of the facility; 11

b. the manufacture of energy by the conversion of energy from one form to another form for final consumption by

or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in the operation of the facility.

Energy consumption

‘Energy consumption’ is defined in r. 2.23:

Consumption of energy, in relation to a facility, means the use or disposal of energy from the operation of the

facility including own-use and losses in extraction, production and transmission.

#### Lease restrictions are on natural gas production

NaturalGas.org, no date (NaturalGas.org, “Natural Gas Supply,” http://www.naturalgas.org/business/analysis.asp)  
The production of natural gas in the United States is based on competitive market forces: inadequate supply at any one time leads to price increases, which signal to production companies the need to increase the supply of natural gas to the market. Supplying natural gas in the United States in order to meet this demand, however, is dependent on a number of factors. These factors may be broken down into two segments: general barriers to increasing supply, and those factors that affect the short term supply scenario. Short Term Supply Barriers In a perfect world, price signals would be recognized and acted upon immediately, and there would be little lag time between increased demand for natural gas, and an increase in supplies reaching the market. However, in reality, this lag time does exist. There are several barriers to immediate supply increases which affect the short term availability of natural gas supply. They include: Availability of Skilled Workers - The need to train and hire skilled workers results in lag times between times of increased demand and an increase in production. For example, from 1991 to 1999, a prolonged period of relatively low prices indicated adequate supplies of natural gas existed, and the exploration and production industry contracted in response. During this period, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics recorded a 26 percent average decrease in employment in the oil and gas extraction industry. Some of these workers left the industry altogether rather than remain unemployed. When production companies began to react to higher prices in late 1999, the need to find and train skilled workers contributed to a slower increase in activity than would have been the case if skilled workers were plentiful. To counter this problem, many production companies offer increasingly high wages, as well as scholarships and educational contributions to attract professionals to the industry. Availability of Equipment - Drilling rigs are very expensive pieces of equipment. Price volatility in the industry makes it very difficult for producers, as well as production equipment suppliers, to plan the construction and placement of drilling rigs far in advance. Prolonged periods of low prices results in reduction of the number of available rigs. When prices respond to increase demand, and drilling activity increases, time is required to build and place an adequate number of drilling rigs. For this reason, drilling rig counts are a good indication of the status of the oil and natural gas production industry. As can be seen in the graph, an increase in operational rigs lags behind period of high prices. For more information on rig counts, click here. Permitting and Well Development - Before a natural gas well actually begins producing, there are several time consuming procedures and development activities that must take place. In order to begin drilling, exploration activities must take place to pinpoint the location of natural gas reserves. Once a suitable field has been located, production companies must receive the required approval from the landowner (which in many cases is the government) to install drilling equipment and begin to drill the well. The Bureau of Land Management is responsible for issuing permits for onshore development, and the Minerals Management Service is responsible for offshore development areas. Once drilling is completed, extraction and field processing equipment must be set up, as well as gathering systems. In all, the between the location of natural gas deposits and the beginning of production can range from as little as a few months to as much as ten years. Weather and Delivery Disruptions - Although unrelated to natural gas prices or demand increases and decreases, weather patterns and anomalies can have a significant impact on natural gas production. For example, hurricanes can have an impact on the offshore production of natural gas, as safety measures require the temporary shut down of offshore drilling and production platforms. In addition, while the safety record of the natural gas industry is extremely good, malfunctions and accidents may occur from time to time that disrupt the delivery of natural gas. For example, a compressor malfunction in a large pipeline serving a major hub could temporarily disrupt the flow of natural gas through that important market center. While the effects of weather and delivery disruptions are most often of short duration, they can still have an effect on the expeditious production of natural gas. General Barriers to Increasing Supply In addition to the short term impediments to increasing natural gas supply, there exist other more general barriers to the increased supply of natural gas in the United States. These include: Land Access - The U.S. government owns more than 29 percent of all the land in the country, and an estimated 40 percent of undiscovered natural gas exists on this land. In several areas, the government has restricted access to federal lands. 59 percent of undiscovered gas resources are on federal lands and offshore waters. Outside of the western Gulf of Mexico, production companies are prohibited access to virtually all federal lands offshore the Lower 48 states. About 9 percent of resource-bearing land in the Rockies is also off limits, and access to another 32 percent is significantly restricted. The National Petroleum Council in 1999 estimated that 213 Tcf of natural gas exists in areas under federal access restrictions. This restriction is the result of presidential and congressional leasing moratoria, and affects the amount of natural gas resources that may be extracted to increase supply. Pipeline Infrastructure - The ability to transport natural gas from producing regions to consumption regions also affects the availability of supplies to the marketplace. The interstate and intrastate pipeline infrastructure can only transport so much natural gas at any one time, and in essence provides a 'ceiling' for the amount of natural gas that can reach the market. Although the current pipeline infrastructure is significant, with the EIA estimating daily delivery capacity of the pipeline grid to be 119 Bcf. However, natural gas pipeline companies must continue to continually expand the pipeline infrastructure in order to meet growing demand. To learn more about the natural gas pipeline infrastructure in the United States, click here. The Financial Environment - Exploring for and producing natural gas is a very capital intensive endeavor. In fact, the National Petroleum Council estimated in 1999 that production companies will have to invest $1.44 trillion in capital between 1999 and 2015 in order to keep pace with demand growth. This puts significant pressures on production companies, particularly small, privately owned firms, to raise the capital necessary to increase production. While efficient and transparent financial markets in the U.S. do offer options for raising capital effectively, the rate at which production companies may do so can serve as a limiting factor in the increasing availability of supplies reaching the market.

### 2AC QER CP

Barlas, ‘12

[Stephen, Financial Executive Magazine, Jan/Feb, “Does the U.S. Really Need An Energy Policy?” http://wa-dcwriter.blogspot.com/2012/01/does-us-really-need-energy-policy.html]

But it is highly unlikely that Obama's Blueprint will lead to a firmer footing for U.S. energy security than past Blueprints from other presidents, or, perhaps more importantly, whether a Blueprint is even necessary. Obama's Blueprint policy is a loosely knit set of policies which focus on producing more oil at home and reducing dependence on foreign oil by developing cleaner alternative fuels and greater efficiency. The Blueprint is not the result of any particular deep thinking or strategy. The President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) called for the development of such a strategy in its November 2010 Report to the President on Accelerating the Pace of Change in Energy Technologies Through an Integrated Federal Energy Policy. The PCAST called for a Quadrennial Technology Review (QTR) as the first step in preparing a Quadrennial Energy Review. The DOE completed the QTR in November 2011, six months after Obama published his Blueprint. Steven E. Koonin, Under Secretary for Science, DOE, says the QTR is limited in scope and all the DOE felt it could get done given budget and time. "Technology development absent an understanding and shaping of policy and market context in which it gets deployed is not a productive exercise," he states. At this point there is no indication that the DOE will even undertake the much more important QER, much less complete it any time soon. The larger reality is that any energy independence plan proposed by any U.S. President--whether based on a QER or not--has as much a chance of coming to fruition as Washington's hapless Redskins have of getting into the Super Bowl. In any case, the rhetoric of President after President aside, maybe the U.S. doesn't even need an energy independence or energy security policy. The biggest energy input for industrial and commercial business users is natural gas. Natural gas prices are incredibly important, both because the fuel is used directly to run industrial processes, heat facilities and commercial buildings, and make products such as fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, plastics and other advanced materials. Thanks to the Shale Revolution, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) forecasts natural gas prices will stay low for the foreseeable future, rising to $4.66 m/BTU in 2015 and $5.05 m/BTU in 2020. That is good news for the owners of 15,000 to 17,000 industrial boilers in this country, most of which use natural gas (and many of those who still use coal are switching to natural gas). In addition, companies such as Dow Chemical are restarting operations at facilities idled during the recession, Bayer is in talks with companies interested in building new ethane crackers at its two industrial parks in West Virginia, and Chevron Phillips Chemical and LyondellBasell, are considering expanding operations in the U.S. Fracking has also had a much less remarked-upon effect on petroleum prices, which are important to businesses with transportation fleets. New oil sources are spurting from the Bakken and Eagles Ford shale plays. U.S. oil prices have fallen from $133.88 a barrel of Texas intermediate crude in June 2008 to $86.07 today. The EIA predicts oil prices will rise to $94.58/bbl in 2015 and $108.10/bbl in 2020. Beyond the flood of natural gas washing over them, U.S. companies are also benefitting from three decades of investments--most of which made without federal subsidies or support--into facility energy efficiency. Ralph Cavanagh, Co-Director, Energy Program, Natural Resources Defense Council, member of Electricity Advisory Board at the DOE, says the most important single solution for U.S. businesses worried about energy prices and energy access is aggressive energy efficiency. "Energy independence is the wrong issue," he says. "It is reducing the cost of energy services and improving energy security. "U.S. business has done a tremendous job in energy efficiency over the past three decades," he states. "It takes less than one-half of a unit of energy to create $1 of economic value than it did in 1973. Industry has done that by upgrading the efficiency of process equipment and upgrading lighting." Others may well argue that the U.S. needs, and has always needed, an energy policy, but one narrowly targeted. Kenneth B Medlock III, PhD, Deputy Director, Energy Forum, James A Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, notes that the DOE and the Gas Research Institute helped develop, with federal funding, the horizontal drilling (i.e. fracking) technology that Mitchell Energy (now a part of Devon Energy) pioneered. "Government ought to be focused on research & development," he states. He also is a supporter of loan guarantees to promote investment activity in frontier technologies, and argues that as long as there are more good bets than bad bets in that kind of portfolio, the funds committed in total are a good investment. But spectacular failures like Solyndra and other less publicized busts such as Beacon Power's Chapter 11 filing kill the prospect of any additional congressional funding for energy loan guarantees of any kind. That is true even when legislation has bi-partisan support, which is the case for the Energy Savings and Industrial Competitiveness Act of 2011 (S. 1000) which would, among other things, provide grants for a revolving loan program designed to develop energy-saving technologies for industrial and commercial use. The bill passed the Senate Energy Committee by a vote of 18-3 in July. However, the Congressional Budget Office has pegged the cost of the bill's provisions at $1.2 billion over five years. That is a serious barrier to passage. And in any case, even if it did pass, the bill would simply authorize funding. Congressional appropriations committees would have to approve the money as part of the DOE's budget, which would be highly unlikely, Solyndra aside, since similar programs authorized by the 2005 and 2007 energy bills are still begging for appropriations.

#### White House blocks recommendation solvency

**Kirsh 11** (Steven T. Kirsh, Bachelor of Science and a Master of Science in electrical engineering and computer science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Why Obama should meet Till," 9/28/11) http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/09/28/why-obama-should-meet-till/-http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/09/28/why-obama-should-meet-till/

If you delegate this to someone else, nothing will happen. Here’s why. Delegating this letter downward from the White House to someone in DOE to evaluate will result in inaction and no follow up. I know this from past attempts that have been made. It just gets lost and there is no follow up. Every time. The guys at DOE want to do it, but they know that they will get completely stopped by OMB and OSTP. Both Carol Browner and Steven Chu asked former DOE nuclear management what to do about nuclear waste. They were told that using fast reactors and reprocessing was the way to go. But nothing happened. So Chu has given up trying. According to knowledgeable sources, the White House has told DOE in no uncertain terms, “do not build anything nuclear in the US.” It’s not clear who is making these decisions, but many people believe it is being driven by Steven Fetter in OSTP.

#### Links to politics – energy action triggers unpopularity and their link scenario

#### Resolved government action key to certainty – counterplan isn’t a clear choice for investors

Deutch, ‘11

[John M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May, “An Energy Technology Corporation Will Improve the Federal Government’s Efforts to Accelerate Energy Innovation,” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2011/5/energy%20corporation%20deutch/05\_energy\_corporation\_deutch\_paper.PDF]

IDEAL CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS There also are important conditions for realizing a successful technology demonstration program from a selected set of projects. I list the conditions that are desirable for a successful program and compare some of these conditions with the conditions that have existed in DOE’s past demonstration efforts. 1. A stable government energy policy—for example, a known greenhouse gas emissions charge—is needed. In the absence of stable policy, a demonstration program must be pursued either on the basis of existing policy or in anticipation of changed policy. In the latter case, the demonstration project is not commercially viable so government assistance is required. A national energy plan that sets a comprehensive framework also would be welcome. Certainty about tax provisions, subsidies, and regulation guide private investment decisions, and signal which technical advances will have and which will not have value in the future. The best example is the effect that the absence of a carbon emissions charge has on investment and technology development in low-carbon electricity generation: nuclear, solar, and coal with carbon capture and sequestration. Absent a carbon charge, there is little incentive for the private sector to make such investments. It might still be sensible for the DOE to finance a technology demonstration that is “out of the money” on a commercial basis, in the absence of a carbon policy, while providing information and realistic options to the private sector if and when the policy changes. 2. Clarity about the purpose of energy policy is also important. It is easy to have a single goal and complicated to have multiple goals, especially when the combination is intended to overwhelm any doubt about the virtue of the policy. Current energy policy seeks to advance several objectives: to encourage the transition from fossil to renewable energy sources, to reduce oil imports, to reduce carbon emissions, to create jobs, to improve U.S. international competitiveness for green technologies, and to lower the costs of energy for the consumer. Alternative policy goals will involve trade-offs. For example, a carbon charge will reduce emissions but also lift the cost of electricity for the consumer. Sound public policy requires clarity about the balance struck among the trade-offs resulting from different policy choices. Sound public policy also requires a comprehensive multiyear plan that describes how the interrelated energy policies will influence different energy sectors of the economy: transportation, power, industry/commercial, and residential. Such a plan will help guide private sector deployment and technology development investment decisions. Absent a stable plan, how should a utility decide whether to build a low-cost but high-carbon-emitting pulverized coal plant for electricity generation or a high-cost but largely carbon-free nuclear power plant? A disciplined and documented procedure is needed to select the portfolio of technology demonstration projects that are intended to provide options for private sector investment. There should be explicit criteria for selecting the projects—for example, prospects for reducing emissions, reducing oil imports, stimulating renewables, creating jobs, and improving competitiveness. To reiterate, a single objective—for example, reducing emissions—is simplest, but multiple objectives are the rule and require explicit weighting in the selection process. I believe the important criteria should be reducing external environmental cost, improving energy security, and lowering the cost of energy for the U.S. consumer. Job creation and competitiveness are broader economic objectives that are not unique to the energy sector.

#### No solvency advocate is a voting issue for deterrence - literature should determine theoretical legitimacy, it increases topic education, incentivizes research skills and ensures the chance for fair affirmative responses – research outweighs and is the core value of debate

### 2ac a2 counterplan

#### **No one will take the exemption, and the SEP is not enough money to fund OTEC**

Brown 11 – Mr. Brown holds an MBA from New York University and a BA from Brown University. Matthew Brown is President of InterEnergy Solutions, a consulting firm that focuses on clean energy policy and finance. 2011, "Brief #1: Funding Mechanisms for Energy Efficiency"ase.org/resources/brief-1-funding-mechanisms-energy-efficiency

Funds are not predictable because they depend on fines that state environmental agencies issue, as well as on the interest that industry may or may not have in paying for a particular project. Companies sometimes view SEPs as a cumbersome alternative **to simply paying a fine and moving on with business operations.** **Not likely to provide large amounts of funding.**

#### **The SEP will not be approved – their author**

Bonorris 7 – Steven Bonorris, Editor, The Public Law Research Institute University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2007, [http://www.ecy.wa.gov/services/enforce/settlements/ABAHastingsSEPreport.pdf](http://www.ecy.wa.gov/services/enforce/settlements/ABAHastingsSEPreport.pdf-http://www.ecy.wa.gov/services/enforce/settlements/ABAHastingsSEPreport.pdf)

Legal Principles 1. A SEP will not be approved if the violator is otherwise legally required to perform the proposed activity. 2. SEPs should have a clear relationship to the violation. This relationship exists if the project reduces the overall environmental or public health impacts or risks to which the violation contributes, or is designed to reduce the likelihood of similar violations in the future. A SEP may not be directly related to the violation if the project is either: a. A pollution prevention project that provides significant environmental benefit; or b. Some other multi-media or facility-wide activity that provides widespread environmental benefit.

#### No solvency --- causes regulatory uncertainty

Steven Bonorris 7, Associate Director for Research, Public Law Research Institute, UC Hastings College of the Law, 1/25/7, “Supplemental Environmental Projects: A Fifty State Survey with Model Practices,” <http://www.ecy.wa.gov/services/enforce/settlements/ABAHastingsSEPreport.pdf>

The capacity for underdeterrence is particularly acute as the SEP cost itself is a new source of regulatory uncertainty: usually, SEP costs are assessed and reported by the violator, and the regulator has no mechanism for confirming the reported figures. 187 Opportunistic violators may overestimate SEP costs in order to receive greater relief from the calculated penalty, or they may underreport the business benefits of SEPs. 188 In order to track SEP implementation, many state SEP policies require the submission of detailed cost estimates and certifications of progress, as well as provide for stipulated penalties for SEPs that end up costing less than estimated. However, the literature has not quantified the efficacy of these measures against opportunistic violators. 189

#### Certainty critical – key to galvanize new investment

Pirog, 12 [Robert Pirog Specialist in Energy Economics CRS, <http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40645_20120210.pdf>]

Introduction and Background In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010, Congress continues to debate how much of the outer continental shelf (OCS) should be available for oil and gas development. Having all of the OCS available is seen by some as a way to increase domestic supply and improve U.S. energy security; others contend that OCS development has risks for the coastal environment and coastal communities, and that other options are available for energy security. The issue remains contentious, as industry would prefer that the entire OCS remain available without any area exclusions such as buffer zones (e.g., 25 or 50 miles from the coastline) or withdrawals. Industry might be reluctant to invest in any new resource assessments unless they are confident that the OCS will remain open for long-term leasing and development. Environmental groups have argued to retain the OCS moratoria as previously specified and that industry already has access to areas in the Gulf of Mexico with large oil and gas reserves as well as several thousand leases not yet developed. Following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill the Obama Administration saw an immediate need to review and upgrade drilling and safety rules for offshore oil and gas development. The 2010 oil spill changed the landscape for offshore oil and gas development. It has led to the reorganization of the Minerals Management Service (MMS) (discussed below), rewriting safety rules for drilling offshore, a suspension of permitting and drilling operations for some, review of the role of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and use of categorical exclusions, and a revised leasing program (announced December 1, 2010). Many in the oil and gas industry asserted that the six-month suspension that was announced on May 28, 2010 (called a “de-facto” moratoria) caused significant disruption of development activities and will lead to a reduction of oil and gas production and other economic losses at least in the short term. However, according to the EIA reference case, crude oil production from the lower 48 offshore region is estimated to increase from 1.71 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2009 to 1.81 mb/d in 2015.1 New deepwater drilling permits were not issued until February 28, 2011.

#### SEP Fines are ineffective- prevents compliance

ARB 11

[Air Resources Board, Enforcement Penalties: Backround and Policy, 9/30/11, <http://www.arb.ca.gov/enf/sb1402/policy.pdf>]

Part 2 is the proposed penalty policy itself and related Cal/EPA guidance documents. The policy calls for consideration of “all relevant circumstances,” in 6 determining the penalty amount. By law, penalty levels must be set at levels to ensure compliance and deter violations. They may be based on any relevant evidence, including a violator’s financial condition. Such circumstances, along with the eight factors enumerated in SB 1402 (see Preface), must all be considered in determining penalties for violations of laws under the Board’s jurisdiction. For easy reference, Appendix B of this document presents a matrix of most of the laws and regulations ARB enforces, with the corresponding penalties. The penalty policy explains how ARB works to consistently reach swift and fair resolution of violations. Fairness is at the heart of an effective enforcement program—one that benefits those who invested in pollution controls and maintains consistency in the level of penalties issued for similar violations. To be fair, the Board also takes into account the specific circumstances, causes, results and actors—all of which vary from case to case. As a result, comparisons between individual cases of similar violations may be invalid. Similarly, the policy does not have a mathematical formula for calculating penalties. Such a formulaic approach would not properly weigh individual circumstances and might result in an unjust or ineffective penalty.

#### SEP fails and no spillover

Robertson 09

[Brooke, Expanding the Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects, 2009, <http://lawreview.wustl.edu/in-print/expanding-the-use-of-supplemental-environmental-projects/>]

The 80% ceiling the SEP policy places on the mitigation percentage is perhaps the largest contributor to the underutilization of SEPs. 116 If the EPA calculates a $100 settlement penalty for a violation, the defendant is presented with two options. The defendant can agree to perform an SEP that will cost $100 and pay a $20 settlement penalty (since only 80% of the SEP cost can be used to mitigate the settlement penalty). 117 Alternatively, the defendant can simply pay the $100 settlement penalty. 118 Thus, the defendant must pay a total of $120 when the SEP is included in the settlement, but must only pay a total of $100 if the SEP is not included. Assuming most defendants are rational economic actors, they will choose the less expensive option. The SEP policy creates “a built-in economic disincentive to undertake SEPs by making the dollars spent on SEPs less valuable than dollars simply paid as penalties.” 119 Another reason a settlement may not include an SEP is that it may not be feasible. The settlement amount may be too small to develop and carry out an SEP in some cases. 120 The current SEP policy requires the defendant to propose a project that meets all the SEP requirements and to be responsible for implementing the SEP. 121 Some defendants may be unable to identify a project that meets the SEP policy requirements or may not have the expertise and resources necessary to implement an SEP.

#### Destroys solvency – no investment occurs

MarEx 11 (Maritime Executive , “Gas-Only Drilling in Offshore Moratorium Areas Suggested”, 1/19, http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/2005-10-20gas-only-drilling-in-offshore-moratori)

Oil and gas industry groups are criticizing a provision in House offshore drilling legislation that would allow the government to offer "natural gas-only" leases in areas that are currently off-limits to new production. The criticism is included in wider comments by petroleum producers to the Minerals Management Service (MMS), which has begun collecting public comments as it begins preparing an outer continental shelf leasing plan for 2007-2012. MMS asked for comment on the gas-only concept. Gas-only leasing was included in a bill by House Resources Committee Chairman Richard Pombo (R-CA.) that allows states to "opt-out" of offshore leasing bans. States exercising the option could allow gas-only leasing, or oil and gas leasing. Senate legislation by Senator Lamar Alexander (R-TN.) -- and supported by chemical companies and other industries that rely on the costly fuel -- also accepts the idea. However, the American Petroleum Institute (API), in comments this week to MMS, says gas-only and gas-preference leasing **would offer the "false promise" of future supplies.** The group says the concept would **create uncertainties** that could dampen investment, since it is impossible to predict with certainty what types of resources will be in an area. "A company might spend up to $80 million to buy a lease, conduct seismic testing, obtain the necessary permits, and drill a well(s) to determine whether any resources are present in amounts that make the prospect economic," the group says. "A company is unlikely to know if it had met the gas only or gas preference requirement until the capital investment had been made. Companies **will be reluctant to spend tens of millions of dollars to explore for and develop a prospect**, only to be forced to abandon the resource, **stranding substantial investments."**

#### Any risk triggers it

Kabelitz 6 (Dr. Klaus-Robert, Chief Economist – E.on Ruhrgas, one of the leading European players in natural gas, “Strategy, Economy, and Regulation,” International Gas Union, June, http://www.igu.org/html/wgc2006/pdf/com/PGC%20B%20final%20report.pdf)

It goes without saying that abundant gas reserves and favourable pre-tax economics may not deliver investment and production growth if the fiscal terms are so onerous as to make post-tax economics uncompetitive. Investors’ political risk perceptions are critical to gas developments. Political risk includes the risk of social and political disturbances, and the risk of unforeseen changes in legal and regulatory conditions. Political risk is a key component of total project risk for long term, large, capital intensive, complex projects involving installations that may easily be targeted or accidentally damaged in times of war or civil strife. Gas projects typically meet all these criteria. Concerning the regulatory aspect of political risk, an uneven playing field, an unstable fiscal framework and/or suspicions of a lack of commitment across the board to the sanctity of contracts can make otherwise low risk areas high risk from the point of view of investors.

#### Carey – feedstock’s directly benefits the chemical industry

#### Extinction

**Baum, ’99** Founder of Chemical and Engineering News Washington (Rudy Baum, C&EN Washington, 6 December 1999, “Millennium Special Report,” <http://pubs.acs.org/cen/hotarticles/cenear/991206/7749spintro2.html)//CC>  
Computers and the Internet are clearly one of the driving forces shaping all aspects of society at the turn of the millennium. But despite the stock market's insistence that "tech stocks" equal "computer stocks," we here at C&EN believe that chemistry in all its permutations remains a vital component of high technology. Which brings me to this "Millennium Special Report: Chemistry In The Service Of Humanity." The pace of change in today's world is truly incomprehensible. Science is advancing on all fronts, particularly chemistry and biology working together as they never have before to understand life in general and human beings in particular at a breathtaking pace. Technology ranging from computers and the Internet to medical devices to genetic engineering to nanotechnology is transforming our world and our existence in it. It is, in fact, a fool's mission to predict where science and technology will take us in the coming decade, let alone the coming century. We can say with finality only this: We don't know. We do know, however, that we face enormous challenges, we 6 billion humans who now inhabit Earth. In its 1998 revision of world population estimates and projections, the United Nations anticipates a world population in 2050 of 7.3 billion to 10.7 billion, with a "medium-fertility projection," considered the most likely, indicating a world population of 8.9 billion people in 2050. According to the UN, fertility now stands at 2.7 births per woman, down from 5 births per woman in the early 1950s. And fertility rates are declining in all regions of the world. That's good news. But people are living a lot longer. That is certainly good news for the individuals who are living longer, but it also poses challenges for health care and social services the world over. The 1998 UN report estimates for the first time the number of octogenarians, nonagenarians, and centenarians living today and projected for 2050. The numbers are startling. In 1998, 66 million people were aged 80 or older, about one of every 100 persons. That number is expected to increase sixfold by 2050 to reach 370 million people, or one in every 24 persons. By 2050, more than 2.2 million people will be 100 years old or older! Here is the fundamental challenge we face: The world's growing and aging population must be fed and clothed and housed and transported in ways that do not perpetuate the environmental devastation wrought by the first waves of industrialization of the 19th and 20th centuries. As we increase our output of goods and services, as we increase our consumption of energy, as we meet the imperative of raising the standard of living for the poorest among us, we must learn to carry out our economic activities sustainably. There are optimists out there, C&EN readers among them, who believe that the history of civilization is a long string of technological triumphs of humans over the limits of nature. In this view, the idea of a "carrying capacity" for Earth—a limit to the number of humans Earth's resources can support—is a fiction because technological advances will continuously obviate previously perceived limits. This view has historical merit. Dire predictions made in the 1960s about the exhaustion of resources ranging from petroleum to chromium to fresh water by the end of the 1980s or 1990s have proven utterly wrong. While I do not count myself as one of the technological pessimists who see technology as a mixed blessing at best and an unmitigated evil at worst, I do not count myself among the technological optimists either. There are environmental challenges of transcendent complexity that I fear may overcome us and our Earth before technological progress can come to our rescue. Global climate change, the accelerating destruction of terrestrial and oceanic habitats, the catastrophic loss of species across the plant and animal kingdoms—these are problems that are not obviously amenable to straightforward technological solutions. But I know this, too: Science and technology have brought us to where we are, and only science and technology, coupled with innovative social and economic thinking, can take us to where we need to be in the coming millennium. Chemists, chemistry, and the chemical industry—what we at C&EN call the chemical enterprise—will play central roles in addressing these challenges. The first section of this Special Report is a series called "Millennial Musings" in which a wide variety of representatives from the chemical enterprise share their thoughts about the future of our science and industry. The five essays that follow explore the contributions the chemical enterprise is making right now to ensure that we will successfully meet the challenges of the 21st century. The essays do not attempt to predict the future. Taken as a whole, they do not pretend to be a comprehensive examination of the efforts of our science and our industry to tackle the challenges I've outlined above. Rather, they paint, in broad brush strokes, a portrait of scientists, engineers, and business managers struggling to make a vital contribution to humanity's future. The first essay, by Senior Editor Marc S. Reisch, is a case study of the chemical industry's ongoing transformation to sustainable production. Although it is not well known to the general public, the chemical industry is at the forefront of corporate efforts to reduce waste from production streams to zero. Industry giants DuPont and Dow Chemical are taking major strides worldwide to manufacture chemicals while minimizing the environmental "footprint" of their facilities. This is an ethic that starts at the top of corporate structure. Indeed, Reisch quotes Dow President and Chief Executive Officer William S. Stavropolous: "We must integrate elements that historically have been seen as at odds with one another: the triple bottom line of sustainability—economic and social and environmental needs." DuPont Chairman and CEO Charles (Chad) O. Holliday envisions a future in which "biological processes use renewable resources as feedstocks, use solar energy to drive growth, absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, use low-temperature and low-pressure processes, and produce waste that is less toxic." But sustainability is more than just a philosophy at these two chemical companies. Reisch describes ongoing Dow and DuPont initiatives that are making sustainability a reality at Dow facilities in Michigan and Germany and at DuPont's massive plant site near Richmond, Va. Another manifestation of the chemical industry's evolution is its embrace of life sciences. Genetic engineering is a revolutionary technology. In the 1970s, research advances fundamentally shifted our perception of DNA. While it had always been clear that deoxyribonucleic acid was a chemical, it was not a chemical that could be manipulated like other chemicals—clipped precisely, altered, stitched back together again into a functioning molecule. Recombinant DNA techniques began the transformation of DNA into just such a chemical, and the reverberations of that change are likely to be felt well into the next century. Genetic engineering has entered the fabric of modern science and technology. It is one of the basic tools chemists and biologists use to understand life at the molecular level. It provides new avenues to pharmaceuticals and new approaches to treat disease. It expands enormously agronomists' ability to introduce traits into crops, a capability seized on by numerous chemical companies. There is no doubt that this powerful new tool will play a major role in feeding the world's population in the coming century, but its adoption has hit some bumps in the road. In the second essay, Editor-at-Large Michael Heylin examines how the promise of agricultural biotechnology has gotten tangled up in real public fear of genetic manipulation and corporate control over food. The third essay, by Senior Editor Mairin B. Brennan, looks at chemists embarking on what is perhaps the greatest intellectual quest in the history of science—humans' attempt to understand the detailed chemistry of the human brain, and with it, human consciousness. While this quest is, at one level, basic research at its most pure, it also has enormous practical significance. Brennan focuses on one such practical aspect: the effort to understand neurodegenerative diseases like Alzheimer's disease and Parkinson's disease that predominantly plague older humans and are likely to become increasingly difficult public health problems among an aging population. Science and technology are always two-edged swords. They bestow the power to create and the power to destroy. In addition to its enormous potential for health and agriculture, genetic engineering conceivably could be used to create horrific biological warfare agents. In the fourth essay of this Millennium Special Report, Senior Correspondent Lois R. Ember examines the challenge of developing methods to counter the threat of such biological weapons. "Science and technology will eventually produce sensors able to detect the presence or release of biological agents, or devices that aid in forecasting, remediating, and ameliorating bioattacks," Ember writes. Finally, Contributing Editor Wil Lepkowski discusses the most mundane, the most marvelous, and the most essential molecule on Earth, H2O. Providing clean water to Earth's population is already difficult—and tragically, not always accomplished. Lepkowski looks in depth at the situation in Bangladesh—where a well-meaning UN program to deliver clean water from wells has poisoned millions with arsenic. Chemists are working to develop better ways to detect arsenic in drinking water at meaningful concentrations and ways to remove it that will work in a poor, developing country. And he explores the evolving water management philosophy, and the science that underpins it, that will be needed to provide adequate water for all its vital uses. In the past two centuries, our science has transformed the world. Chemistry is a wondrous tool that has allowed us to understand the structure of matter and gives us the ability to manipulate that structure to suit our own purposes. It allows us to dissect the molecules of life to see what makes them, and us, tick. It is providing a glimpse into workings of what may be the most complex structure in the universe, the human brain, and with it hints about what constitutes consciousness. In the coming decades, we will use chemistry to delve ever deeper into these mysteries and provide for humanity's basic and not-so-basic needs.

### 2ac a2 elgin DA

#### We solve this argument – drilling in Florida key

Mason 11 (Joseph – Senior Fellow, The Wharton School, Louisiana State University Endowed Chair of Banking and nationally-renowned economist, “House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources Hearing; Fisheries, Wildlife, Oceans and Insular Affairs Legislative Hearing on H.R. 306, H.R. 588, S. 266 and H.R. 285”, 4/6, lexis)

Apart from national energy concerns, however, economic considerations also favor increased development of OCS energy resources. Specifically, the boost provided to local onshore economies by offshore production would be particularly welcome in the present economic climate. Similar to fiscal alternatives presently under consideration, OCS development would provide a long-run economic stimulus to the U.S. economy because the incremental output, employment, and wages provided by OCS development **would be spread over many years**. Unlike those policies, however, this stimulus would not require government expenditures to support that long-term growth. A. The Present State of Offshore U.S. Oil and Gas Production Despite its importance, U.S. oil and natural gas production in offshore areas is currently limited to only a few regions. At the present time, oil and gas is only actively produced off the coast of six U.S. states: Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, California, and Alaska. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports that Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas are the only coastal states that provide access to all or almost all of their offshore energy resources. Only two additional states--Alaska and California--are producing any offshore energy supplies. All California OCS Planning Areas and most Alaska OCS Planning Areas, however, were not open to any new facilities until the recent end of the Congressional and Presidential moratoria. The remaining 16 coastal states are not open to new production and are not presently extracting any offshore energy resources. Even without those remaining sixteen states, plus California and Alaska, the OCS is already the most important source of U.S. energy supplies. According to the MMS, "the Federal OCS is a major supplier of oil and **natural gas** for the domestic market, contributing more energy (oil and natural gas) for U.S. consumption than any single U.S. state or country in the world." That is, OCS production presently meets more U.S. energy demand than any other single source, including Saudi Arabia. B. Offshore Oil Production Stimulates Onshore Economies Offshore oil and gas production has **a significant effect** on local onshore economies as well as the national economy. There are broadly three "phases" of development that contribute to state economic growth: (1) the initial exploration and development of offshore facilities; (2) the extraction of oil and gas reserves; and (3) refining crude oil into finished petroleum products. Industries supporting those phases are most evident in the sections of the Gulf of Mexico that are currently open to offshore drilling. For example, the U.S. shipbuilding industry - based largely in the Gulf region - **benefits significantly** from initial offshore oil exploration efforts. Exploration and development also requires specialized exploration and drilling vessels, floating drilling rigs, and miles and miles of steel pipe, as well as highly educated and specialized labor to staff the efforts. The onshore support does not end with production. A recent report prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy indicates that the Louisiana economy is "highly dependent on a wide variety of industries that depend on offshore oil and gas production" and that offshore production supports onshore production in the chemicals, platform fabrication, drilling services, transportation, and gas processing. **Fleets of** helicopters and U.S.-built vessels **also supply offshore facilities with a wide range of industrial and consumer goods**, from industrial spare parts to groceries. As explained in Section IV.G, however, the distance between offshore facilities and onshore communities can affect the relative intensity of the local economic effects. The economic effects in the refining phase are even more diffuse than the effects for the two preceding phases. Although significant capacity is located in California, Illinois, New Jersey, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington, additional U.S. refining capacity is spread widely around the country. As a result, refinery jobs, wages, and tax revenues are even more likely to "spill over" into other areas of the country, including non-coastal states like Illinois, as those are home to many refining and chemical industries that ride the economic coattails of oil exploration and extraction.

#### Prevents multiple great power conflicts --- risk of escalation high

Crospey 12 (Dr. Seth – Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute, Former Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy, ““The U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plan: Assumptions and Associated Risks to National Security”, Statement before the Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations U.S. House of Representatives, 4/18, http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/SethCropsey--USNavyShipbuildingPlan--Testimony041812.pdf)

If the Navy’s assumption is mistaken that current political leadership will agree to large future increases in shipbuilding we will be headed toward a kind of naval holiday. The equally optimistic expectation that average ship costs can be maintained at $2 billion dollars per vessel prolongs the holiday. This will not be a pleasant holiday. China’s economy has its problems but it continues to perform. Janes Defence Forecasts says that China will double its defense budget between now and 2015.iii Russia plans a $160 billion dollar naval expansion in the Pacific which is to include 36 new submarines and 40 surface ships.iv If a couple postpones needed repairs on their home for a decade and then decides to fix all that has broken they will be very lucky to finish the job in a year. They will also be fortunate because other more prudent owners will have sustained the home repair industry. Our shipbuilding industry **does not have the benefit of other purchasers** who can sustain it if Navy budgets prove unequal to the task. For the industrial base that supports U.S. shipbuilding a budget-induced naval holiday would be a disaster that could take decades—**if ever**—from which to recover. Knowledge of shipbuilding remains part of American manufacturing. But accelerating cost, an ageing workforce, reduced orders for warships, and an uncertain future risk the nation’s ability to turn out sufficient numbers of vessels at affordable prices and profitably enough to keep shipbuilding companies alive. The destabilization of the American shipbuilding industrial base is one reason that the cost of warships is outpacing the rate of inflation. The Navy’s reduced procurement of ships over the past twenty years has caused the industry to contract, lay off workers, and in general to become less reliable. This has driven up the cost of labor and the cost of construction materials. The fewer ships the Navy buys, the less lucrative the industry is for skilled workers. As the cost of labor rises shipbuilders are increasingly pressed to attract and train qualified personnel. The negative trends reinforce each other. As younger workers are dissuaded from seeking employment or remaining in the industry by the prospects of sporadic employment those who remain—the existing workers—age. The cycle is self-defeating. Paying older workers increases overhead costs and makes it increasingly expensive to invest in the training and education of a younger workforce. The destabilization of the industrial base also causes costs to rise since many of the materials and products that go into building Navy ships are not useful for other purposes. Since the Navy is buying far fewer ships now than it did in the 1980s, many shipyards rely on a single source for necessary materials. With a virtual monopoly on these products, the suppliers have in large part the ability to name their price. The inefficient manner in which the shipyards acquire these materials drives up labor and overhead costs. The solution lies in stabilizing the American shipbuilding industry. This means that the Navy must either increase its orders of ships and/or improve its business practices, for example disciplining the changes it requires of shipbuilders once orders have been placed and vessels are under construction. Buying and stockpiling spare parts for ships that are already in service and whose need for regular maintenance and repair is well known would also help provide stability for the American shipbuilding industry. In a study conducted on the subject in 2006, the RAND Corporation concluded that the rising costs of building ships is the result of a combination of unsteady U.S. Government procurement rates and a “monopsony relationship” between the government and the shipbuilders. In a monopsony a single purchaser is faced with a host of sellers. Because there is so little American shipbuilding outside of what the Navy purchases, U.S. firms are at the commercial mercy of the 9 percent of the Navy budget devoted to buying ships. A 2005 Government Accountability Office report attributed cost increases in shipbuilding to instability in the entire industry, the difficulty in recruiting and training qualified personnel, high rates of skilled personnel turnover and the shipbuilders’ dependence on a rapidly shrinking supplier base. Finally there are the consequences **if U.S. seapower continues to decrease** and proves unable to meet even the reduced goals it has set for itself. History is a good guide. Nations in the middle like to side with the winner. During our Civil War British political leadership considered recognizing the Confederacy but was eventually dissuaded by Union military success. In World War II Sweden declared neutrality but grew increasingly amenable to Allied requests as Germany’s military position worsened. Romania initially sided with Germany in the same war but changed sides following U.S. attacks on their oil fields and a coup that deposed the pro-German dictator, Antonescu. Bulgarians followed a similar path from siding with the Nazis to switching their allegiance to the Allies in 1944. Saudi Prince Bandar, acknowledging China’s increasing international prominence and power visited Beijing last year and met with President Hu. American weakness at sea, especially in the Indo-Pacific will change the current military, diplomatic, and commercial character of the region. Whether the U.S. fleet shrinks because of too little funding or because unreformed procurement practices have raised the price of ships or because ships have been called home to save on operational expense, the result is the same. While we were once present in strength, we would be no more. A nation burdened with massive debt whose ability to shape world events has been limited in tandem with its capacity to invest in research and technology will have more and more trouble finding markets. China’s potential hegemony would not only force its neighbors’ to reconsider whether the U.S. is a reliable ally. It would also become an increasingly powerful magnet for trade in the region—at the expense of U.S. commerce. Unlike the U.S. whose seapower has protected global sea lanes that other states have used to their benefit **China has a different set of values**. It views with suspicion a liberal trading system notwithstanding the benefits received from it. **China’s friends include Iran and North Korea**. Beijing is a poor candidate to support the international order that has been the keel of U.S. foreign and security policy for a century. Waning U.S. seapower **is an invitation that China will regard as a complement to its rising military and navy** in particular. It foreshadows **a coercive resolution** of territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the likelihood of an increased regional arms race, and the troubling international perception that the U.S. is—or has—**abandoned its role as a great power**. American seapower is the strategic keel of our foreign and security policy. Reducing it would be an exercise of history-making shortsightedness. Restoring it would be an act of statesmanship from which Americans and all who cherish political liberty would benefit for the remainder of this century. Thank you.

### 2ac add on

#### Advanced manufacturing technology will make war IMPOSSIBLE

**Paone 2k9** (Chuck, 66th Air Base Wing Public Affairs for the US Air Force, 8-10-09, “Technology convergence could prevent war, futurist says,” http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123162500)

The convergence of "exponentially advancing technologies" will form a "super-intelligence" **so formidable that it could avert war**, according to one of the world's leading futurists. Dr. James Canton, CEO and chairman of the Institute for Global Futures, a San Francisco-based think tank, is author of the book "The Extreme Future" and an adviser to leading companies, the military and other government agencies. He is consistently listed among the world's leading speakers and has presented to diverse audiences around the globe. He will address the Air Force Command and Control Intelligence, Survelliance and Reconnaissance Symposium, which will be held Sept. 28 through 30 at the MGM Grand Hotel at Foxwoods in Ledyard, Conn., joining Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz and a bevy of other government and industry speakers. He offered a sneak preview of his symposium presentation and answered various questions about the future of technology and warfare in early August. "**The superiority of convergent technologies will prevent war,"** Doctor Canton said, claiming **their power would present an overwhelming deterrent to potential adversaries**. While saying that the U.S. will build these super systems faster and better than other nations, he acknowledged that a new arms race is already under way. "It will be a new MAD for the 21st century," he said, referring to the Cold War-era acronym for Mutually Assured Destruction, the idea that a nuclear first strike would trigger an equally deadly response. It's commonly held that this knowledge has essentially prevented any rational state from launching a nuclear attack. Likewise, Doctor Canton said he believes rational nation states, considering this imminent technology explosion, will see the futility of nation-on-nation warfare in the near future. Plus there's the "socio-economic linking of the global market system." "The fundamental macroeconomics on the planet favor peace, security, capitalism and prosperity," he said. Doctor Canton projects that nations, including those not currently allied, will work together in using these smart technologies to prevent non-state actors from engaging in disruptive and deadly acts. As a futurist, Doctor Canton and his team study and predict many things, but their main area of expertise -- and the one in which he's personally most interested -- is advanced and emerging technology. "I see that as the key catalyst of strategic change on the planet, and it will be for the next 100 years," he said. **He focuses on six specific technology areas: "nano, bio, IT, neuro, quantum and robotics;"** those he expects to converge in so powerful a way. Within the information technology arena, Doctor Canton said systems must create "meaningful data," which can be validated and acted upon. "Knowledge engineering for the analyst and the warfighter is a critical competency that we need to get our arms around," he said. "Having an avalanche of data is not going to be helpful." Having the right data is. "There's no way for the human operator to look at an infinite number of data streams and extract meaning," he said. "The question then is: How do we augment the human user with advanced artificial intelligence, better software presentation and better visual frameworks, to create a system that is situationally aware and can provide decision options for the human operator, faster than the human being can?" He said he believes the answers can often be found already in what he calls 'edge cultures.' "I would look outside of the military. What are they doing in video games? What are they doing in healthcare? What about the financial industry?" Doctor Canton said he believes that more sophisticated artificial intelligence applications will transform business, warfare and life in general. Many of these are already embedded in systems or products, he says, even if people don't know it.

### sequestration

#### No impact to sequestration – rhetoric is overblown and doesn’t decrease overall spending

Derugy, 12 [September 13th,Fears over sequestration are overblown, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, <http://washingtonexaminer.com/fears-over-sequestration-are-overblown/article/2507916#.UJsn2oZ1v3U>] Thanks to the Budget Control Act of 2011, the Pentagon is due for a cut of $500 billion over nine years, starting on Jan. 2, 2013. Next year's cut comes in at $54 billion. That prospect has generated a lot of end-of-the-world-type rhetoric from Washington hawks. Yet with the national debt exceeding $16 trillion, a gross debt-to-GDP ratio above 100 percent, and Moody's Investors Service warning the country of a potential credit downgrade, we need to cut through the rhetoric and face the facts. **Defense sequester cuts simply do not warrant the fears they inspire.** The sequester will certainly pose management challenges in its first year of implementation. Yet even under sequestration, defense spending merely reverts to its level in 2007 -- a year in which America was ably defended and plenty of cash flowed to the armed forces. And that's in real, inflation-adjusted terms. **By 2018, the defense budget returns to its fiscal 2012 level**. In nominal terms, cumulative nonwar defense spending over the FY2012-FY2021 period will increase to $4.8 trillion with sequestration, as opposed to $5.3 trillion without it. In other words, even with sequestration, **nonwar military spending will still** grow by **about** 10 percent **over the next decade.** According to the Congressional Budget Office, over that period, the Department of Defense will also spend an additional $400 billion on war, on top of its base budget. And if a decade's worth of behavior is any indication of the future, we can predict that Congress will continue to use this war account to provide **additional nonwar spending** to the military. For instance, according to defense spending expert Russell Rumbaugh, Senate appropriators moved some $10 billion in requested funding from the base budget to the war budget last November, when they marked up the 2012 defense appropriations bill. CQ Weekly's Frank Oliveri reported that the House-passed 2013 appropriations bill shifts an additional $5.9 billion of nonwar spending into the war column as well for ordinary nonwar spending on bases. Defense spending is not just one of the most sacrosanct parts of the budget, but also one of the largest and most inscrutable. Adjusting for inflation, military spending has grown for an unprecedented 14 consecutive years and is now higher than at any time since World War II. Even excluding war costs, the military base budget has grown by about 50 percent over the past decade. And figuring out how much is actually spent on the military is not an easy task. Perhaps more important for those concerned about the United States' defense standing, **even after the sequestration cuts, the United States will remain the biggest global military power in the world.**

#### Republicans won’t cave now

**Waldman 1-2** – Paul, contributing editor for the Prospect and the author of Being Right is Not Enough: What Progressives Must Learn From Conservative Success. (Get Ready for the Next Crisis, The American Prospect, http://prospect.org/article/get-ready-next-crisis)

By the time you read this, President Obama will probably have declared victory in fending off the fiscal cliff/austerity trap, and there are certainly some things in the agreement that progressives should be pleased about. But we should also understand what Republicans won.

The great Republican triumph of the current negotiation—and whether it came from hard-nosed negotiating or simple capitulation on the White House's part, I'm not sure—is the fact that an end to the debt ceiling was not part of the deal worked out by Mitch McConnell and Joe Biden. Nor, for that matter, was the question of sequestration resolved; instead, it was simply put off for two months. That means we'll be facing not one but two more crises, when we get to do this all over again. And when we do, the conditions will be very different.

On the debt ceiling, President Obama has said that it isn't up for negotiation; it just has to be raised, and that's all there is to it. Republicans, on the other hand, are quite looking forward to the chance to once again threaten to bring about the collapse of the American economy unless they can squeeze some more cuts from the budget. But once we get to that confrontation, most of the leverage the Democrats now have will be gone. Remember that there are two main things Republicans want: They want to keep taxes low on the wealthy, and they want to cut domestic spending. Obama's leverage in the current negotiations came from the fact that if action wasn't taken, all the Bush tax cuts would expire—i.e., there would be a large tax increase, including on the wealthy. Because Republicans really didn't want that to happen, he could force them to accept some of his other priorities, like an extension of unemployment benefits.

But now the tax issue is settled. So when the debt ceiling comes up in a couple of months, there will be nothing Republicans will be afraid of. They'll have no reason to give an inch. And they'll be emboldened by the fact that every time we've had one of these crises, Obama has drawn a bunch of lines in the sand that he eventually backtracked right over.

But what about sequestration, you ask? You may remember that the point of sequestration was that it was supposedly so awful that neither party would want to see it happen. Democrats would recoil at the prospect of domestic budget cuts, while Republicans would do anything to forestall the cuts in military spending. But that was based on a fundamental miscalculation. It's safe to say now that while the Republicans would rather not see those deep cuts to the military, they don't hate that prospect nearly as much as they relish the prospect of extracting more cuts to domestic programs. Maybe they never did.

So the net result of all this is that now that the crisis has been put off for a couple of months, Republicans have nothing more lose and nothing more to fear. But won't they be afraid that they'll get blamed for another hostage crisis? I wouldn't bet on that counting for much. As Bloomberg's Josh Barro points out, for most House Republicans, doing something that is terrible for their country and their party, like forcing an economic crisis, can be perfectly rational for them as individuals. If you're from a safely conservative district (and most of them are), you don't have to fear that in your next election you'll get attacked for irresponsibly damaging the American economy. What you have to fear is a challenge from the right. And a challenger from the right will use a vote in favor of any deal that includes increased revenue to say you went along with Barack Obama's Kenyan socialist tax hikes, just as they'll use a vote in favor of increasing the debt ceiling to say you went along with Barack Obama's Kenyan socialist debt. So even if it brings your party universal condemnation, creating yet another crisis (and voting against ending that crisis) can be the rational thing to do.

That assumes, of course, that you're more concerned about your next election than whether your party looks terrible in the eyes of the public. But many of today's most conservative Republicans don't care all that much about the fortunes of the GOP. They didn't get where they are by toiling away on the lower rungs of the party ladder, patiently working their way up. They see themselves as brave mavericks, bucking the party establishment to promote their ideological agenda. I'm sure that for more than a few of them, a bipartisan chorus of voices screaming, "Are you f-ing crazy???" does nothing but convince them that they're right.

#### Plan is popular---key to bipartisan bargain

Coral Davenport 12 is Energy and Environment Correspondent for National Journal. “How Obama and Congress Could Find Common Ground on Energy,” December 6, 2012, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/how-obama-and-congress-could-find-common-ground-on-energy-20121206>, Accessed date: 12-30-12 y2k

Meanwhile, the partisan impasse may be about to end. Quietly, lawmakers and lobbyists say they can envision a grand bargain on energy and climate change—cutting fossil- fuel use and investing in clean energy in exchange for new offshore drilling or approval of the controversial Keystone XL pipeline. The biggest if, and the heaviest lift, will be getting Congress to enact the policy that economists say would do the most to transform the nation’s energy economy: taxing or pricing fossil carbon pollution. A price on carbon, say economists across the ideological spectrum, will increase the price of fossil fuels and decisively drive the free market toward clean energy. Yet any lawmaker who supports the plan could be accused of supporting an energy tax. Still, a combination of events—including more droughts, floods, and extreme weather like superstorm Sandy—has increased the sense of urgency. The recent explosion in domestic oil and natural-gas production has helped to create jobs and prop up the recovery while bringing together oil companies and the Obama White House in alliances that could pave the way for new agreements on energy policy. And as Washington grapples with the deficit, many in the capital are more open to the carbon tax as a way to raise revenue.

#### Any perception argument is non unique – won’t pass now

iStockAnalyst (market analysis news group) January 3, 2013 “Sequester, One Step Back And Two Steps Forward” http://www.istockanalyst.com/finance/story/6217753/sequester-one-step-back-and-two-steps-forward

The fiscal cliff deal winding its way through Congress promises to delay automatic defense cuts until March 1, 2013, giving Washington a bit more time to avert sequestration. Yet the details of the patch and the way it was passed suggest prospects for a lasting deal are slim. It seems the easiest path to overturning sequestration would have been to include it in a broader fiscal deal that used incremental revenue (i.e. Taxes) to offset sequestration cuts. With the revenue fisticuffs presumably concluded, sequestration will apparently be tackled in the context of a February debt ceiling showdown in which Republicans promise to keep the focus squarely on spending cuts. "Asking to restore already cut funds will be like waving a first class boarding pass on an economy-only flight. We expect defense stocks to come under sustained pressure in the coming days as the dimensions of the challenge are better understood," Oppenheimer analyst Yair Reiner said in a client note. Though the Senate deal delays sequestration by two months, defense doesn't get a free ride. Half of the $24 billion price tag for the delay will come by cutting discretionary spending, including to defense. In effect, Congress is letting half the sequestration go through, though under a different name and a slightly different budgetary paradigm. Tellingly, the bill appears to deal with sequestration almost as an afterthought, in the final three and half pages of a 158 page law. "The section that deals with sequestration is like a caboose attached with a shoelace," Reiner said. The key question, when the two-month sequester delay is up, and the debt ceiling is reached, is who will pay to attach the caboose more securely. With the first fiscal cliff averted, Republicans will presumably nix any attempt to pay down the sequester with additional revenue. Democrats, meanwhile, will resist attempts to offset sequestration with spending cuts elsewhere. A solution may be lurking, but it isn't obvious where. In the final weeks of December, markets were hoping that a grand bargain being negotiated by President Obama and Boehner might replace sequestration with a much smaller and more orderly set of defense cuts. However, that optimism appears to have been misplaced. "It looks to us increasingly unlikely that sequestration can be substantially averted," Reiner noted.

#### PC not key – can’t overcome Republican obstructionism

**Marcus 1-2** – Ruth, opinion writer for the Washington Post (On the fiscal cliff, a no-big-deal deal, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ruth-marcus-on-the-fiscal-cliff-a-no-big-deal-deal/2013/01/02/d98f84e0-5511-11e2-bf3e-76c0a789346f\_story.html)

The moment called for a grand bargain. It yielded a pathetic punt.

No one should feel good about this outcome. Washington proved, as if more proof were needed, that it is good at dispensing benefits with money it doesn’t have, bad at making the hard choices it so solemnly vows to pursue.

Judging the merits of the cliff deal depends on what problem you were hoping to solve.

If the goal was to avoid inflicting immediate pain, and that’s a worthy aim, the agreement succeeded. The middle class — indeed, nearly all Americans — will not see income taxes rise. Benefits will continue for the long-term unemployed. The blunderbuss impact of across-the-board spending cuts has been postponed.

Yet the goal was, or should have been, larger: not only to prevent instant fiscal shock but also to help avoid future fiscal catastrophe. By this metric, the deal was a flop.

First, it failed to raise anywhere near enough tax revenue. Recall, President Obama sought $1.6 trillion over 10 years. House Speaker John Boehner offered $800 billion. So they compromised . . . on $620 billion ($737 billion with interest).

Yes, this was the first vote for a tax increase in umpty-ump years. But the Bush tax rates are now locked in for nearly everyone, as are lower rates on capital gains and dividends and a gallingly generous, permanent estate tax break.

Second, the agreement did nothing about spending — specifically, nothing about the entitlement programs, primarily Medicare, driving the debt. Instead, that discussion was, surprise, put off.

Recall: The debt-ceiling debate begat the supercommittee, which was supposed to produce $1.2 trillion in cuts. The supercommittee failed, which begat the sequester — or was supposed to.

“I will veto any effort to get rid of those automatic spending cuts to domestic and defense spending,” Obama proclaimed in November 2011, after the supercommittee fizzled. “There will be no easy off-ramps on this one.”

With the sequester about to hit, this week’s deal featured, yes, an off-ramp, in the form of a two-month delay — paid for, yes, but in part with a tax gimmick that helps better-off taxpayers and ultimately loses billions of dollars.

There were two avenues available for the president and Congress in crafting a deal: big/big, maximizing both tax increases and spending cuts, and small/small. In the end, the negotiators chose the route of small/nonexistent — insufficient tax revenue coupled with no spending cuts.

Whose fault is this? You could lament a failure of presidential leadership. Where was the cliff during the campaign? What was the president’s plan — not just eliminating tax cuts for the wealthy but reforming entitlements as well?

Still, the ultimate blame lies with the House Republican caucus, which spurned two deals (the collapsed Obama-Boehner plan during the debt-ceiling fight in 2011 and the collapsed Obama-Boehner plan to avoid the cliff) that were far better, from the point of view of debt reduction, than what ended up passing.

The most effective communicator wielding the bulliest of pulpits could not prevail with a crowd this entrenched in anti-tax craziness.

History offers scant basis for optimism about the prospects for success with the coming cliffs: the postponed sequester, the return of the debt ceiling, the expiration of the continuing resolution to fund the government.

The White House theory is these forcing mechanisms will provide the spur for additional tax revenue, obtained through tax reform, coupled with spending cuts in the form of changes to entitlement programs. Hence, if not a grand bargain, a good-enough one, just down the road.

But where does the deal leave the administration’s leverage to obtain more in tax increases? Certainly not increased from where it was before.

The cliff just dodged represented a point of maximum power to extract new revenue. Why would an already irrationally intransigent House be more compliant under less pressure?

More likely, the administration’s bargaining power for more taxes is significantly reduced — or, looked at another way, Republicans’ ability to extract painful entitlement cuts as a price of new revenue has been significantly enhanced. Emphasis, here, on the word painful. Entitlement reform is necessary, but it should be done with care for the most vulnerable.

The president can say all he wants that he will not negotiate over the debt ceiling. But there are more negotiations to come — over the sequester and expiring spending bills, and those discussions will be taking place during precisely the same period as the debt-ceiling non-negotiations. If this doesn’t make you nervous, you haven’t been paying attention.

#### 8% risk of an internal link

**Beckman et al 11** [Matthew Professor of Political Science at UC Irvine, Opportunism in Polarization, Presidential Studies Quarterly; Sep 2011; 41, 3]

The final important piece in our theoretical model—presidents' political capital— also finds support in these analyses, though the results here are less reliable. Presidents operating under the specter of **strong economy** and **high approval ratings** get an important, albeit moderate, increase in their chances for prevailing on "key" Senate roll-call votes (b = .10, se = .06, p < .10). Figure 4 displays the substantive implications of these results in the context of polarization, showing that going from the lower third of political capital to the upper third increases presidents' chances for success by **8 percentage points** (in a setting like 2008). Thus, political capital's impact does provide an **important boost** to presidents' success on Capitol Hill, but it is **certainly not potent enough to overcome basic congressional realities**. Political capital is just strong enough to put a presidential thumb on the congressional scales, which often will not matter, but can in close cases.

#### Immigration and gun control thump the disad – coming this month

**Foley and Stein 1-2** – Elise and Sam, writers for the Huffington Post (Obama's Immigration Reform Push To Begin This Month, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/02/obama-immigration-reform\_n\_2398507.html?1357169103)

WASHINGTON -- Despite a bruising fiscal cliff battle that managed to set the stage for an even more heated showdown that will likely take place in a matter of months, President Barack Obama is planning to move full steam ahead with the rest of his domestic policy agenda.

An Obama administration official said the president plans to push for immigration reform this January. The official, who spoke about legislative plans only on condition of anonymity, said that coming standoffs over deficit reduction are unlikely to drain momentum from other priorities. The White House plans to push forward quickly, not just on immigration reform but gun control laws as well.

The timeframe is likely to be cheered by Democrats and immigration reform advocates alike, who have privately expressed fears that Obama's second term will be drowned out in seemingly unending showdowns between parties. The just-completed fiscal cliff deal is giving way to a two-month deadline to resolve delayed sequestration cuts, an expiring continuing resolution to fund the government and a debt ceiling that will soon be hit.

#### Nat gas lobbies support the plan.

Brian Wingfield 8 is Forbes Staff Writer. “Clean Skies Forever,” 09.02.08, <http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/02/rnc-natural-gas-biz-beltway-cx_bw_0902rnc-gas.html>, Accessed date: 12-30-12 y2k

Perched on a rooftop just blocks from the Republican National Convention's main arena is an outpost for the natural gas industry. You can't tell so immediately. The American Clean Skies Foundation's chief executive officer, Denise Bode, describes the group as a "think tank" with a focus "on communicating and educating on clean energy, particularly natural gas, wind and renewables, as well as energy efficiency." But natural gas billionaire and Chesapeake Energy (nyse: CHK - news - people ) boss Aubrey McClendon provided much of the seed money for the foundation, and serves as its chairman. The organization's Web site, cleanskies.org, touts the benefits of natural gas as the "natural partner" for renewable fuels and its potential as a vehicle fuel. It arrives amid the conventions during a banner year for natural gas. Industry advocates now say the U.S. has supply to last at least 100 years. This is a big year for lobbying, and natural gas producers could indeed benefit from a cap-and-trade bill because it would create an incentive to rely less on electricity generated by traditional coal-fired power plants. All of which explains their presence in St. Paul, though Bode says Clean Skies does not take a position on legislation. "We just try to illuminate the facts and figures and impact so policymakers can make a decision for themselves." But while Clean Skies says it's not pushing an agenda, the gas industry sure is. It wants to see the Congressional ban on offshore drilling in much of the coastal U.S. lifted (a stance supported by John McCain). It opposes laws that might restrict onshore drilling on federal lands. It wants the government to lower the dividends and capital gains tax rates. And, of course, it wants to see any climate change bill Congress might consider be favorable to natural gas.

#### Key to agenda---outweighs their link.

Dan Froomkin 11 is senior Washington correspondent for the Huffington Post. “How The Oil Lobby Greases Washington's Wheels,”

04/06/11, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/06/how-the-oil-lobby-greases_n_845720.html?view=print&comm_ref=false>, Accessed date: 12-31-12 y2k

Clout in Washington isn't about winning legislative battles -- it's about making sure that they never happen at all. The oil and gas industry has that kind of clout. Despite astronomical profits during what have been lean years for most everyone else, the oil and gas industry continues to benefit from massive, multi-billion dollar taxpayer subsidies. Opinion polling shows the American public overwhelmingly wants those subsidies eliminated. Meanwhile, both parties are hunting feverishly for ways to reduce the deficit. But when President Obama called on Congress to eliminate about $4 billion a year in tax breaks for Big Oil earlier this year, the response on the Hill was little more than a knowing chuckle. Even Obama's closest congressional allies don't think the president’s proposal has a shot. "I would be surprised if it got a great deal of traction," Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.), chairman of the Senate energy committee, told reporters at the National Press Club a few days after Obama first announced his plan. Rep. Earl Blumenauer (D-Ore.), co-author of a House bill that closely resembles Obama's proposal, nevertheless acknowledges that it has slim chances of passing. "It will be a challenge to get anything through the House that includes any tax increase for anyone under any circumstance," he told The Huffington Post. The list goes on: "It's not on my radar," said Frank Maisano, a spokesman for Bracewell Giuliani, a lobbying firm with several oil and gas industry clients. "It's old news and it's never going to happen in this Congress. It couldn't even happen in the last Congress." Indeed, the oil and gas industry's stranglehold on Congres is so firm that even when the Democrats controlled both houses, repeal of the subsidies didn't stand a chance. Obama proposed cutting them in his previous two budgets as well, but the Senate -- where Republicans and consistently pro-oil Louisiana Democrat Mary Landrieu had more than enough votes to block any legislation -- never even took a stab at it. Now that the House is controlled by the GOP, Obama's proposal is deader than an oil-soaked pelican. Over the last decade in particular, the Republican Party's anti-tax policies and pro-drilling campaign rhetoric have become nearly indistinguishable from those of Big Oil. "Obama's been proposing to get rid of these subsidies since his first budget in February 2009," said Tyson Slocum, director of the energy program for the consumer watchdog group Public Citizen. "The obstacle has been the petroleum industry. The American Petroleum Institute has dug in their heels and is fighting tooth and nail to retain these subsidies." The American Petroleum Institute (API) is the industry's enormously powerful lobbying and trade association. "API is very focused on making sure that we have a voice in policy debates," said Martin Durbin, the organization's executive vice president for government affairs. "Certainly I hope we're having some role in the debate here." Is he pleased at the industry's success in heading off this particular debate? "I feel that we are successfully getting the point across, successfully educating policy-makers about the importance of our industry throughout the economy," he said. Even before Obama's 2011 State of the Union address, API president Jack Gerard used his "State of American Energy" speech to cast the repeal attempt as a tax increase and a job-killer. "The way I see it, our policy-makers are at a crossroads," Gerard said. "They face two choices: One leads us forward and promotes jobs, investments, revenue and growth -- or one that takes us backward, threatening the progress we've made and closing the door on future opportunities." Gerard was speaking to a receptive audience. As Time noted, "Republican Fred Upton, the new chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, was in the front row of the audience for Gerard's speech." Upton did not return calls for comment. A PAMPERED INDUSTRY In January, Obama previewed his 2012 budget proposal during his State of the Union address. "I'm asking Congress to eliminate the billions in taxpayer dollars we currently give to oil companies," he said. "I don't know if you've noticed, but they're doing just fine on their own." The line got a laugh, and then Obama pointed out the trade-offs of giving public support to a powerful private interest: "Instead of subsidizing yesterday's energy, let's invest in tomorrow's." he said. With the actual budget proposal came more details: a list of tax breaks that, if eliminated, would generate $43.6 billion of additional revenue over the next 10 years. Two of the biggest breaks date back nearly a century, to a time when a young, untested industry needed incentives to drill. The API, after adding in the cost of some other proposed measures (including reinstating Superfund taxes and repealing two accounting gimmicks that would affect other industries as well), concluded that Obama's FY 2012 proposed budget could cost the oil and gas industry $90 billion over the next decade. The loss of subsidies would affect the industry's bottom lines, but would hardly, as Rep. Joe Barton (R-Tex), recently suggested, start driving companies out of business. That's because Obama was right; the oil companies are doing just fine. The big five -- BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil and Shell -- made a combined total profit of nearly $1 trillion over the past decade, with ExxonMobil clearing $31 billion in profits this past year alone. And it's hardly the case that the oil industry needs added incentives to drill. Former oilman George W. Bush made that point as clearly as anyone when he leveled with members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in a 2005 address: "I will tell you with $55 [a barrel] oil we don't need incentives to oil and gas companies to explore," he said. "There are plenty of incentives." Slocum, of Public Citizen, concurs: "With prices around $100 a barrel, it is asinine to suggest that $4 to $6 billion a year collectively is driving decisions about whether or not to pursue extraction opportunities in the U.S.," he said. "It is market prices that are driving investment decisions." While the oil industry warns that repealing the subsidies -- in addition to costing jobs -- would lead to higher gas prices, that too is hardly evident. Fuel costs largely reflect the price of oil, and that price has little to do with how much it costs to produce it. According to a U.S. Energy Information Administration survey, between 2007 and 2009, major U.S.-based oil companies spent an average of $29.31 to produce a barrel of oil. About one third of that amount went for extraction and taxes, and two thirds for exploration and development -- precisely why those companies are making such a killing when prices are $100 a barrel or more. Rather than production costs, the price of oil is set by the global market, and is affected by multiple factors. Those can include financial speculation and geopolitical fears that lately have been causing wild price swings. The repeal of a few billion dollars in subsidies isn't enough to make more than a small ripple in an approximately $3 trillion-a-year global market. Blumenauer argues that subsidies aren't appropriate for any well-established industry. Instead, he says, they should be used to support developing ones. "What's happened over the years, as the oil industry matured, as the giants consolidated into global players, and as the price of oil has been on a pretty steady upward trajectory -- with some hiccups along the way -- is that there ceased to be any rationale for providing these tax subsidies other than they were in the code and they benefited some of these companies." By contrast, he points out: "The rationale for providing tax subsidies for emerging technologies and energy sources now makes perfect sense for solar, wind, and geothermal -- where helping them come to scale would help provide a better balance to our energy choices." Oil and gas subsidies don't appear to wash with the general public, either. In a February NBC/Wall Street Journal poll that proffered suggestions for things that might be cut or eliminated as a way to reduce the current federal budget deficit, "eliminating tax credits for the oil and gas industries" was considered acceptable by a whopping 74 percent of Americans. Nearly 50 percent called it "totally acceptable." The only policy proposals that were more popular were raising taxes on the rich, eliminating earmarks, and canceling unnecessary weapons systems. The API says it has gotten very different signals from people.. Durbin said API's own polls show otherwise. "If you ask people, 'Should we take away unfair advantages to Big Oil,' then of course they'll say yes," he said. "If you ask a straight question, as we do... you get a much different answer." API's poll question asked "Do you support or oppose increased taxes on America's oil and natural gas industry?" ENERGY GIANTS ANTE UP With so much public opposition, why do subsidies remain? You might as well ask why there is no carbon tax, or why there was no significant reform legislation passed after the BP oil spill. The answer is that one of the many things the industry can do with its fat pocketbook is hire a veritable army of sharp lobbyists and back them up with big wads of cash in the form of campaign donations and spending. The end result is that the industry has a remarkable ability to get its way on Capitol Hill. According to the Center for Responsive Politics' website, the oil and gas industry has spent more than $1 billion on lobbying since 1998, including a jaw-dropping $147 million just last year. For comparison's sake, $147 million is about equivalent to the total budget of 100 congressional offices. That's more than the $103 million spent in 2010 by the financial service industry, another potent lobbying force -- but considerably less than the $240 million spent by the pharmaceutical industry. Among major industries, Opensecrets.org ranked Big Oil fifth in terms of lobbying dollars spent, behind only Big Pharma, electric utilities, business associations and insurance. The oil and gas industry used its $147 million to employ 788 individual lobbyists in 2010 -- some 500 (or almost two thirds) of whom, according to Opensecrets.org, are former federal employees who came through the revolving door particularly well versed in the ways of government. All told, that's well more than one oil and gas lobbyist per member of Congress out there on the Hill arming allies with talking points and briefing books, spinning the undecided and pressuring the opposition. And there's more of them every year. Consider the trendlines. As recently as 2004, the oil and gas industry spent about $52 million a year in lobbying; by 2009, that figure was up to $175 million -- or a 300 percent increase in just five years. The industry backs up its extraordinary lobbying effort with lavish spending on political campaigns. Candidates associated with oil and gas companies made about $15 million in direct campaign donations during the 2010 mid-term election cycle ($26 million during the 2008 presidential cycle). The industry was also responsible for more than $10 million in donations through its political action committees, or PACs, in the 2010 cycle. The trendlines are notable here, as well. In the early ’90s, oil and gas campaign spending favored Republicans over Democrats by about a 2 to 1 margin: For every $1 the industry gave to Democrats, it gave Republicans $1.78. But starting in the 1996 election cycle (think Al Gore), that changed dramatically. Now, for every $1 the industry gives Democrats, it gives Republicans about $3.35. Among the top oil and gas industry donors in the 2010 cycle, Koch Industries and ExxonMobil head the list. And Opensecrets.org's top 20 list of oil and gas money recipients is 4 to 1 Republican. In addition to contributions to individuals and PACs, there's the whole new world of spending opportunities opened up by recent Supreme Court rulings that essentially blew a hole through the post-Watergate campaign finance laws. Super PACs are groups that can now accept unlimited contributions, though they must disclose their contributors. Opensecrets.org calculates that companies with interests in the energy sector combined to give more than $5.6 million to Super PACs in the 2010 cycle. Former Bush political guru Karl Rove's American Crossroads group, for one such Super PAC. It spent $21 million on political advertising in the 2010 cycle; oil and gas interests contributed just over $3 million of that amount. The recent court rulings also opened the way for nonprofit groups to spend unlimited amounts of money on political campaigns -- and unlike the Super PACs, they don't have to disclose their donors. All they have to do is report how much they spent. These groups, led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, reported $140 million in campaign spending in the 2010 cycle, the vast majority of which went to support conservative causes. There's no way to know how much of that money came from Big Oil. Adding yet more firepower to its lobbyists’ arsenal, API announced last month that it will start funding political campaigns directly through a new PAC of its own -- in addition to what its member organizations give already. "API is very focused on making sure that we have a voice in policy debates," said its spokesman, Durbin. "We're always looking at ways to improve the way we do our jobs here. This just adds one more tool to leverage our ability to get the point across about the critical nature of this industry." One more thing: According to another study by the Center for Responsive Politics, oil and gas industry holdings are some of the most popular investments among lawmakers and their spouses, and in recent years have grown in value, offering a bundle of potential conflicts of interest problems. "Without question, among all the different industries that lobby the federal government, that make campaign contributions, oil and gas is right at the top of the top," said CRP's Dave Levinthal. "They can invest incredible resources into the political process that make so much of a difference in Washington, at the cost of a fraction of a faction of their haul." And it's not just the breadth of their efforts -- it's the ferocity and the effectiveness. Last month, one of the House's nine freshmen Democrats, Rep. William Keating of Massachusetts, tried to tack a subsidy repeal onto a continuing budget resolution. He failed, by a 73 vote margin, with not a single Republican voting in favor and 13 Democrats voting against the measure. Keating said he considers that vote a testament to the power of the oil and gas lobby. "It's incredible to me. It would be my Exhibit A," he said. "Because we're sitting here in the midst of a budget deadlock, we're sitting here cutting Head Start programs, police, fire, border security, reading teachers -- we're sitting here cutting the basics, and there's just this refusal to even consider subsidies for the oil companies." There's no business or economic argument for them, Keating said. "These are profitable businesses right now. This isn't a situation where you're trying to provide capital for businesses that need it, or trying to provide assistance to get a small business off the ground. It's not for economic development. It's not for job creation. It's not to enhance the middle class. So why is it there?" The answer, Keating said, has to be the industry's political clout. "I used to be a district attorney. Many times you begin an investigation by eliminating everything else. So I've been trying to eliminate every other possible reason, and I'm left with that." The money the industry spends influencing legislation and elections looks enormous -- until you compare it with what it buys. "If you look at $4 billion [in subsidies] annually, compared to say $200 million for lobbying and campaign spending," said Daniel J. Weiss, director of climate strategy for the Center for American Progress Action Fund, "that is a 20-to-1 payoff." And maintaining subsidies is only a small part of what the oil industry lobby has accomplished. Last session, the industry also blocked cap-and-trade legislation and staved off any action in response to the BP oil spill. Right now, it's fully occupied trying to defund the Environmental Protection Agency and roll back regulations across the board.

#### No middle east war

**Fettweis 2007** – assistant political science professor at Tulane, assistant professor of National Security Affairs at US Naval War College (December, Christopher, Survival, 49.4, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq”)

Without the US presence, a second argument goes, nothing would prevent Sunni-Shia violence from sweeping into every country where the religious divide exists. A Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and Cairo might face a Shia bloc headquartered in Tehran, both of which would face enormous pressure from their own people to fight proxy wars across the region. In addition to intra-Muslim civil war, cross-border warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan might be the first to send troops into Iraq to secure its own border; once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia might follow suit. The Middle East has no shortage of rivalries, any of which might descend into direct conflict after a destabilising US withdrawal. In the worst case, Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able to bully and blackmail its neighbours with its new nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon demand suitable deterrents of their own, and a nuclear arms race would envelop the region. Once again, however, none of these outcomes is particularly likely.

Wider war

No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region's autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam's rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again.

The region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique.

The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq's neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their co-religionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17

Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor - the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world - to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare.

#### Credibility impacts are empirically false and unsupported by any research

**Fettweis, 10** – assistant professor of political science at Tulane University (Christopher, “The Remnants of Honor: Pathology, Credibility and U.S. Foreign Policy," August, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1657460)

If credibility kept a state safe in a dangerous world, then the occasional war to bolster it would be a small price to pay. There are good reasons to believe that this is not the case. In order for credibility to be a useful, rational motivation for action, two criteria must be met: There must be actors in society with the desire and capability to take advantage of perceived low credibility; and second, there must be good reason to believe that they can be deterred by a reputation for resolve. For the United States in the twenty-first century, neither of these is fulfilled. The current international system does not resemble the kind of dangerous, anarchic world where honor and credibility can deter aggression. A concern for credibility is irrational when there are no major enemies poised to take advantage of irresolution. Furthermore, decades of research cast doubt upon the deterrent ability of honor in the international system, suggesting that its benefits are illusory. Target states rarely learn the lessons we try to teach them. Credibility never kept a country safe; fortunately, in today’s world, the United States is safe with or without it.

### 1ac adv 1

#### ADVANTAGE ONE IS MANUFACTURING

#### Gas supply crunch coming now – production ceilings and economics

Nelder, 12 [Chris, Smart Planet, February, Everything you know about shale gas is wrong, http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/energy-futurist/everything-you-know-about-shale-gas-is-wrong/341]

But now there’s even more bad news: U.S. gas production appears to have hit a production ceiling, and is actually declining in major areas. The startling revelation comes from a new paper published today by Houston-based petroleum geologist and energy sector consultant Arthur Berman. Berman reached this conclusion by compiling his own production history of U.S. shale gas from a massive data set licensed from data provider HPDI. His well-by-well analysis found that total U.S. gas production has been on an “undulating plateau” since the beginning of 2009, and showed declines in some areas in 2011. This stands in stark contrast to recent data provided by the EIA, which shows shale gas production rising steadily for the past two years, and well into the future. The EIA’s forecast is bullish because it’s mainly a view of demand, without great regard for supply limits. But their historical supply data differs for a reason that will be no surprise to experienced observers: the data is bad. The EIA gets its data on shale gas production by sampling the reports of major operators, then applying a formula to estimate how much gas is actually being produced, according to Berman. This may explain why they only have official monthly historical production data for the two years (unofficially, three) of 2008 and 2009, and only annual data for 2010 and 2011. This has been a big red flag to me in my recent work on shale gas, accustomed as I am to EIA’s far more detailed and up-to-date monthly and weekly data on oil, and has made it nearly impossible to verify the claim that we’ve had “booming” gas production over the past two years. Data is also available directly from the states, but some states haveflawed reporting processes**,** the granularity and reporting frequency varies (as low as every six months, in the case of Pennsylvania), and ultimately the data isn’t available in a usable format. It’s also inaccurate and incomplete, as one Pittsburgh newspaper recently found out. Berman reached the same conclusion, noting in his paper that “the data that EIA makes available does not have sufficient resolution to evaluate individual plays or states.” So he had to build his own database. An unprofitable treadmill One reason for the recent slowdown in production growth is that “unconventional” shale gas wells have to make up for the decline of conventional gas wells, which has accelerated from 23 percent per year in 2001 to 32 percent per year today. The U.S. now needs to replace 22 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) of production each year just to maintain flat supply. Currently, all shale gas plays together produce around 19 Bcf/d. The shift to unconventional gas has put us on a production treadmill: We have to keep drilling like mad to maintain output because unconventional wells are far less productive and shorter-lived than conventional gas wells. Berman observes that an average gas well in Texas in 2010 produces one-fifth as much gas as an average conventional gas well did in 1972. In 1972, 23,000 gas wells produced 7.5 trillion cubic feet in Texas; in 2010, it took 102,000 wells to produce 6.4 trillion cubic feet. Another reason was that the spurt of production created a gas glut and drove prices far below the level of profitability. Data from a January, 2012 presentation by the CEO of gas operator Range Resources showed that gas needs to sell for at least $4 per million BTU in order for operators to turn a profit. Source: Jonathan Callahan, The Oil Drum. Data from Range Resources. Berman is certain that the $4 threshold applies to new drilling on existing plays only; after accounting for land leasing, overhead and debt service, the threshold would be much higher. In any case, we can see that production flattened out when prices fell below $4 at the beginning of 2009. Source: Arthur Berman. Data from Natural Gas Intelligence. A gas price below $3 spells real trouble for operators, and flagging production is but the first effect. The next is debt: According to analysis by ARC Financial Research, the 34 top U.S. publicly traded shale gas producers are currently carrying a combined $10 billion quarterly cash flow deficit. And finally, there will the destruction of forward supply, as new development grinds down. Financing further development with debt in this environment will be extremely difficult, and eventually even the joint-venture sugar daddies that have sustained operators over the past few months will get cold feet. Without a reversal in price, gas production is guaranteed to decline. The gas gold rush is over Indeed, Berman concludes that “the gold rush is over at least for now with the less commercial shale plays.” Within the major producing areas of the U.S., which account for 75 percent of production, all except Louisiana have been either flat or declining in recent years. Overall, he sees evidence that 80 percent of existing U.S. shale gas plays are already approaching peak production. Rig counts have been falling, and major operators such as Chesapeake Energy and ConocoPhilips have announced slowdowns in drilling in the last month. The two major plays that do not show evidence of peaking yet are the newer ones: the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania and the Haynesville Shale in Louisiana. To see the influence of these two plays on overall production, compare the first chart below, which shows production from all shale plays, to the second, which removes production from those two plays: Source: Arthur Berman Source: Chart by Chris Nelder, from Arthur Berman’s worksheets The Haynesville surpassed the Barnett Shale in Texas last year as the top-producing shale play in the U.S., but it may be reaching a production plateau now. Worse, Berman’s analysis finds that despite its impressive production, the Haynesville is among the least economic of the shale plays, requiring gas prices above $7.00 per thousand cubic feet to sustain new drilling profitably, and nearly $9.00 per thousand cubic feet after accounting for leasing and other costs. (One thousand cubic feet is roughly equivalent to one million BTU.) A word of caution is in order here: A one-year decline in production in an unprofitable environment is not proof that shale gas has “peaked.” It’s certainly possible that renewed drilling could bring higher production when gas prices rise again. The operative question in that case is when. If gas prices recover within the next year or two, it will be relatively easy to bring new wells online rapidly. But if gas prices languish for longer than that, the most productive “core” areas of the plays could become exhausted because the wells deplete so quickly. Without sustained new drilling to replace their production, by the time producers begin drilling again in the remaining, less productive prospects, an air pocket could form in the supply line. Disinformation and diffusion theory Berman admits that it’s strange for his bottom-up analysis to produce results that are so wildly divergent from the claims of the operators and the data offered by the EIA. “I ask myself: Where could we be wrong?” he explained. “We’ve looked at the individual wells and it looks like they’ll produce less gas than the operators say, so where could we be wrong? Likewise on cost: There are no retained earnings, so how could they be saying they’re profitable?” Having scrutinized the financial reports of operators, Berman concludes that operators are being honest with the SEC, because if they aren’t, somebody will go to jail. But then they’re telling a very different story to the public, and to investors, particularly regarding their costs. This isn’t necessarily nefarious; it’s really just a way of working around the natural risks associated with new resource development. They’re playing for the future, not for immediate profitability. Early wildcatters gambled on debt-fueled drilling with the hope that they’d be able to hold the leases long enough to see prices rise again and put them nicely in the black, or flip them at a profit to someone who could. And the profit picture is substantial: according to the Range Resources presentation, when gas is $6, they’ll be realizing a 135 percent internal rate of return. “I think these companies realize—clearly—that the U.S. is moving toward a gas economy,” Berman observes. “The natural gas industry has been very successful at screwing up the coal industry. . . a huge part of the demand is from the power generation business. The President now thinks, incorrectly, that we’ve got 100 years of natural gas. [Op’erators think] ‘If we can just get all this land held, drilled, etc., then in a couple of years when the price recovers we’re going to make a fortune’. . . and they’re right!” I am inclined to agree. My own analysis suggests that [gas is trouncing coal](http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/energy-futurist/regulation-and-the-decline-of-coal-power/275) in the power generation sector. I am also strongly against exporting LNG, because it will increase domestic costs across the board, another point on which Berman and I agree. “If they go through with the permits to export LNG, then that’s gonna seal it,” he remarked. “All you have to do is commit to 20-year contracts to ship a few bcf per day. . . I fear what’s really going to happen is that we’re going to have to start importing LNG.” Ultimately, we have to ask why there seems to be such an enormous disconnect between the reality of the production and reserve data, and the wild-eyed claims of operators and politicians. Berman’s answer is blunt: “We’re in a weird place where it’s not in anybody’s vested interest to say that things aren’t wonderful,” he said, and went on to relate a few stories of his encounters with politicians. They admitted to him, straight-up, that they can’t tell the public the truth about energy issues like gas reserves and peak oil because nobody wants to hear it, and they’ll just wind up getting voted out of office. “This gets back to basic diffusion theory,” Berman muses, “where only 5 percent of people base their decisions on information, while the other 95 percent make decisions on what everybody else thinks.” That sounds right to me. It benefits everyone involved to tell happy lies, and benefits no one to own up to the current reality. That is true for everyone from the operators right on up to the President. Perhaps in the end—like government—we’ll simply get the energy policy we deserve.

#### And, shale industry unsustainable—decline rates prove

Berman, 11/12/12 [Arthur, lecturer at Rice Graduate School of Management, geological consultant with 32 years of experience in petroleum exploration and production, M.S. Geology Colorado School of Mines, B.A Amherst College, published 50 articles on geology, member of the National Petroleum Council and on the Board of Directors of ASPO USA editorial board of The Oil Drum, and an associate editor of the AAPG (American Association of Petroleum Geologists) Bulletin, “Shale Gas Will be the Next Bubble to Pop - An Interview with Arthur Berman”, http://oilprice.com/Interviews/Shale-Gas-Will-be-the-Next-Bubble-to-Pop-An-Interview-with-Arthur-Berman.html]

A lot of investors from other parts of the world, particularly the oil-rich parts have been making somewhat high-risk investments in the United States for many years and, for a long time, those investments were in real estate. Now these people have shifted their focus and are putting cash into shale. There are two important things going on here, one is that the capital isn't going to last forever, especially since shale gas is a commercial failure. Shale gas has lost hundreds of billions of dollars and investors will not keep on pumping money into something that doesn’t generate a return. The second thing that nobody thinks very much about is the decline rates shale reservoirs experience. Well, I've looked at this. The decline rates are incredibly high. In the Eagleford shale, which is supposed to be the mother of all shale oil plays, the annual decline rate is higher than 42%. They're going to have to drill hundreds, almost 1000 wells in the Eagleford shale, every year, to keep production flat. Just for one play, we're talking about $10 or $12 billion a year just to replace supply. I add all these things up and it starts to approach the amount of money needed to bail out the banking industry. Where is that money going to come from? Do you see what I'm saying? Oilprice.com: You've been noted suggesting that shale gas will be the next bubble to collapse. How do you think this will occur and what will the effects be? Arthur Berman: Well, it depends, as with all collapses, on how quickly the collapse occurs. I guess the worst-case scenario would be that several large companies find themselves in financial distress. Chesapeake Energy recently had a very close call. They had to sell, I don't know how many, billions of dollars worth of assets just to maintain paying their obligations, and that's the kind of scenario I'm talking about. You may have a couple of big bankruptcies or takeovers and everybody pulls back, all the money evaporates, all the capital goes away. That's the worst-case scenario.

#### And, historical data proves shale hype is overblown – our data uses an academic “gold standard”

Hurdle, 12/3/12 [Jon, Citing Berman, qualls above, AOL Energy, “Are US Shale Gas Resources Overstated? Part 1”, http://energy.aol.com/2012/12/03/are-us-shale-gas-resources-overstated-part-1/?icid=trending1]

A forthcoming book argues that the country's shale gas plays contain only about a quarter of the fuel that has been estimated by the US Energy Information Administration, and other widely used industry and academic assessments. "Cold, Hungry and in the Dark: Exploding the Natural Gas Supply Myth," by Bill Powers asserts that the quantity of unproved but technically recoverable natural gas in US shale plays is approximately 127 trillion cubic feet, or about a quarter of the 482 tcf estimated by the EIA in its Annual Energy Outlook for 2012. Powers, who publishes a newsletter for energy investors, argues that existing natural gas plays have not been nearly as productive as their backers predicted, and so cannot be expected to live up to expectations for future output. "Recent drilling success has been extrapolated into the future," said Powers, who also sits on the board of the Calgary oil and gas company Arsenal Energy. "That's not supported by drilling history." In Arkansas' Fayetteville Shale, 4,400 wells have produced 3.3 tcf since 2005, according to the Arkansas Oil & Gas Commission, or around a tenth of the 32 tcf that the EIA says is technically recoverable. In reality, Powers says, the Fayetteville contains a total recoverable resource (TRR) of just 10 tcf. In Louisiana, Arkansas and east Texas, the Haynesville Shale has produced around 5 tcf so far, Powers said. He predicted it has a total recoverable resource of 10-20 tcf, far short of the EIA's estimate of 75 tcf, a number Powers called "ridiculous." **Swimming Against the Current** He applies the same argument to Michigan's Antrim Shale, a play that has not been subject to the new wave of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling that has made many shale beds economic, but whose long history since the mid-1980s shows production that he says has fallen short of expectations. The Antrim has so far produced 3 tcf from some 10,000 wells, and its output has been declining since 1998, according to the Michigan Public Service Commission. Powers predicted the shale contains a TRR of 2 tcf, sharply lower than the 20 tcf predicted by the EIA. Powers is the latest analyst to argue that the widely heralded shale-gas "revolution" may be overblown. Other skeptics include Houston-based petroleum consultant Arthur Berman who has long claimed that resource estimates are being overstated by energy companies seeking to defend their stock prices. Berman, who writes the foreword to Powers's book, said the national gas resource, including proven reserves, is likely to equal about 22 years of consumption at the current rate, or less than a quarter of the 100 years' worth that is often cited by analysts and policymakers including President Obama. Berman's forecast is based on an estimate of probable reserves published by the Potential Gas Committee at the [Colorado School of Mines](http://energy.aol.com/tag/Colorado+School+of+Mines/), a 100-strong panel of company representatives that Berman called the "gold standard" of natural gas resource estimation. "There is a great deal more uncertainty in this whole shale revolution than most people want to believe," Berman told AOL Energy. "There is definitely less gas than the propaganda says."

#### And, that ensures catastrophic price spikes

Maize, 12/1/12 [“Is Shale Gas Shallow or the Real Deal?”, Kennedy, Veteran Journalist¶ Kennedy Maize has spent the past 40 years working as a journalist, analyst, and manager in the private sector and federal government, with over 35 years of that focused on energy and environmental topics. Over that time, he has seen myriad examples of how group think, policy fads, and bad judgment can result in colossal failures, particularly in the field of atomic energy. Maize has seen, up close and personal, the demise of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the arrival of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the birth of the U.S. Department of Energy, the failures of nuclear flight, the hubris of atomic earthmoving, the boom and bust uranium market, the birth and death of breeder reactors, and the 60-year wandering in the wilderness of nuclear waste policy. After graduating from Penn State and graduate study at the University of Maryland, Kennedy Maize worked for newspapers in Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia and the Associated Press in Baltimore. He then spent five years in management at the National Institute of Health and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission before taking a job covering energy, environment, and business topics for Editorial Research Reports, a division of Congressional Quarterly, where his work appeared in over 1,000 daily newspapers in the U.S. during the mid-to-late 1970s. Maize became a staff writer and editor at The Energy Daily, a preeminent energy trade paper, on March 28, 1979, the day the Three Mile Island accident began outside Harrisburg, Pa. Over more than 10 years at The Energy Daily, he covered the nuclear and coal industries, including stories involving the Clinch River Breeder Reactor, the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corp., the Powder River Basin coal leasing scandal, and the Chernobyl explosion. In 1993, he founded The Electricity Daily, where he was the editor for 14 years, writing about changes in the electricity business, the rise and fall of Enron, the stagnation of the nuclear power business, and the arrival of market forces in the utility field. Since 2006, he has been an editor at POWER magazine, and the founder of MANAGING POWER magazine, where he has written about the Fukushima catastrophe, the emergence of shale gas and decline of coal, and the often ill-advised push for renewable electricity technologies¶ http://www.powermag.com/gas/Is-Shale-Gas-Shallow-or-the-Real-Deal\_5188.html]

In an interview with POWER, Berman argued that the boom in drilling shale gas wells has obscured a long-term decline in conventional gas supply. But a coming rapid decline in shale production, he said, will soon reveal the overall limits to the gas boom, and volatility and upward pressure could return to natural gas prices. “It’s not a problem for today or tomorrow,” Berman said, “but it is coming. Once we work through the current oversupply, if capital is not forthcoming,” prices will spike. The gas supply bubble will burst.¶ Because of the current gas glut, with long prices in the range of $3 per million cubic feet (mcf), drilling shale gas wells has tanked, noted Berman. Chesapeake Energy, the most bullish of the shale gas players, is selling assets and shifting rigs to drilling for oil because the company just can’t make money on $3 gas. “I can see a time not too many months away when we could see gas supply in rather serious decline,” Berman said, noting that “there is plenty of gas, but it takes a long time to shift momentum back” to gas drilling. At a 2010 meeting in Washington, as low gas prices were resulting in a decline in new drilling, Berman commented, “Shale plays are marginally commercial at best.”¶ Greatly complicating the supply equation, said Berman, is the nature of shale gas wells. “Shale wells decline 30 to 40% per year,” he said. “Conventional wells decline 20 to 25%. What most don’t grasp is how many wells it takes just to keep supply flat.”¶ In the Barnett Shale in Texas, where Berman is most familiar with the geology, he calculates that the annual decline in the gas resource is 1.7 bcf/day. In order to add to the net Barnett production, Berman says, companies would have to drill 3,880 wells, at a cost of $12 billion.¶ “We are setting ourselves up for a potential reduction in supply and price will go up,” said Berman. “I don’t know how much it will go up, and there is a check-and-balance with coal. There will be gas-coal switching if prices do go much higher than now.”

#### And, demand increases make a shock inevitable – corresponding supply growth key

Moors, 12/14/12 [Dr. Kent, Dr. Kent F. Moors is an internationally recognized expert in global risk management, oil/natural gas policy and finance, cross-border capital flows, emerging market economic and fiscal development, political, financial and market risk assessment. He is the executive managing partner of Risk Management Associates International LLP (RMAI), a full-service, global-management-consulting and executive training firm. Moors has been an advisor to the highest levels of the U.S., Russian, Kazakh, Bahamian, Iraqi and Kurdish governments, to the governors of several U.S. states, and to the premiers of two Canadian provinces. He’s served as a consultant to private companies, financial institutions and law firms in 25 countries and has appeared more than 1,400 times as a featured radio-and-television commentator in North America, Europe and Russia, appearing on ABC, BBC, Bloomberg TV, CBS, CNN, NBC, Russian RTV and regularly on Fox Business Network. A professor in the Graduate Center for Social and Public Policy at Duquesne University, where he also directs the Energy Policy Research Group, Moors has developed international educational programs and he runs training sessions for multiple U.S. government agencies. And until recent revisions in U.S. policy, Dr. Moors was slated to be the deputy director of the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) in Baghdad,

http://moneymorning.com/2012/12/14/2013-natural-gas-forecast-six-bullish-reasons-why-now-is-the-time-to-buy/\]

A rise on the supply side would generally reduce prices, especially if the number of operators continues to increase. More gas moving on the market from more suppliers results in a downward pressure on prices.¶ The second dynamic, however, is moving in the other direction, enticing the increase in drilling and expansion of infrastructure.¶ This factor considers the demand side, and there are at least six major trends colliding to increase the prospects for gas usage as we move through 2013.¶ As a result, I expect natural gas prices to see a 25% increase from current levels... here's why.¶ 2013 Natural Gas Forecast¶ 1) Winter Chill Increases Natural Gas Demand¶ The first factor driving price increases will come from a colder winter throughout the United States. Traditionally, gas prices have been quite sensitive to seasonal shifts. The overly mild winter in the East last winter was enough to depress gas prices across the board. In 2011, NYMEX futures contracts declined to less than $2 per 1,000 cubic feet (or million BTUs).¶ The price has recovered to as much as $3.90 recently, although it is currently down to about $3.50. Nonetheless, the recovery (largely a result of companies pulling drilling rigs out of service and reducing the number of new wells) combined with a colder winter, will provide a base pushing the price to $4 as we start the new year.¶ The other five elements are more directly affecting demand increases moving forward. These will have primary effects on the gas balance between anticipated needs and drilling volume.¶ 2/3) Industrial and Petrochemical Usage on the Rise¶ The second and third elements are increasing industrial and petrochemical uses for gas. Industrial use has been building for a while, but it is one of the last demand factors to emerge during an economic recovery. That is now beginning to kick in.¶ However, petrochemical usage is resulting in an appreciating demand situation. Gas, natural gas liquids, and byproducts are replacing crude oil and oil products as feeder stock for an entire range of petrochemicals - from solvents and polymers, to plastics and fibers.¶ The intense competition over where the next "crackers" will be located in the U.S. is clear testimony to the added demand coming from petrochemicals. These facilities will break down gas flows, making the feeder stock ingredients more accessible. This development is also putting some additional weight on the processing of "wet" gas, raw material containing value-added byproducts.¶ 4) Natural Gas Fleets Expand Across the U.S.¶ The fourth demand factor is the increasing use of natural gas as a vehicle fuel. We have been witnessing a rise in interest here for several years, but the move to using liquefied natural gas (LNG) and compressed natural gas (CNG) to replace gasoline and diesel has been gaining strength.¶ Entire fleets of heavy-duty trucks have been retrofitted across Canada, while refueling terminals have been popping up near interstates in the U.S. to service company-designated vehicles. The cost savings in fuel is significant, usually representing more than two dollars per gallon.¶ The downside is on the infrastructure side. It will take several years of heavy capital investment to provide the network of transport pipelines, storage and terminal facilities, filling stations, and related requirements.¶ And we must consider the cost of retrofitting engines. At an average of $35,000 per vehicle, it will remain an obstruction for some.¶ I expect to see an increase in natural gas-as-fuel usage continuing, but remaining on the truck side for 2013. Personal autos will stay a niche market in the near-term. Still, this will comprise an improving demand area for natural gas.¶ 5) Electricity Consumption from Gas Set to Spike¶ Fifth is the massive transfer underway from coal to gas as the preferred fuel for generating electricity. Coal will remain a fuel of choice in several sectors of the world and will still be cost effective in certain regions in the U.S. But the days of "King Coal" in the generation of electricity are drawing to a close.¶ The figures here are massive. The American market is replacing more than 90 gigawatts (GW) of generating capacity by 2020, virtually all of this coal-fired. In addition, the phasing in of non-carbon regulations (cutting mercury, sulfurous, and nitrous oxide emissions) will add another 20 GW to the retirement agenda, once again coming almost exclusively from coal.¶ Each 10 GW transferred to natural gas will require an additional 1.2 billion cubic feet of gas per day. If only 50% of the expected transition from coal to gas occurs, the added demand will eliminate three times the current total gas in storage nationwide.¶

#### And, supply expansion locks in economic renaissance—key to manufacturing

Pirog and Ratner, 12 [November, Congressional Research Service, Natural Gas in the U.S. Economy: Opportunities for Growth Robert Pirog Specialist in Energy Economics Michael Ratner Specialist in Energy Policy, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42814.pdf]

Expanded supply, coupled with low natural gas prices, has the potential to contribute to a transformation of important sectors of the U.S. economy. Increased output and employment, expanded investment, income growth, improved competitiveness, and a reduction in the foreign trade deficit are likely outcomes. These conditions in the natural gas markets are likely to benefit certain key industries directly, while many other industries could experience indirect benefits. direct beneficiaries are those industries that use natural gas as a raw material or as an important input in a production process. Industries whose output is directly related to the expansion of natural gas exploration, development and production are also direct beneficiaries. Examples of industries that use natural gas directly are petrochemicals and fertilizers. The steel industry is an example of an industry whose output is linked to the pace of natural gas resource development. Industries experiencing indirect benefits might include construction and capital goods producers that contribute to the supply chain for the investment projects undertaken by expanding natural gas consumers. In addition, more spending by workers in all of these industries could increase the growth of a wide variety of consumer goods and retail firms. The economic benefits of shale gas development and production will also open areas not recently accustomed to natural gas production, for example, the Marcellus field in parts of Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, Maryland, Virginia, and New York. In the international economy, those U.S. industries directly affected by expanded supply and low natural gas prices are likely to experience a competitive advantage over the producers of similar goods in other countries, resulting in increased exports from, and decreased imports to the United States. These effects would likely improve the U.S. trade deficit position. This advantage is likelyto be maintained over time if the U.S. price of natural gas remains below those observed in other world regional markets (see Figure 5).13 U.S. industry’s advantage could be reduced through a process of world natural gas price convergence, especially in the three leading regional markets. However, for this to occur, traditional long-run contract terms, specifically linking natural gas prices to oil prices, would need to be changed to a more market-oriented method.

#### And, expectations of continued supply prevents economic collapse via a collapse of manufacturing

Carey, 12/13/12 [Julie M, Julie M. Carey is an energy economist with Navigant Economics who provides consulting and testifying services Navigant’s unconventional oil and gas offerings include advisory services for strategic business decision analysis, construction risk management, economic and antitrust analyses, investment banking and restructuring advisory services, and expert services for disputes and investigations, “How Unconventional Oil And Gas Is Supercharging The U.S. Economy”, http://www.forbes.com/sites/energysource/2012/12/13/how-unconventional-oil-and-gas-is-transforming-the-u-s-economy/]

It’s an exciting time to be in the energy industry in America. The impact of unconventional oil and gas development on the U.S. economy is considerable, with potentially hundreds of billions of dollars in investments, millions of new jobs, and a renaissance of American ingenuity and innovation. In thinking about what is to come, looking back five years helps set the stage. January 2008: The energy sector was facing the great recession, high current and future expected natural gas prices, and job losses to China. There was a generallypoor outlook for the energy industryand the economy. Few could have predicted the changes that were to come. Unforeseen happenings include the North Dakota oil rush, liquefied natural gas facilities being used as export facilities (instead of as import facilities as originally planned), railroads hauling crude oil, and jobs coming back from China. And, this is just the beginning. The commencement of the crude oil and natural gas revolution can be boiled down to one simple equation: [Surprise Side Effect Of Shale Gas Boom: A Plunge In U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions](http://www.forbes.com/sites/energysource/2012/12/07/surprise-side-effect-of-shale-gas-boom-a-plunge-in-u-s-greenhouse-gas-emissions/) Forbes Staff Contributor Abundant resources + cost effective extraction = high production levels of unconventional oil and gas. The net effect is a reshaping of the U.S. energy industry and our economy. Additionally, the country’s increased reliance on natural gas (displacing coal) has already benefited the environment, and will continue to do so in the future. Carbon emissions hit a 20-year low (in the first quarter 2012 according to EIA) and some industry observers believe that the U.S. could meet the Kyoto agreement standards by 2020 (even though the U.S. did not sign it). The emergence of unconventional oil and gas will have tremendous impacts on both the energy industry and the economy. The outlook for unconventional gas is exceptionally bright—with expectations for relatively low future natural gas prices, enough supply to meet domestic needs, and surplus enough to export to other countries. While the unconventional oil story continues to unfold and evolve, an abundance of domestic crude oil is expected. And, thus, an opportunity to not only significantly reduce the country’s dependence on oil imports, but to also increase energy security. Currently, crude oil prices are out of balance as new supply regions are isolated, making it difficult to get crude oil to market. That is expected to change once the necessary infrastructure is built to handle the new-found supply. As a result of these infrastructure needs, and the tremendous opportunities associated with unconventional oil and gas, U.S. economic activity is rising. Rising levels of economic activity can be divided into three distinct but overlapping waves of capital investment. The first wave of capital investment targets new and expanding oil and gas production areas. Sustained investment in the upstream sector – including wellheads, drilling and production – will be required to keep pace with increases in demand for the foreseeable future. The second wave of investment will focus on infrastructure to address new supply locations, delivering the product to market, and capitalizing on the near term opportunities arising from lower energy costs. Billions of dollars of investments specifically targeting capital projects in this wave are being announced weekly. Substantial investment in crude oil, natural gas and natural gas liquids pipelines will be required in order to build, expand, and reverse pipelines to address the new supply source locations. Natural gas processing plants that separate natural gas liquids (NGL) from natural gas will be required to address the growing production levels and new supply regions. In addition, LNG facilities will begin to export natural gas, and there is a potential opportunity for natural gas-to-diesel plants. In addition to these traditional areas of investment, creative market solutions are also emerging, such as rail transportation of crude oil. While railroads may serve primarily as a near to mid-term solution in the wake of long-lead time pipeline solutions, they are nimble competitors with small capital requirements that can be quickly deployed to utilize the country’s far-reaching rail networks. With only a few years needed to recover capital costs on investment, the competitive landscape changes and rail transportation rates could be reduced after pipelines enter the market to keep railroads competitive and still profitable. These factors suggest that railroads could be in the crude oil transportation business for the long haul. During this second wave, there will be a manufacturing resurgence, in part because of lower expected energy costs. Other macroeconomic factors will also be at work—including relative improvement in U.S. labor rates as labor markets tighten in China and other countries. Petrochemical plants will become cost effective competitors in the worldwide market and will be a significant component of the manufacturing investment story. Manufacturing facilities will be built to manufacture pipes, drill bits, valves and other required infrastructure materials. In addition, other manufacturing plants will likely be built solely as a play on the expectation of relatively low energy costs into the future. Such suspects could include those whose energy costs are large portion of production costs: semiconductors, plastics, and LCD televisions. The trend includes linking production and energy resources in an efficient manner, and moving production closer to market demand in order to minimize transportation related costs. The last wave of investment – which won’t begin to heat up for a few years – focuses on the consumers segment. In this wave, additional natural gas-fired power plants will be built to replace retiring coal plants and meet future increases in demand. Of course, new gas fired power plants will initially be built in regions with less excess capacity (post coal plant retirement). Another impact of U.S. unconventional oil and gas development will be increased in electricity demand (occurring more dramatically in various localized pockets), directly resulting from investment in waves one and two. New production areas and locations for processing and manufacturing plants will observe higher load growth. For example, localized areas within the Bakken region expect energy demand to double in the next five years. As a result of very specific changes to the economic activity and corresponding energy consumption levels, a more granular analyses will be required than is previously provided by traditional load forecasting methods. This third wave will also see a significant number of new heavy-duty natural gas vehicles, including bus and truck fleets. Greater reliance on natural gas-fueled light duty vehicles is possible but will require more time due to greater infrastructure requirements and technological innovation. Other creative opportunities being explored include natural gas pumps (hooked up to the home) to fuel natural gas vehicles, and light duty vehicles relying on fuel cells (which manufacturers hope to begin building by 2015). While it’s not currently clear who the winners will be, it’s safe to say that positive market forces and ample opportunity will lead to innovative solutions. The near-term outlook for total capital investment (from primarily first and second wave projects) is immense. The table below provides a snapshot analysis of the short term outlook (through 2020) for domestic (lower 48 state) based capital investment. These estimates are conservative and based largely on publicly reported company business plans. For example, Table 1 includes only a portion of expected U.S. LNG projects going forward, as compared to the full list of DOE applications. The estimate also excludes the massive $65 billion proposed Alaska pipeline/export facility project and third wave investments targeting natural gas fired power plants and natural gas vehicles. Even with just a portion of total investment included, the conservative estimate of short term investment reaches more than $300 billion. **Estimate of U.S. Unconventional Oil and Gas Capital Expenditures and Job Creation**  **(Through 2020)** These investments have a huge economic impact on the U.S. economy—impacting jobs, economic growth and energy security. Some studies indicate that the U.S. has avoided retreating into an economic recession as a result of activity in the unconventional oil and gas sector. Production areas for unconventional oil and gas have observed very low unemployment and stronger GDP and tax revenues as compared to the rest of the U.S. As a result of the significant near term investments associated with unconventional oil and gas, it’s possible that up to 3.5 million jobs will be created from the infrastructure build out and related opportunities (including both direct and indirect jobs).

#### And, strong manufacturing ensures economic resilience – prevents disruptions from inevitable economic shocks

Ettlinger, 11 [Michael, Vice President for Economic Policy at the Center for¶ American Progress Prior to joining the Center, he spent six years at the Economic¶ Policy Institute directing the Economic Analysis and Research Network.¶ Previously, he was tax policy director for Citizens for Tax Justice and the Institute¶ on Taxation and Economic Policy for 11 years. He has also served on the staff of¶ the New York State Assembly. “The Importance and Promise¶ of American Manufacturing Why It Matters if We Make It in America and Where We Stand Today”, http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/04/pdf/manufacturing.pdf]

Manufacturing is critically important to the American economy. For generations,¶ the strength of our country rested on the power of our factory floors—both the¶ machines and the men and women who worked them. We need manufacturing¶ to continue to be a bedrock of strength for generations to come. Manufacturing¶ is woven into the structure of our economy: Its importance goes far beyond what¶ happens behind the factory gates. The strength or weakness of American manufacturing¶ carries implications for the entire economy, our national security, and the¶ well-being of all Americans.¶ Manufacturing today accounts for 12 percent of the U.S. economy and about¶ 11 percent of the private-sector workforce. But its significance is even greater¶ than these numbers would suggest. The direct impact of manufacturing is only a¶ part of the picture.¶ First, jobs in the manufacturing sector are good middle-class jobs for millions of¶ Americans. Those jobs serve an important role, offering economic opportunity to¶ hard-working, middle-skill workers. This creates upward mobility and broadens¶ and strengthens the middle class to the benefit of the entire economy.¶ What’s more, U.S.-based manufacturing underpins a broad range of jobs that¶ are quite different from the usual image of manufacturing. These are higher-skill¶ service jobs that include the accountants, bankers, and lawyers that are associated¶ with any industry, as well as a broad range of other jobs including basic research¶ and technology development, product and process engineering and design, operations¶ and maintenance, transportation, testing, and lab work.¶ Many of these jobs are critical to American technology and innovation leadership.¶ The problem today is this: Many multinational corporations may for a¶ period keep these higher-skill jobs here at home while they move basic manufacturing¶ elsewhere in response to other countries’ subsidies, the search for cheaper¶ labor costs, and the desire for more direct access to overseas markets, but eventually¶ many of these service jobs will follow. When the basic manufacturing leaves, the feedback loop from the manufacturing floor to the rest of a manufacturing¶ operation—a critical element in the innovative process—is eventually broken.¶ To maintain that feedback loop, companies need to move higher-skill jobs to¶ where they do their manufacturing. And with those jobs goes American leadership in technology and innovation. This¶ is why having a critical mass of both manufacturing and associated service jobs in¶ the United States matters. The “industrial commons” that comes from the crossfertilization¶ and engagement of a community of experts in industry, academia, and¶ government is vital to our nation’s economic competitiveness.¶ Manufacturing also is important for the nation’s economic stability. The experience¶ of the Great Recession exemplifies this point. Although manufacturing¶ plunged in 2008 and early 2009 along with the rest of the economy, it is on the¶ rebound today while other key economic sectors, such as construction, still¶ languish. Diversity in the economy is important—and manufacturing is a particularly¶ important part of the mix. Although manufacturing is certainly affected¶ by broader economic events, the sector’s internal diversity—supplying consumer¶ goods as well as industrial goods, serving both domestic and external markets—¶ gives it great potential resiliency.¶ Finally, supplying our own needs through a strong domestic manufacturing sector¶ protects us from international economic and political disruptions. This is most¶ obviously important in the realm of national security, even narrowly defined¶ as matters related to military strength, where the risk of a weak manufacturing¶ capability is obvious. But overreliance on imports and substantial manufacturing¶ trade deficits weaken us in many ways, making us vulnerable to everything from¶ exchange rate fluctuations to trade embargoes to natural disasters.

#### And, economic collapse causes nuclear war

Harris and Burrows, 9 – \*counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, \*\*member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr\_burrows.pdf)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier.

In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn.

The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.

Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

#### Goes global—strong studies

Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-214

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

#### Advanced manufacturing key to advanced nanotech

**Swezey 2k11** (Devon Swezey, Project Director for Breakthrough Institute where he works as an energy and climate policy analyst and Ryan McConaghy, “Manufacturing Growth Advanced Manufacturing and the Future of the American Economy,” pg online @ <http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/BTI_Third_Way_Idea_Brief_-_Manufacturing_Growth_.pdf> //um-ef)

New manufacturing thrives on and drives innovation. Manufacturing is a core component of the nation’s innovation ecosystem. Firms engaged in manufacturing re-invest a significant portion of revenues in research and development (R&D). Overall, the manufacturing sector comprises two-thirds 9 of industry investment in R&D and employs nearly 64% of the country’s scientists and engineers. 10 Manufacturers also have unique opportunities to apply new technologies **for specialized functions** and achieve economies of scale at the plant or firm, 11 making the return on manufacturing R&D significant. The transition to advanced manufacturing will enhance the sector’s role in fostering innovation and developing and commercializing new technologies. Advanced manufacturing industries, including semiconductors, computers, pharmaceuticals, clean energy technologies, and nanotechnology, play an outsized role in generating the new technologies, products, and processes that drive economic growth. Advanced manufacturing is also characterized by the rapid transfer of science and technology into manufacturing processes and products, which in and of itself drives innovation. The research-to-manufacturing process is cyclical, with multiple feedbacks between basic R&D, pre-competitive research, prototyping, product development, and manufacturing. This opens new possibilities for product development and manufacturing. 12

#### The impact is quantum encryption

**Koenig 2k8** (Kelly, consultant with CSC's Global Business Solutions. extensive experience in business architecture, risk mitigation and process improvement solutions, master’s degree from Northwestern University (joint program with Kellogg School of Management and McCormick School of Engineering and Applied Science. December 2008, “ Bleeding Edge: Nanotechnological Applications In Quantum Cryptography)

After considering the physical limits of today’s technology and the energy needs we face today, we’re witnessing products coming to market that have already begun to exploit the potential of nanotechnology. However, the full potential that can be expected from advanced research investment in nanotechnology has not yet reached the market – it has only begun to scratch the surface. A nanotechnological solution such as quantum cryptography is a leading force in a strong wave of nanotechnologies based on completely new properties relatively unacknowledged by the mainstream. Quantum cryptography is a powerful solution to today’s security issues. It has already proven to be a successful and in-demand security solution, and it represents an enormous potential for market capture. It’s an innovation that promises to revolutionize the entire IT industry over the next two decades. Learning the principles behind quantum cryptography provides value for the next generation of nanotechnologies coming through the pipeline. It is important to educate and engage people of all backgrounds, both business and technical, in order to open a dialogue for future collaborations. Such collaborations ensure that the benefits of nanotechnology will be realized.

#### Falling behind in quantum encryption leads to cyber attacks

**Shay, 10** (Christopher, Time Correspondent, “ China's Great (Quantum) Leap Forward,” Sep. 09, 2010, Time.com, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2016687,00.html>)

The advance in secure communications comes none too soon. With ever-increasing computing power, the expiration date on today's cryptography techniques could be looming, Luce says. Right now, breaking modern encryption techniques require such computing power that one can change the code long before a computer has time to crack it. But "it's become very difficult to 'future proof' the encryption of data," Luce writes for the Jamestown Foundation. Tomorrow's computers will improve and data could suddenly become unprotected, while quantum teleportation, he says, "has a seemingly infinite time horizon." (Comment on this story.) Though the Chinese scientists claim in their peer-reviewed paper that this experiment communicated quantum information more than 20 times farther than previous tests over open space, this may not be entirely true. According to Luce in 2005, a group of universities along with defense corporations with a grant from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) transferred quantum information over 23 km (14 miles) in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Though Luce writes that a few differences in the DARPA project "may not technically disqualify the Chinese" from their claims, it's clear the U.S. military is also investing in this technology. Luce says it's difficult to know how far the U.S. is in developing quantum teleportation, "because a lot of the U.S. work is classified." Of course, what's possible in theory — perfectly secure communication — is different from what will happen in practice. Luce suspects **China's pioneering research in this technology is as much an attempt to find weaknesses in a possible U.S. quantum security network as it is to develop its own.** Roy of the East-West Center says one of China's "pockets of excellence" is its cyber-warfare capability**. If developed by the U.S., however, this technology could help neutralize China's ability to break into sensitive computer systems.** Less than two weeks ago, researchers from Germany and Norway claim to have hacked a commercial quantum cryptography system by exploiting flaws in its detection equipment. It doesn't undermine the fundamental principle of secure quantum messaging, but it is a reminder that there is almost always a loophole. "The security of quantum cryptography relies on quantum physics but not only," Gerd Leuchs, a professor at the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, says in a press release announcing the vulnerabilities. "It must also be properly implemented." No one claims that the Chinese military will surpass the U.S.' anytime soon, but it isn't just dueling naval exercises that will determine pecking order. It's also how fast China can integrate the newest technologies into its military, maintaining its strengths like cyber-warfare while improving the PLA's precision, coordination and secrecy. In these ways, **China has made a quantum leap forward.**

#### The threat is real—takes out C and C and causes nuclear war

**Tilford 12** Robert, Graduate US Army Airborne School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, "Cyber attackers could shut down the electric grid for the entire east coast" 2012, http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-attackers-could-easily-shut-down-the-electric-grid-for-the-entire-east-coa

To make matters worse a cyber attack that can take out a civilian power grid, for example could also cripple the U.S. military.¶ The senator notes that is that the same power grids that supply cities and towns, stores and gas stations, cell towers and heart monitors also power "every military base in our country."¶ "Although bases would be prepared to weather a short power outage with backup diesel generators, within hours, not days, fuel supplies would run out", he said.¶ Which means military command and control centers could go dark.¶ Radar systems that detect air threats to our country would shut Down completely.¶ "Communication between commanders and their troops would also go silent. And many weapons systems would be left without either fuel or electric power", said Senator Grassley.¶ "So in a few short hours or days, the mightiest military in the world would be left scrambling to maintain base functions", he said.¶ We contacted the Pentagon and officials confirmed the threat of a cyber attack is something very real.¶ Top national security officials—including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA Director— have said, "preventing a cyber attack and improving the nation~’s electric grids is among the most urgent priorities of our country" (source: Congressional Record).¶ So how serious is the Pentagon taking all this?¶ Enough to start, or end a war over it, for sure (see video: Pentagon declares war on cyber attacks http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\_kVQrp\_D0kY%26feature=relmfu ).¶ A cyber attack today against the US could very well be seen as an "Act of War" and could be met with a "full scale" US military response.¶ That could include the use of "nuclear weapons", if authorized by the President.

### 1ac adv 2

#### ADVANTAGE TWO IS INTERNATIONALISM

#### Unabated natural gas supply alters the global geopolitical landscape – reorients the balance of power

Gjelten, 12 [Tom Gjelten is a correspondent for NPR, The Dash for Gas: The Golden Age of an Energy Game-Changer, January/February, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/dash-gas-golden-age-energy-game-changer]

Desperate for signs of cooperation from North Korea? Check out reports that Kim Jong-il may agree to the construction of a natural gas pipeline that would link Russia, Pyongyang, and Seoul. From Asia to the Middle East to North America, a boom in natural gas usage is rearranging international connections, with major repercussions for global politics.¶ Energy consumers see that natural gas is relatively inexpensive, provided it can be transported efficiently, and abundant, especially if it can be harvested from shale rock and other unconventional deposits. The International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that over the next twenty-five years gas will be the fastest-growing energy source, overtaking coal as soon as 2030. Around the world, natural gas is fast becoming the fuel of choice for electric power generation, especially with nuclear losing its appeal in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster. Energy experts predict gas could even displace oil in the transportation sector, as car and truck engines are redesigned. The trend has so impressed IEA analysts that the agency in 2011 boldly predicted that the world is entering “a golden age of gas.”¶ The implications are significant. Because gas is somewhat cleaner than other fossil fuels, its rise as a fuel source should have environmental benefits. Because it is cheaper than oil, its increased use would lower energy costs and bring energy to millions of people who lack access to it now. But among the most striking consequences of a dramatic growth in natural gas consumption would be its effect on international relations. The energy trade is an important determinant of the global balance of power, and the shift to natural gas will introduce a new set of winners and losers, bringing greater independence to many countries and reducing the energy leverage that oil producers have traditionally enjoyed. After chairing an advisory panel on the subject for the Department of Energy, former CIA director John Deutch concluded that the prospective geopolitical shifts amount to no less than “a natural gas revolution” in global affairs.¶ No less a figure than President Obama has now acknowledged the existence of Web-based warfare. So shouldn't there be cyber war treaties? NPR's Tom Gjelten explores the often nebulous world of cyber 'disarmament.'¶ ¶ A big difference between gas and oil is the trading infrastructure. While oil can be shipped in tankers, gas has moved mainly through pipelines, thus confining it largely to regional markets. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is facilitating the development of a global market in gas, but it is still traded largely on a country-to-country basis, with negotiated prices that are specified in contracts. As gas usage has grown, these gas deals have grown more important.¶ In Bolivia, for instance, a determination to use natural gas wealth for political ends has affected relations with its neighbors for most of the past decade. Privately financed exploration in the late 1990s revealed that the country’s proven gas reserves were six times greater than what was previously believed, but Bolivian leaders could not agree on how to exploit them. A public outcry forced President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada to resign and leave the country in 2003 after he proposed to export natural gas to Mexico and the United States through a terminal in Chile, where it was to have been liquefied. (Anti-Chilean sentiment has run deep in Bolivia ever since a war with Chile in 1879 cost the country its Pacific access.) Bolivian gas is now sold instead to Brazil and Argentina, but disputes with Brazil over the terms of the gas contract have cast a shadow over that relationship in recent years, and management of the country’s gas exports is probably Bolivia’s top foreign-policy challenge.¶ The Bolivian case shows how the natural gas trade is more likely to be complicated by resource nationalism than the oil business would be. In a pique, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez can say he is prepared to cut off oil sales to the United States, but because oil is a globally traded commodity managed by middlemen, the threat is largely meaningless. For every buyer, there will always be a seller. State-to-state gas deals, by contrast, are more likely to carry geopolitical overtones. In 2005, for example, Egypt took the bold step of agreeing to sell natural gas to Israel. The gas began flowing in 2008 through a pipeline that runs across the Sinai peninsula and continues undersea to the Israeli port of Ashkelon. Israel depends on natural gas for much of its power generation, and the deal with Egypt has provided the country with more than forty percent of its gas needs.¶ The notion of exporting gas to Israel has been highly unpopular in Egypt, however, and in the months following the collapse of the Mubarak regime, the Sinai pipeline has been repeatedly blown up, forcing Israel to fire up unused coal plants and convert several gas-fueled generating stations to run on fuel oil or diesel instead, at a cost of several million dollars. But the country had a possible solution: In December 2010, a Houston-based energy exploration company announced “a significant natural gas discovery” about eighty miles off Israel’s coast. Preliminary measurements suggested it could be the world’s biggest deepwater gas discovery in ten years and could provide Israel with enough gas to become a net exporter, providing it with more clout in its regional energy relationships.¶ South Korea also relies on imported energy sources and is keen on natural gas, which explains its interest in a Russian proposal to build a pipeline that would carry Russian gas from Siberia across the Korean peninsula. The idea has been floated for years, but North Korean leader Kim Jong-il apparently gave the proposal his firm support during a meeting in August 2011 with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak subsequently agreed to work closely with the Russians to make the project a reality. The South Koreans have offered to build a natural gas power generating plant in the north as compensation for Pyongyang’s support for the pipeline. The key to the project’s success would be a design that would reassure Seoul that the North Korean authorities had no incentive to steal the gas or cut off the supply before it reaches the south¶ The textbook illustration of a link between geopolitics and the natural gas trade is Russia. As of 2010, the country was the world’s top gas producer (after briefly being surpassed by the United States), with one state-controlled company, Gazprom, accounting for about eighty percent of the country’s production. Originally part of the Soviet Union’s Ministry of Gas Industry, Gazprom is in effect a state monopoly, and its power and reach are without comparison in the energy world. The company has its own armed forces, with as many as twenty thousand armed security guards and a private fleet of unmanned drones, used mainly to monitor pipelines and production facilities. The company effectively operates as an arm of the Russian state, and the company’s gas deals in Europe and Asia can legitimately be seen as an extension of Russian foreign policy, exemplifying the growing importance of “gas diplomacy.”¶ Though its relative importance as a gas provider to Europe has diminished over the past ten years, Russia still meets about a quarter of Europe’s needs, more than any other supplier, and European governments have long been uneasy about their dependence on Russian gas. About eighty percent of the Russian gas shipment to Europe goes through Ukraine, and the flow has been cut on two major occasions at least in part because of geopolitical wrangling. In January 2006, after Kiev resisted price increase demands, Gazprom reduced the flow of gas to Ukraine, causing shortages in other European countries that received gas through Ukraine. Politics seems to have played a role in the Russian move. Ukraine at the time was moving closer to the West, and Ukrainian leaders charged that Moscow, with its price increase demands, was trying to “blackmail” Ukraine into changing its political course.¶ The gas flow was cut once again in January 2009, causing a severe midwinter gas shortage across Europe. The two episodes convinced many European leaders that Russia was ready and willing to use Gazprom’s clout in what it considered its “privileged sphere of influence,” with the goal of bringing the former Soviet republics back under Moscow’s control. Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998 to 2005, spoke for many European observers when he wrote in 2010, “The primary goal of Russian gas policy isn’t economic but political, namely to further the aim of revising the post-Soviet order in Europe.”¶ The eagerness of European countries to reduce their dependence on Russian gas has prompted ongoing efforts to find alternative supply routes. Iraq and the former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are promising sources, and for about a decade European authorities have been scheming to develop a gas pipeline that would bypass Russia. The Nabucco pipeline project, launched in 2002, would bring gas from the Caspian basin across Turkey to a hub in Austria. In addition, BP and two Italian companies have been promoting pipeline projects of their own along that southern corridor. The European Commission and the United States have both given strong backing to the Nabucco project, but the pipeline planners have had a difficult time lining up the supply commitments needed to make the project economically worthwhile. Moscow has put pressure on the Central Asian states to send their gas to Russia rather than Europe, and China is pursuing supply deals of its own in the region.¶ ¶ Among the major new developments has been the construction of new facilities to liquefy natural gas. Petroleum engineers have long known how to convert gas into liquid form through extreme cooling, but only in recent years has the LNG industry expanded to the point that it has altered gas trading patterns. The construction of dozens of new liquefaction and regasification plants around the world, along with the introduction of LNG tanker ships, has made it possible for island nations like Australia to become major gas exporters, and it has given gas-consuming countries new supply sources. The United States, Japan, China, and European countries were all quick to embrace the industry. (In the US alone, twelve new terminals have been built to receive LNG, with plants to regasify the LNG for shipment through pipelines around the country.)¶ The development has been rapid. The International Energy Agency predicts that between 2008 and 2020 total liquefaction capacity will double. Qatar, which opened its first LNG plant in 1997, by 2006 had become the world’s top LNG producer and was investing in LNG terminals around the world. For European countries with terminals, importing LNG from Qatar or Algeria or Nigeria is another way to reduce dependence on Russian supplies. By 2035, for example, LNG is expected to supply about half of the United Kingdom’s natural gas needs, with imports from Qatar leading the way. British Prime Minister David Cameron’s February 2011 visit to Qatar, culminating in a new gas deal, put Moscow on notice that Europe had alternatives to Russian gas.¶ Qatar and other LNG exporters have an even more inviting market in Asia. The IEA foresees China’s gas consumption growing by nearly six percent annually up to 2035. Japan, having lost much of its nuclear generating capacity as a result of the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, is now a huge gas market as well, and LNG imports from Australia, Qatar, and the other gas exporting countries will be essential to its energy mix. Such developments were not foreseen twenty years ago. The LNG industry has diversified the gas trade, introducing new producers into the picture and giving gas importers more supply choices just as their demand for gas is growing.¶ ¶ Without a doubt, the most revolutionary recent development in the natural gas world has been an improvement in the ability to extract gas from shale rock and other unconventional sources. Geologists have known for two hundred years that shale contains combustible gas, but the tightness of the shale formation meant that the gas was generally considered unrecoverable. In the last decade, however, energy companies in the United States have found that it is economically possible to harvest shale gas through the use of hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”), by which large amounts of water mixed with sand and chemicals are injected at high pressure into the rock formations in order to free the gas trapped inside. In addition, gas producers are now employing horizontal drilling techniques, turning their drill bits in a horizontal direction after reaching a deep shale reservoir and thus reaching more deposits from a single well.¶ These developments have proven so promising that analysts are dramatically increasing their estimates of how much shale gas can be recovered around the world. In the United States, shale accounted for almost no gas production as recently as 2000. It now provides about twenty percent of the total production, and within twenty years it could be half. The US government’s Energy Information Administration has estimated that if recoverable shale gas reserves are included, the United States may have enough natural gas to meet US needs for the next hundred years, at current consumption rates.¶ Such estimates are imprecise and may well be adjusted downward, but the production of shale gas has already dramatically altered the US energy picture. Just a few years ago, it was assumed that the United States would be a net importer of natural gas, with much of it arriving as LNG. But the terminals and regasification facilities that were built to facilitate LNG imports are now going largely unused. The successful production of shale gas could even mean the United States will soon be a net gas exporter. Some of the existing regasification facilities, built for LNG imports, could actually be converted to liquefaction plants, so that excess domestic gas production can be exported as LNG.¶ If the United States became self-sufficient in natural gas, there would be significant geopolitical implications. When Arab states in 1973 imposed an embargo on oil shipments to the United States as punishment for US support of Israel, American consumers learned how vulnerable their country was to the “oil weapon” when used by potentially hostile states. As the United States moves toward energy independence, if only in gas, that vulnerability disappears. There would also be geopolitical effects overseas. With the United States no longer importing LNG, that gas could go to European consumers instead, and Europe’s dependence on Russia for its gas supply would diminish. In 2000, Russia was supplying about forty percent of Europe’s gas; some estimates have the Russian share sliding to ten percent by 2040.¶ Whether the United States can maintain a sharply upward trend in shale gas production depends on whether the reserves are as promising as they now appear to be, whether the gas price is sufficient to cover production costs, and especially whether environmental concerns associated with shale drilling are addressed. Hydraulic fracturing requires enormous amounts of water, and recycling or disposal of the waste water can be problematic. There have been cases where shale well casings have proved defective, and contamination of the surrounding soil or water has occurred. Authorities in New York, New Jersey, and Maryland have imposed temporary moratoria on fracking in order to assess the practice and determine whether it imposes any risks to drinking water or human health.¶

#### And, domestic supply allows successful pursuit of leadership

Mead, 12 [7/15/12, Walter Russell, Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College, Editor at the American Interest, “Energy Revolution 2: A Post Post-American Post,” American Interest, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/15/energy-revolution-2-a-post-post-american-post/]

Forget peak oil; forget the Middle East. The energy revolution of the 21st century isn’t about solar energy or wind power and the “scramble for oil” isn’t going to drive global politics. The energy abundance that helped propel the United States to global leadership in the 19th and 2oth centuries is back; if the energy revolution now taking shape lives up to its full potential, we are headed into a new century in which the location of the world’s energy resources and the structure of the world’s energy trade support American affluence at home and power abroad.¶ By some estimates, the United States has more oil than Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran combined, and Canada may have even more than the United States. A GAO report released last May (pdf link can be found [here](http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-740T)) estimates that up to the equivalent of 3 trillion barrels of shale oil may lie in just one of the major potential US energy production sites. If half of this oil is recoverable, US reserves in this one deposit are roughly equal to the known reserves of the rest of the world combined.¶ Edward Luce, an FT writer usually more given to tracing America’s decline than to promoting its prospects, cites estimates that as early as 2020 the US may be producing more oil than Saudi Arabia.¶ So dramatic are America’s finds, analysts talk of the US turning into the world’s new Saudi Arabia by 2020, with up to 15m barrels a day of liquid energy production (against the desert kingdom’s 11m b/d this year). Most of the credit goes to private sector innovators, who took their cue from the high oil prices in the last decade to devise ways of tapping previously uneconomic underground reserves of “tight oil” and shale gas. And some of it is down to plain luck. Far from reaching its final frontier, America has discovered new ones under the ground.¶ Additionally, our natural gas reserves are so large that the US is likely to become a major exporter, and US domestic supplies for hydrocarbon fuels of all types appear to be safe and secure for the foreseeable future. North America as a whole has the potential to be a major exporter of fossil fuels for decades and even generations to come.¶ Since the 1970s, pessimism about America’s energy future has been one of the cornerstones on which the decline theorists erected their castles of doom; we are now entering a time when energy abundance will be an argument for continued American dynamism.¶ The energy revolution isn’t a magic wand that can make all America’s wishes come true, but it is a powerful wind in the sails of both America’s domestic economy and of its international goals. The United States isn’t the only big winner of the energy revolution — Canada, Israel and China among others will also make gains — but the likely consequences of the energy revolution for America’s global agenda are so large, that the chief effect of the revolution is likely to be its role in shoring up the foundations of the American-led world order.¶ I will look at the global consequences for geopolitics and the environment in some upcoming posts, but first things come first and I’d like to look at the domestic consequences of the boom before moving on to its impact on the world.¶ Domestically, the energy bonanza changes the American outlook far more dramatically than most people yet realize. This is a Big One, a game changer, and it will likely be a major factor in propelling the United States to the next (and still unknown) stage of development — towards the next incarnation of the American Dream.¶ The energy revolution is first and foremost a revolution that affects jobs. We are in the very early stages, but since the financial crisis of 2008, fracking alone has created something like 600,000 new jobs in the United States, says the FT. Throw in more jobs in both extracting and refining the new energy wealth, and add the manufacturing and processing industries that will return to US shores to benefit from cheap, secure and abundant energy and feedstock, and it is clear that the energy revolution will be a jobs revolution.¶ These jobs pay well; for the first time in a generation we are looking at substantial growth of high-income jobs for skilled blue collar workers. Some of these jobs, especially with overtime, will pay in the six figures; most offer wages well above the national blue collar average.¶ The boom has the potential to change the debate over immigration. The best blue collar jobs in the new oil and gas patches will demand workers with good English language skills and some technical background — good junior colleges and strong vocational high schools will prepare workers for these new jobs. Low skilled, non-English speaking workers will have a hard time competing for these jobs but will work instead in less well paid jobs servicing the energy sector and its workers. They will build houses for the oil workers to live in and staff the restaurants where they eat. As more blue collar native-born Americans see their living standards rise, it is likely that (legal) immigration will lose some of its political salience.¶ Towards A New Geography of Power?¶ There’s another advantage: these jobs will mostly be located away from the coasts. The hollowing out of Middle America has been one of the tragedies of the last generation. Looking at the depopulation of the northern Great Plains, planners began to speculate about returning large chunks of whole states to the wild: the “Buffalo Commons” idea that would have taken up to 20 million acres out of private hands. The buffalo will have to move over now for the oil rigs and the people who work them; North Dakota will not be reverting to the wild anytime soon.¶ But there are large oil and/or gas reserves in other downtrodden areas. Western New York State and much of Pennsylvania and Ohio appear to have commercial quantities of fossil fuel. The revival of the Rustbelt may be getting under way. And Dixie will not lose out: the US share of the Gulf of Mexico is now believed to have the potential to produce 2 to 3 million more barrels per day than the 1.2 million that it currently pumps.¶ Overall, the new energy geography points toward a revival of the Mississippi-Ohio-Missouri river system as the axis of American growth. That’s likely among other things to be good for America’s political climate; the Midwest has traditionally been something of a swing region — less liberal than the coastal northeast and less aggressively conservative than Dixie. Middle Westerners have tended to be pragmatic optimists over time, and it would be interesting to see how a revival of this political tendency would work out in our politics today. In any case, we may be looking at a decline in the power of the northeast and (unless California embraces its inner tycoon and begins to exploit its own energy riches) the Pacific, while Dixie continues current rates of growth and the Middle West booms.¶ Energy frontiers tend to be individualistic places. Canada, where the oil boom is a few years ahead of the US, has shifted to the right as power and money flow from blue Ontario and Quebec to Alberta. Prosperous blue collar workers and aspiring oil tycoons are not generally the strongest supporters of expensive welfare states, and American greens are already feeling the political consequences of a newly energized hydrocarbon sector. They are also not very interested in subsidizing the fiscal problems of other states; should California’s woes worsen and the state come to Washington for more help, the energy rich states and their representatives are likely to take a hard, skeptical look at its requests.¶ Even so, the Middle West’s traditional moderation is going to soften the rough edges a bit; much of the oil is coming to places where people historically have valued community ties and concerned themselves about the well being of the less fortunate. This won’t be the second coming of Ayn Rand.¶ Heartland Economics¶ There are significant economic benefits in having all this prosperity in the heartland. North Dakota and Wyoming are states where shipping costs from China and Japan are high — but Chicago and St. Louis are much better placed to serve them. Put cheap and secure energy in the Middle West, and build large new cities and centers of economic demand in the neighborhood, and the energy revival in a few states will support general economic growth in many more.¶ The long term outlook for the dollar and even for the federal government’s accounts will also improve. Even quite recently people assessing the long term health of the United States pointed toward inexorably rising energy imports as an important drain on the balance of trade and on the health of the dollar. But oil imports are going to decline, and exports — especially of natural gas — will help offset them. The federal government is also going to be collecting taxes on the new energy production — and on all the incomes of the individuals and companies involved, directly or indirectly, in the new energy boom.¶ The United States will be a more attractive place for foreign investment. Building the infrastructure required to get the new energy industry up and running and to transport its products to the market offers some very profitable and secure investment opportunities. And with the US much less dependent on foreign oil (and with the foreign oil it does need coming largely from Canada), the US economy will be much less exposed to the risks associated with turmoil in the Middle East. That is the kind of thing investors look for: high growth in safe places.¶

And, it promotes global growth, democratic interdependence, and China relations

Mead, 12 [Walter Russell, Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College, Editor at the American Interest “Energy Revolution 3: The New American Century”, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/18/energy-revolution-3-the-new-american-century/]

Get ready for an American century: that appears to be the main consequence of the energy revolution that is now causing economic and political experts to tear up their old forecasts all over the world. The new American century won’t be a repeat of the last one, but in some very important ways the world now looks more likely to continue in the direction of global liberal capitalism that the US—like Britain before us—has seen as its geopolitical goal for many years.¶ Energy was critical to the geopolitics of the 20th century; energy shortages shaped some of the strategic decisions that led both Germany and Japan to defeat in World War II, and the struggle over the energy-rich Middle East played an important role in the Cold War. The assumption that the world was at or near “peak oil” has been a driving force behind predictions that the 21st century would be an era of U.S.-China competition as China’s desperate quest for more energy resources led it to push an aggressive global energy policy that would conflict with vital U.S. interests. The assumption that there were few major discoveries left to be made also led many to forecast that the Middle East and especially the Gulf region would continue to be a major fulcrum in global affairs; indeed, countries like Saudi Arabia, with the ability to increase production to meet the thirst of an oil-starved world, would become more important than ever as the geopolitics of oil scarcity took hold.¶ But as I’ve been [writing](http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/08/the-energy-revolution-part-one-the-biggest-losers/) recently, none of that looks true anymore. Advances in extraction technology have changed our understanding of the world’s energy future. As I wrote in my last post, the U.S. and Canada each may have more energy potential than the entire Middle East. China also has significant resources. So do Israel and Brazil.¶ It is too soon to tell just how much of this potential can be unlocked, but for several years now it has begun to look as if much more of these unconventional resources will be available much sooner than thought, and serious people now argue that the US could pass Saudi Arabia to become the world’s leading oil producer by 2020.¶ Even if some of the new sources prove difficult to extract at a reasonable economic and environmental price, the amount of available energy out there may be even greater than we now think. Because the extraction technology is new, and because it is still developing, much of the world has not been surveyed for these unconventional deposits. Both on land and under the sea, there is a lot of territory still to explore.¶ It’s going to take time for us to develop a clear picture of what the new energy future looks like, but there is more than enough information already available to start thinking through some of the important consequences of the new energy situation for 21st century politics and policy. In the first of these energy posts I identified some geopolitical losers; in the second I took a look at the domestic implications of the new energy situation for the United States. In this post I’ll sketch out some initial thoughts about how the new energy picture—if it isn’t a mirage—will affect American foreign policy.¶ The effects won’t be trivial. Changes this profound in the energy outlook imply major changes in world politics and given the unique global role of the United States and the global scale of its interests, those changes matter hugely for American foreign policy. Much of the punditry of the last ten years is looking suddenly obsolete; a number of writers are going to hope that some of the books and articles they’ve recently published will be quickly forgotten. They shouldn’t worry; the public is quick to forget, and most prophets of decline and Malthusian struggle will have little trouble in reinventing themselves as analysts of abundance.¶ The U.S. may not be the biggest geopolitical winner in the new dispensation; that title may go to Israel if it’s energy potential proves out. If Israel’s potential as an energy superpower is actually realized, the Jewish state will be like a pudgy orphan girl who inherits a billion dollar trust fund and suddenly tranforms from social pariah to belle of the ball. Not only will it replace or supplement Arab countries as a principle source of oil and gas for Europe, it will see the weight of its most serious enemies in world politics decline as the Gulf becomes only one of a number of energy-rich regions.¶ But on the bigger stage of world politics, it’s the United States that benefits most from the energy revolution. To begin with, the core objective of the United States—a reasonably stable, orderly and liberal global system—is a lot easier to achieve in an era of energy abundance than in one of tough resource competition. Oil is a lubricant, and the more the world has, the more smoothly things are likely to run. A world in which jealous, competing states are trying to elbow each other aside to access the last few remaining pools of oil is a much nastier place than one in which the whole oil question is a lot more laid back.¶ Abundant energy will also promote global economic growth, an effect that strengthens and stabilizes the world system. It is easier for countries to cooperate when their economies are doing well. There is less nationalistpressure inside countries driving political leaders to take confrontational stands, and it is easier to negotiate win-win solutions and build functioning international institutions when all parties are relatively optimistic about their prospects.¶ On the whole, a world of energy abundance should be particularly good for U.S.-China relations. If both China and the United States have large energy reserves at home, and if new discoveries globally are making energy more abundant, there is less chance that China and the U.S. will compete for political influence in places like the Middle East. More energy security at home may also lessen the political pressure inside China to build up its naval forces.¶ Oil may calm the troubled waters around China’s shores. The maritime disputes now causing trouble from Korea and Japan to Malaysia and the Philippines will be easier to manage if the potential undersea energy resources are seen as less vital to national economic security. Nationalist passion will still drive tough stands on the maritime issues, but nationalism is a much stronger force when powerful economic arguments share the agenda of radical nationalist groups. If the South China Sea issue is seen as both a question of national pride and, because of perceived energy supply issues, a vital national interest, Chinese policy will be much tougher than if it is simply a question of pride.¶ Depending on the size of China’s unconventional domestic reserves (and some analysts think the country could have something like the equivalent of double Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves), China will feel marginally less constrained by Washington’s global naval supremacy. As it now stands, in any serious clash with China, the U.S. could bring Beijing to its knees with a naval blockade. With much larger domestic energy production, China would be less vulnerable to this threat. This could translate into a greater willingness to take a hard line on international issues.¶ On the other hand, China is unlikely to gain complete energy independence, and in any case it will still need access to the global system for trade and investment. Indeed, assuming that the new energy abundance promotes global economic prosperity, access to the global market will become more attractive for China and its deepening economic independence with world markets would make China less willing to risk cutting off its maritime connections to the rest of the world.¶ The energy revolution is likely to have profound implications for American policy in the Middle East. American public opinion, already deeply depressed about the prospects for constructive change in the region and deeply weary of war, is likely to welcome any chance to think less about a part of the world in which U.S. initiatives rarely seem to go well. The Gulf in particular will, however, continue to be important to countries like India, China and Japan as well as to Europe. Over time, as the world’s energy picture becomes less Middle East-centric, the U.S. is likely to explore the possibility of becoming more of a balancer, less of a hegemon in the region. It will still be a goal of U.S. policy to prevent any single other power from being able to dominate the region and interrupting the oil flow, but the U.S. will likely look to achieve that more through agreements and power balancing than through overwhelming military superiority by land, sea and air. This will not happen all at once, and may not happen at all if initial U.S. attempts to disengage lead to greater threats, but both public and elite opinion would much rather reduce than increase the U.S. presence in this part of the world, and if the changing world energy picture makes that easier to do, the U.S. will take the opportunity to step back.¶ India, Russia, Turkey, China, Japan, Israel, Iran and the European powers will all have interests in the Middle East. If the U.S. goal is to manage and limit competition among these players and other local governments, the multiplicity of interests and powers involved in the region could make that a complex but not altogether impossible task. The future of this region remains hard to predict, but the U.S. may well find that its key interests in the Middle East can be achieved with much less sweat in the next fifty years than in the last thirty.¶ The one exception is likely to be U.S. support for Israel. Israel’s security does not require U.S. ground troops or even naval forces, but U.S. public opinion will likely continue want Israel to be safe. Arms sales, aid and cooperation can be expected to continue, though if Israel’s own potential energy resources come online, Israel may have more friends, more money and fewer and weaker enemies than it now has.¶ Globally, America’s ambition is not and never has been to be an active, busy hegemon. At its core, America is a lazy power. The world order America wants is liberal, capitalist, predominantly democratic and broadly accepted by the major powers. It wants to prevent the domination of either end of Eurasia by a single power and it doesn’t want any part of the world to close itself off for purposes of investment and trade, but otherwise it is open to a wide range of political and security arrangements.¶ An American century is one in which the world is moving towards this kind of configuration. The 21st century already appeared to be heading America’s way—less because the U.S. has the will or the power to impose its designs on the world than because American objectives match up reasonably well with the vital interests of most of the world’s important powers. The new energy picture supports that kind of outcome in three ways.¶ The American economy will gain important advantages that will ease the transition to a post-blue social model and promote social cohesion and public confidence in our economic model.¶ Energy abundance will promote global economic growth, increasing global acceptance of liberal capitalism as living standards rise.

#### And, the plan checks Chinese and Russian revisionism and strengthens diplomatic standing

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The energy boom upends arguments about the inevitability of U.S. strategic decline A previous post peered into the crystal ball to argue that America’s strategic prospects are dramatically brightening due to an unexpectedly improving energy outlook and the looming revitalization of its manufacturing base. This thesis cuts against the reigning anxiety about the nation’s economic course as well as the torrent of prophesying about how China is poised to eat America’s lunch.\* A subsequent post extended this theme to suggest that among the foreign policy implications of the U.S. energy boom would be the denouement of Russia’s great power aspirations and the restoration of U.S. soft power. In the few months since these two posts, other analysts have amplified these points and offered others worth pondering. The present post focuses on the energy side of the story, while my next one will pick up the manufacturing side. As a starting point, consider the sheer magnitude of the U.S. energy bonanza. Over the last five years, there has been a marked surge in domestic oil and natural gas production, causing in turn a dramatic reduction in the level of oil imports. According to the Wall Street Journal, the United States will cut its reliance on Middle Eastern oil in half by the end of this decade and could end it altogether by 2035. [Citigroup reports](http://fa.smithbarney.com/public/projectfiles/ce1d2d99-c133-4343-8ad0-43aa1da63cc2.pdf) that for the first time since 1949, the U.S. has become a net exporter of petroleum products and has edged out Russia as the world’s largest refined petroleum exporter. Some experts even predict that the country will become the world’s largest producer of oil and gas by 2020. Just a few years ago, the fear was that America was quickly running out of domestic energy resources, but it now appears that it is sitting atop a staggering amount of natural gas, perhaps as much as a century’s worth supply. The International Energy Agency speaks of the “Golden Age of Gas” and just last month natural gas supplanted coal as the largest source of U.S. power generation. The new-found bounty is courtesy of key strides in extraction technology – namely, hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) and horizontal drilling – as well as advances in seismic imagining that have unlocked gas and oil deposits previously thought inaccessible within tightly-packed shale rock formations. A recent report by the Government Accountability Office concludes that oil deposits in the Green River Formation spanning parts of Colorado, Utah and Wyoming contain up to 3 trillion barrels of oil, half of which may be recoverable, which is about equal to the entire world’s proven oil reserves. The Bakken shale bed in North Dakota has been a bonanza (here and here), turning the state into the nation’s second-largest oil producer after Texas. The gas-rich Marcellus formation in the eastern U.S. has made Pennsylvania the site of the world’s second-largest gas field. The Congressional Research Service reports that total U.S. energy reserves now exceed those of all other countries, including the Middle Eastern nations that have long been our oil overlords. The energy boom promises far-reaching, even astounding, economic reverberations. A new [Bank of America Merrill Lynch study](http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/story/2012-07-11/natural-gas-finds-lower-energy-costs/56157080/1) finds that the benefits are injecting as much as $1 billion a day into the U.S. economy and may be keeping the country out of another recession. According to the IHS Cera research firm, some 600,000 new energy-related jobs have already been created since 2008. The Citigroup study cited above predicts net job creation from 2.7 million to as high as 3.6 million across the entire economy by 2020 as manufacturers benefit from much lower energy costs. It also foresees an increase in real GDP by an additional 2 to 3 percentage points and a 60-percent reduction in the current account deficit as oil imports fall and energy exports rise. The political ramifications are equally profound. As Walter Russell Mead sees it, growing prosperity in the American heartland will rework the domestic political landscape as the Middle West’s pragmatism reasserts itself and calms the nation’s roiling ideologicaldivisions. Building on this point, one might add that the region’s Jacksonian values, which look askance at ideology-based exertions abroad, will also have a major effect on the nation’s foreign policy debates.

#### And, liberal internationalism strengthens global problem solving and prevents great power war

Deudney and Ikenberry 2012 [November, Democratic¶ Internationalism¶ An American Grand Strategy for a Post-exceptionalist Era, Dandiel, American political scientist and Associate Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, AND John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics, p. Council on Foreign Relations PDF]

In the 250 years since its founding, the United States has been both exceptional and indispensable:¶ exceptional because it was the most liberal and democratic state in world politics, and indispensable¶ because it had sufficient size and power to protect and expand the community of free states during an¶ era when they were rare, and when rival great powers animated by radical antiliberal ideologies made¶ serious bids to extinguish liberal democracy and dominate the world. By the turn of the twenty-first¶ century, the United States had played a major role in producing a world order that was more peaceful,¶ prosperous, and free for more people than ever before in history.¶ Today, the United States is no longer as exceptional and indispensable precisely because of its success¶ in creating a free world order in which so many states are liberal, capitalist, and democratic. This¶ democratic world is America’s greatest accomplishment, but it also provides a new set of opportunities¶ and challenges that the United States has been slow to recognize and address. The failure to formulate¶ a new foreign policy strategy will jeopardize this global accomplishment and also miss a historic¶ opportunity to reestablish the domestic foundations of U.S. leadership.¶ Reframing American grand strategy begins with the recognition that the world has fundamentally¶ changed. The world is now predominantly democratic, and includes both the old trilateral core of¶ North America, Europe, and Japan and rising non-Western and postcolonial democracies. However,¶ community among democracies is weak. With power shifting among the North, South, East, and¶ West, there is a danger that new rivalries will arise, the world will fragment, and democratic states¶ will not be up to the task of cooperating to meet common problems.¶ American grand strategy should be refocused on initiating a new phase of liberal internationalism¶ that renews and deepens democracy globally, prevents democratic backsliding, and strengthens and¶ consolidates bonds among democratic states. By pursuing this strategic focus, the United States¶ would once again embrace democracy promotion, but based on a strategy of attraction—the pull of¶ success rather than the push of power. In short, it must aim to ensure that the dominant reality in¶ world politics in the coming decades is a community of democracies leading global efforts to solve¶ problems, rather than a world of weak global institutions and rising great power rivalries.¶ This new grand strategy would carry forward the longstanding and largely successful American¶ project of liberal internationalism—the effort to build an open and rule-based world order centered¶ on institutionalized cooperation among democracies. This next phase of “democratic internationalism”¶ would return liberal internationalism to its roots in social democratic ideals, seek to redress imbalances¶ within the democratic world between fundamentalist capitalism and socioeconomic equity,¶ and move toward a posthegemonic system of global governance in which the United States increasingly¶ shares authority with other democracies.¶ Democratic internationalism is appealing as an American grand strategy not only because it is¶ consistent with American values, but also because it acknowledges that the world includes a vast and¶ diverse array of democracies and confronts a cascade of interdependencies—some quite novel—that¶ must be managed to sustain economic well-being. At the same time, mindsets, legacies, and suspi2¶ cions inherited from the past undermine community and common problem-solving, and risk fueling¶ new great power rivalries. By exploiting America’s relative advantages and refurbishing the most¶ successful elements of the twentieth-century liberal world order, a new grand strategy of democratic¶ internationalism offers the most promising approach to addressing pressing domestic and global¶ problems alike.¶

#### And, the escalation of every transnational threat

**Ikenberry, 11** [Spring, A World of Our Making G. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton, http://www.democracyjournal.org/20/a-world-of-our-making.php?page=all]

**Grand Strategy as Liberal Order Building** American dominance of the global system will eventually yield to the rise of other powerful states. The unipolar moment will pass. In facing this circumstance, American grand strategy should be informed by answers to this question: What sort of international order would we like to see in place in 2020 or 2030 when America is less powerful? Grand strategy is a set of coordinated and sustained policies designed to address the long-term threats and opportunities that lie beyond the country’s shores. Given the great shifts in the global system and the crisis of liberal hegemonic order, how should the United States pursue grand strategy in the coming years? The answer is that the United States should work with others to rebuild and renew the institutional foundations of the liberal international order and along the way re-establish its own authority as a global leader. The United States is going to need to invest in alliances, partnerships, multilateral institutions, special relationships, great-power concerts, cooperative security pacts, and democratic security communities. That is, the United States will need to return to the great tasks of liberal order building. It is useful to distinguish between two types of grand strategy: positional and milieu oriented. With a positional grand strategy, a great power seeks to diminish the power or threat embodied in a specific challenger state or group of states. Examples are Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, the Soviet bloc, and perhaps—in the future—Greater China. With a milieu-oriented grand strategy, a great power does not target a specific state but seeks to structure its general international environment in ways that are congenial with its long-term security. This might entail building the infrastructure of international cooperation, promoting trade and democracy in various regions of the world, and establishing partnerships that might be useful for various contingencies. My point is that under conditions of unipolarity, in a world of diffuse threats, and with pervasive uncertainty over what the specific security challenges will be in the future, this milieu-based approach to grand strategy is necessary. The United States does not face the sort of singular geopolitical threat that it did with the fascist and communist powers of the last century. Indeed, compared with the dark days of the 1930s or the Cold War, America lives in an extraordinarily benign security environment. Rather than a single overriding threat, the United States and other countries face a host of diffuse and evolving threats. Global warming, nuclear proliferation, jihadist terrorism, energy security, health pandemics—these and other dangers loom on the horizon. Any of these threats could endanger Americans’ lives and way of life either directly or indirectly by destabilizing the global system upon which American security and prosperity depends. What is more, these threats are interconnected—and it is their interactive effects that represent the most acute danger. And if several of these threats materialize at the same time and interact to generate greater violence and instability, then the global order itself, as well as the foundations of American national security, would be put at risk. What unites these threats and challenges is that they are all manifestations of rising security interdependence. More and more of what goes on in other countries matters for the health and safety of the United States and the rest of the world. Many of the new dangers—such as health pandemics and transnational terrorist violence—stem from the weakness of states rather than their strength. At the same time, technologies of violence are evolving, providing opportunities for weak states or nonstate groups to threaten others at a greater distance. When states are in a situation of security interdependence, they cannot go it alone. They must negotiate and cooperate with other states and seek mutual restraints and protections. The United States can-not hide or protect itself from threats under conditions of rising security interdependence. It must get out in the world and work with other states to build frameworks of cooperation and leverage capacities for action against this unusually diverse, diffuse, and unpredictable array of threats and challenges. This is why a milieu-based grand strategy is attractive. The objective is to shape the international environment to maximize your capacities to protect the nation from threats. To engage in liberal order building is to invest in international cooperative frameworks—that is, rules, institutions, partnerships, networks, standby capacities, social knowledge, etc.—in which the United States operates. To build international order is to increase the global stock of “social capital”—which is the term Pierre Bourdieu, Robert Putnam, and other social scientists have used to define the actual and potential resources and capacities within a political community, manifest in and through its networks of social relations, that are available for solving collective problems. If American grand strategy is to be organized around liberal order building, what are the specific objectives and what is the policy agenda? There are five such objectives. First, the United States needs to lead in the building of an enhanced protective infrastructure that helps prevent the emergence of threats and limits the damage if they do materialize. Many of the threats mentioned above are manifest as socioeconomic backwardness and failure that cause regional and international instability and conflict. These are the sorts of threats that are likely to arise with the coming of global warming and epidemic disease. What is needed here is institutional cooperation to strengthen the capacity of governments and the international com-munity to prevent epidemics or food shortages or mass migrations that create global upheaval—and mitigate the effects of these upheavals if they occur. The international system already has a great deal of this protective infrastructure—institutions and networks that pro-mote cooperation over public health, refugees, and emergency aid. But as the scale and scope of potential problems grow in the twenty-first century, investments in these preventive and management capacities will also need to grow. Early warning systems, protocols for emergency operations, standby capacities, etc.—these safeguards are the stuff of a protective global infrastructure. Second, the United States should recommit to and rebuild its security alliances. The idea is to update the old bargains that lie behind these security pacts. In NATO, but also in the East Asia bilateral partner-ships, the United States agrees to provide security protection to the other states and brings its partners into the process of decision-making over the use of force. In return, these partners agree to work with the United States—providing manpower, logistics, and other types of support—in wider theaters of action. The United States gives up some autonomy in strategic decision-making, although it is more an informal restraint than a legally binding one, and in exchange it gets cooperation and political support. Third, the United States should reform and create encompassing global institutions that foster and legitimate collective action. The first move here should be to reform the United Nations, starting with the expansion of the permanent membership on the Security Council. Several plans have been proposed. All of them entail adding new members—such as Germany, Japan, India, Brazil, South Africa, and others—and reforming the voting procedures. Almost all of the candidates for permanent membership are mature or rising democracies. The goal, of course, is to make them stakeholders in the United Nations and thereby strengthen the primacy of the UN as a vehicle for global collective action. There really is no substitute for the legitimacy that the United Nations can offer to emergency actions—humanitarian interventions, economic sanctions, uses of force against terrorists, and so forth. Public support in advanced democracies grows rapidly when their governments can stand behind a UN-sanctioned action. Fourth, the United States should accommodate and institution-ally engage China. China will most likely be a dominant state, and the United States will need to yield to it in various ways. The United States should respond to the rise of China by strengthening the rules and institutions of the liberal international order—deepening their roots, integrating rising capitalist democracies, sharing authority and functional roles. The United States should also intensify cooperation with Europe and renew joint commitments to alliances and multilateral global governance. The more that China faces not just the United States but the entire world of capitalist democracies, the better. This is not to argue that China must face a grand counterbalancing alliance against it. Rather, it should face a complex and highly integrated global system—one that is so encompassing and deeply entrenched that it essentially has no choice but to join it and seek to prosper within it. The United States should also be seeking to construct a regional security order in East Asia that can provide a framework for managing the coming shifts. The idea is not to block China’s entry into the regional order but to help shape its terms, looking for opportunities to strike strategic bargains at various moments along the shifting power trajectories and encroaching geopolitical spheres. The big bargain that the United States will want to strike is this: to accommodate a rising China by offering it status and position within the regional order in return for Beijing’s acceptance and accommodation of Washington’s core strategic interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia. In striking this strategic bargain, the United States will also want to try to build multilateral institutional arrangements in East Asia that will tie China to the wider region. Fifth, the United States should reclaim a liberal internationalist public philosophy. When American officials after World War II championed the building of a rule-based postwar order, they articulated a distinctive internationalist vision of order that has faded in recent decades. It was a vision that entailed a synthesis of liberal and realist ideas about economic and national security, and the sources of stable and peaceful order. These ideas—drawn from the experiences with the New Deal and the previous decades of war and depression—led American leaders to associate the national interest with the building of a managed and institutionalized global system. What is needed today is a renewed public philosophy of liberal internationalism—a shift away from neoliberal-ism—that can inform American elites as they make trade-offs between sovereignty and institutional cooperation. Under this philosophy, the restraint and the commitment of American power went hand in hand. Global rules and institutions advanced America’s national interest rather than threatened it. The alternative public philosophies that have circulated in recent years—philosophies that champion American unilateralism and disentanglement from global rules and institutions—did not meet with great success. So an opening exists for America’s postwar vision of internationalism to be updated and rearticulated today. The United States should embrace the tenets of this liberal public philosophy: Lead with rules rather than dominate with power; provide public goods and connect their provision to cooperative and accommodative policies of others; build and renew international rules and institutions that work to reinforce the capacities of states to govern and achieve security and economic success; keep the other liberal democracies close; and let the global system itself do the deep work of liberal modernization. As it navigates this brave new world, the United States will find itself needing to share power and rely in part on others to ensure its security. It will not be able to depend on unipolar power or airtight borders. It will need, above all else, authority and respect as a global leader. The United States has lost some of that authority and respect in recent years. In committing itself to a grand strategy of liberal order building, it can begin the process of gaining it back.

#### **And, material capabilities are irrelevant – liberalism cements cooperative approaches to great power conflict**

Kromah 9 (Lamii Moivi Kromah, Department of International Relations University of the Witwatersrand, February 2009, “The Institutional Nature of U.S. Hegemony: Post 9/11”, http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/7301/MARR%2009.pdf)

A final major gain to the United States from the benevolent hegemony has perhaps been less widely appreciated. It nevertheless proved of great significance in the short as well as in the long term: the pervasive cultural influence of the United States. 39 This dimension of power base is often neglected. After World War II the authoritarian political cultures of Europe and Japan were utterly discredited, and the liberal democratic elements of those cultures revivified. The revival was most extensive and deliberate in the occupied powers of the Axis, where it was nurtured by drafting democratic constitutions, building democratic institutions, curbing the power of industrial trusts by decartelization and the rebuilding of trade unions, and imprisoning or discrediting much of the wartime leadership. American liberal ideas largely filled the cultural void. The effect was not so dramatic in the "victor" states whose regimes were reaffirmed (Britain, the Low and Scandinavian countries), but even there the United States and its culture was widely admired. The upper classes may often have thought it too "commercial," but in many respects American mass consumption culture was the most pervasive part of America's impact. American styles, tastes, and middle-class consumption patterns were widely imitated, in a process that' has come to bear the label "coca-colonization." 40 After WWII policy makers in the USA set about remaking a world to facilitate peace. The hegemonic project involves using political and economic advantages gained in world war to restructure the operation of the world market and interstate system in the hegemon's own image. The interests of the leader are projected on a universal plane: What is good for the hegemon is good for the world. The hegemonic state is successful to the degree that other states emulate it. Emulation is the basis of the consent that lies at the heart of the hegemonic project. 41 Since wealth depended on peace the U.S set about creating institutions and regimes that promoted free trade, and peaceful conflict resolution. U.S. benevolent hegemony is what has kept the peace since the end of WWII. **The upshot is that U.S. hegemony and liberalism have produced the most stable and durable political order that the world has seen** since the fall of the Roman Empire. It is not as formally or highly integrated as the European Union, but it is just as profound and robust as a political order, Kant’s Perpetual Peace requires that the system be diverse and not monolithic because then tyranny will be the outcome. As long as the system allows for democratic states to press claims and resolve conflicts, the system will perpetuate itself peacefully. A state such as the United States that has achieved international primacy has every reason to attempt to maintain that primacy through peaceful means so as to preclude the need of having to fight a war to maintain it. 42 This view of the post-hegemonic Western world does not put a great deal of emphasis on U.S. leadership in the traditional sense. U.S. leadership takes the form of providing the venues and mechanisms for articulating demands and resolving disputes not unlike the character of politics within domestic pluralistic systems. 43 America as a big and powerful state has an incentive to organize and manage a political order that is considered legitimate by the other states**. It is not in a hegemonic leader's interest to preside over a global order that requires constant use of material capabilities to get other states to go along**. Legitimacy exists when political order is based on reciprocal consent. It emerges when secondary states buy into rules and norms of the political order as a matter of principle, and not simply because they are forced into it. But if a hegemonic power wants to encourage the emergence of a legitimate political order, it must articulate principles and norms, and engage in negotiations and compromises that have very little to do with the exercise of power. 44 So should this hegemonic power be called leadership, or domination? Well, it would tend toward the latter. Hierarchy has not gone away from this system. Core states have peripheral areas: colonial empires and neo-colonial backyards. Hegemony, in other words, involves a structure in which there is a hegemonic core power. The problem with calling this hegemonic power "leadership" is that leadership is a wonderful thing-everyone needs leadership. But sometimes I have notice that leadership is also an ideology that legitimates domination and exploitation. In fact, this is often the case. But this is a different kind of domination than in earlier systems. Its difference can be seen in a related question: is it progressive? Is it evolutionary in the sense of being better for most people in the system? I think it actually is a little bit better. The trickle down effect is bigger-it is not very big, but it is bigger. 45 It is to this theory, Hegemonic Stability that the glass slipper properly belongs, because both U.S. security and economic strategies fit the expectations of hegemonic stability theory more comfortably than they do other realist theories. We must first discuss the three pillars that U.S .hegemony rests on structural, institutional, and situational. (1) Structural leadership refers to the underlying distribution of material capabilities that gives some states the ability to direct the overall shape of world political order. Natural resources, capital, technology, military force, and economic size are the characteristics that shape state power, which in turn determine the capacities for leadership and hegemony. If leadership is rooted in the distribution of power, there is reason to worry about the present and future. The relative decline of the United States has not been matched by the rise of another hegemonic leader. At its hegemonic zenith after World War II, the United States commanded roughly forty five percent of world production. It had a remarkable array of natural resource, financial, agricultural, industrial, and technological assets. America in 1945 or 1950 was not just hegemonic because it had a big economy or a huge military; it had an unusually wide range of resources and capabilities. This situation may never occur again. As far as one looks into the next century, it is impossible to see the emergence of a country with a similarly commanding power position. (2) Institutional leadership refers to the rules and practices that states agree to that set in place principles and procedures that guide their relations. It is not power capabilities as such or the interventions of specific states that facilitate concerted action, but the rules and mutual expectations that are established as institutions. Institutions are, in a sense, self-imposed constraints that states create to assure continuity in their relations and to facilitate the realization of mutual interests. A common theme of recent discussions of the management of the world economy is that institutions will need to play a greater role in the future in providing leadership in the absence of American hegemony. Bergsten argues, for example, that "institutions themselves will need to play a much more important role. 46 Institutional management is important and can generate results that are internationally greater than the sum of their national parts. The argument is not that international institutions impose outcomes on states, but that institutions shape and constrain how states conceive and pursue their interests and policy goals. They provide channels and mechanisms to reach agreements. They set standards and mutual expectations concerning how states should act. They "bias" politics in internationalist directions just as, presumably, American hegemonic leadership does. (3) Situational leadership refers to the actions and initiatives of states that induce cooperation quite apart from the distribution of power or the array of institutions. It is more cleverness or the ability to see specific opportunities to build or reorient international political order, rather than the power capacities of the state, that makes a difference. In this sense, leadership really is expressed in a specific individual-in a president or foreign minister-as he or she sees a new opening, a previously unidentified passage forward, a new way to define state interests, and thereby transforms existing relations.Hegemonic stability theorists argue that international politics is characterized by a succession of hegemonies in which a single powerful state dominates the system asa result of its victory in the last hegemonic war. 47 Especially after the cold war America can be described as trying to keep its position at the top but also integrating others more thoroughly in the international system that it dominates. It is assumed that the differential growth of power in a state system would undermine the status quo and lead to hegemonic war between declining and rising powers 48 , but I see a different pattern: the U.S. hegemonic stability promoting liberal institutionalism, the events following 9/11 are a brief abnormality from this path, but the general trend will be toward institutional liberalism. Hegemonic states are the crucial components in military alliances that turn back the major threats to mutual sovereignties and hence political domination of the system. Instead of being territorially aggressive and eliminating other states, hegemons respect other's territory. They aspire to be leaders and hence are upholders of inter-stateness and inter-territoriality. 49 The nature of the institutions themselves must, however, be examined. They were shaped in the years immediately after World War II by the United States. The American willingness to establish institutions, the World Bank to deal with finance and trade, United Nations to resolve global conflict, NATO to provide security for Western Europe, is explained in terms of the theory of collective goods. It is commonplace in the regimes literature that the United States, in so doing, was providing not only private goods for its own benefit but also (and perhaps especially) collective goods desired by, and for the benefit of, other capitalist states and members of the international system in general. (Particular care is needed here about equating state interest with "national" interest.) Not only was the United States protecting its own territory and commercial enterprises, it was providing military protection for some fifty allies and almost as many neutrals. Not only was it ensuring a liberal, open, near-global economy for its own prosperity, it was providing the basis for the prosperity of all capitalist states and even for some states organized on non- capitalist principles (those willing to abide by the basic rules established to govern international trade and finance). While such behaviour was not exactly selfless or altruistic, certainly the benefits-however distributed by class, state, or region-did accrue to many others, not just to Americans. 50 For the truth about U.S. dominant role in the world is known to most clear-eyed international observers. **And the truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world's population. It is certainly a better international arrangement than all realistic alternatives**. To undermine it would cost many others around the world far more than it would cost Americans-and far sooner. As Samuel Huntington wrote five years ago, before he joined the plethora of scholars disturbed by the "arrogance" of American hegemony; "A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country shaping global affairs”. 51 I argue that the overall American-shaped system is still in place. It is this macro political system-a legacy of American power and its liberal polity that remains and serves to foster agreement and consensus. This is precisely what people want when they look for U.S. leadership and hegemony. 52 If the U.S.retreats from its hegemonic role, who would supplant it, not Europe, not China, not the Muslim world –and certainly not the United Nations. Unfortunately, the alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral utopia, but the anarchic nightmare of a New Dark Age. Moreover, the alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be ‘apolarity’ –a global vacuum of power. 53 Since the end of WWII the United States has been the clear and dominant leader politically, economically and military. But its leadership has been unique; it has not been tyrannical, its leadership and hegemony has focused on relative gains and has forgone absolute gains. The difference lies in the exercise of power. The strength acquired by the United States in the aftermath of World War II was far greater than any single nation had ever possessed, at least since the Roman Empire. America's share of the world economy, the overwhelming superiority of its military capacity-augmented for a time by a monopoly of nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them--gave it the choice of pursuing any number of global ambitions. That the American people "might have set the crown of world empire on their brows," as one British statesman put it in 1951, but chose not to, was a decision of singular importance in world history and recognized as such. 54 Leadership is really an elegant word for power. To exercise leadership is to get others to do things that they would not otherwise do. It involves the ability to shape, directly or indirectly, the interests or actions of others. Leadership may involve the ability to not just "twist arms" but also to get other states to conceive of their interests and policy goals in new ways. This suggests a second element of leadership, which involves not just the marshalling of power capabilities and material resources. It also involves the ability to project a set of political ideas or principles about the proper or effective ordering of politics. It suggests the ability to produce concerted or collaborative actions by several states or other actors. Leadership is the use of power to orchestrate the actions of a group toward a collective end. 55 By validating regimes and norms of international behaviour the U.S. has given incentives for actors, small and large, in the international arena to behave peacefully The uni-polar U.S. dominated order has led to a stable international system. Woodrow Wilson’s zoo of managed relations among states as supposed to his jungle method of constant conflict. The U.S. through various international treaties and organizations as become a quasi world government;It resolves the problem of provision by imposing itself as a centralized authority able to extract the equivalent of taxes. The focus of the theory thus shifts from the ability to provide a public good to the ability to coerce other states. A benign hegemon in this sense coercion should be understood as benign and not tyrannical. If significant continuity in the ability of the United States to get what it wants is accepted, then it must be explained. The explanation starts with our noting that the institutions for political and economic cooperation have themselves been maintained. Keohane rightly stresses the role of institutions as "arrangements permitting communication and therefore facilitating the exchange of information. By providing reliable information and reducing the costs of transactions, institutions can permit cooperation to continue even after a hegemon's influence has eroded. Institutions provide opportunities for commitment and for observing whether others keep their commitments. Such opportunities are virtually essential to cooperation in non-zero-sum situations, as gaming experiments demonstrate. Declining hegemony and stagnant (but not decaying) institutions may therefore be consistent with a stable provision of desired outcomes, although the ability to promote new levels of cooperation to deal with new problems (e.g., energy supplies, environmental protection) is more problematic. Institutions nevertheless provide a part of the necessary explanation. 56 In restructuring the world after WWII it was America that was the prime motivator in creating and supporting the various international organizations in the economic and conflict resolution field. An example of this is NATO’s making Western Europe secure for the unification of Europe. It was through NATO institutionalism that the countries in Europe where able to start the unification process. The U.S. working through NATO provided the security and impetus for a conflict prone region to unite and benefit from greater cooperation. Since the United States emerged as a great power, the identification of the interests of others with its own has been the most striking quality of American foreign and defence policy. Americans seem to have internalized and made second nature a conviction held only since World War II: Namely, that their own well- being depends fundamentally on the well-being of others; that American prosperity cannot occur in the absence of global prosperity; that American freedom depends on the survival and spread of freedom elsewhere; that aggression anywhere threatens the danger of aggression everywhere; and that American national security is impossible without a broad measure of international security. 57

#### And, stable China relationship solves transition wars

**Lieberthal 11** – Senior fellow in the Foreign Policy and the Global Economy and Development Programs @ Brookings Institution [Dr. Kenneth Lieberthal (Professor of Poli Sci and Business Administration @ University of Michigan and Former senior director for Asia on the National Security Council) “The U.S. and China -- mending fences,” Los Angeles Times, Janary 17, 2011|pg. http://tinyurl.com/8wlq833

Many Chinese believe that America is a declining No. 1 that will do anything in its power to prevent China, No. 2, from catching up. They thus bring deep suspicion to the table when they analyze American actions in Pakistan, India, the South China Sea and Northeast Asia. Put simply, while the Obama administration sees itself as reengaging fully in Asia after what it considers the relative neglect of the region under President George W. Bush, Beijing is prone to see this activity instead as an effort to mobilize the rest of Asia against China's growing legitimate interests throughout the region. The United States and most nations in the region, by contrast, see China adopting a harder edge to its diplomacy after years of stressing its "peaceful development." China is also modernizing its military and now is deploying naval vessels, missiles and other capabilities that threaten America's heretofore largely unhindered military access to the Western Pacific. Tensions inevitably result. In this context, Washington has taken heart that countries throughout Asia are urging the U.S. to increase its presence and activities there. Asian nations are engaging with China fully on the economic side while asking the U.S. to make sure Beijing does not convert its economic weight into lopsided diplomatic and military advantage. But America should beware: If the U.S. primarily provides muscle as China expands its economic role in the region, then Asia will be a profit center for China and a cost center for the U.S. American interests require a better-balanced outcome than that, which means we must work more effectively with China. There are both security and economic measures that the upcoming summit can advance to reduce mutual distrust and enhance effective cooperation. The U.S. and Chinese military establishments have habitually suspended their limited high-level contacts to show displeasure whenever significant developments occur (such as the forced landing of an American surveillance plane after a midair collision in 2001 or the U.S. arms sale offer to Taiwan in 2010). The result is military-to-military discussions that are infrequent and anemic. The two militaries are now too powerful and operate in too close proximity in Asia to permit this situation to continue. Following up on Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates' trip to China last week, , the Washington summit should endorse a new era in U.S.-Chinese military contacts. This should include regular, high-level discussions on such key issues as future contingencies in North Korea and Iran and the establishment of "rules of the road" for naval activities in China's 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Both sides would benefit greatly from having junior and mid-level officers spend serious time at one another's military institutes. America already does this with many other major militaries. Economically, both sides must address the sensitive issues of currency valuation, protectionism, technology transfer requirements and intellectual property rights. Major American businesses that formerly supported good U.S.-Chinese relations now harbor more pessimistic expectations of their future there. It is in Beijing's interest to provide a basis for greater confidence. With America mired in high unemployment and a weak economic recovery, and China concerned about inflation and trade protectionism abroad, both sides need to focus on improving economic and trade ties on a sustainable basis. One area — cooperation on development and deployment of clean energy technologies — holds particular promise. This is a global growth area, and the two nations' capabilities are now relatively complementary. Together we can produce innovative technologies and scale them up far more rapidly and inexpensively than either side can alone. This requires carefully structured deals, but it holds out the potential of investment and job creation in both directions, substantial new sources of profit, enhanced trust based on mutual interests and significant reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.

#### Extinction

**Wittner 11** - Professor of History @ State University of New York-Albany. [Lawrence S. Wittner, “Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?,” Huntington News, Monday, November 28, 2011 - 18:37 pg. http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446]

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries **national conflicts have led to wars**, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-ularmed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. **Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands**. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “**nuclear winter**” around the globe—destroying agriculture, [and] creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade. To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to **improve U.S.-China relations**. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies.

### 1ac plan

#### The United States Federal Government should reduce restrictions on offshore natural gas production in the United States.

### 1ac solvency

#### SOLVENCY

#### Offshore gas is abundant

Luthi, 11/9/12 [Luthi is the president of the National Ocean Industry Association, representing more than 275 companies engaged in all aspects of the exploration and production of both traditional and renewable energy resources on the nation’s outer continental shelf, “Let's find agreement on new offshore access”, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-a-environment/267089-lets-find-agreement-on-new-offshore-access]

Now that the election is (finally) behind us, President Obama has an opportunity to set the nation more forcefully on the road to energy independence. We’re well on our way thanks in large part to new techniques and technologies that have unlocked vast deposits of shale oil and natural gas. But we could and should be doing much more. Back in June, the Interior Department issued its five-year Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas leasing plan. Despite high expectations encouraged by President Obama’s self-described “all-of-the-above” approach to the nation’s energy policy and the absence of long-standing Administrative and Congressional exploration bans that were lifted in 2008, theplan failed to open any new offshore areas to oil and natural gas exploration and production. The industry is still limited to the same 15 percent of the acreage on the OCS that’s been available for decades, leaving 85 percent untouchable. Don’t get me wrong. That 15 percent has been incredibly productive. In fact, the Gulf of Mexico region, which is the heart of America’s offshore oil and gas industry, has yielded six times more oil than 1980s resource estimates predicted it held. Production in the Gulf is finally ramping back up now that permitting rates are bouncing back from historic lows following the Macondo spill in 2010. We have every reason to believe that the areas where we can explore and produce will continue to support and create jobs and contribute to America’s energy security for years and even decades to come. For this reason, we will continue to advocate that the Obama Administration streamline and accelerate permitting on these acres of the OCS. We will also fight to put to rest once and for all the erroneous claims that the industry is “sitting on” offshore tracts, a red herring that surfaced again during the presidential debates. In fact, the success industry has crafted out of the 15 percent of the OCS currently open to exploration and production underscores why the Interior Department’s 5-Year Leasing Plan was so disappointing. Think of how much energy awaits us in the 85 percent of the offshore areas where we currently cannot explore or produce. One report by the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, conducted several years ago, estimates recoverable resources in “U.S. moratorium areas” of 19.29 billion barrels of oil and 83.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. If history is any guide, these estimates will prove to be very conservative. The frustrating truth is we have no idea how much is waiting for us there, because we’re not allowed to go look.

#### And, the plan strikes a balance between supply and demand—creates certainty for offshore production

Griles 3 [Lisa, Deputy Secretary, Department of the Interior, “Energy Production on Federal Lands,” Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate]

Mr. GRILES. America’s public lands have an abundant opportunity for exploration and development of renewable and nonrenewable energy resources. Energy reserves contained on the Department of the Interior’s onshore and offshore Federal lands are very important to meeting our current and future estimates of what it is going to take to continue to supply America’s energy demand. Estimates suggest that these lands contain approximately 68 percent of the undiscovered U.S. oil resources and 74 percent of the undiscovered natural gas resources. President Bush has developed a national energy policy that laid out a comprehensive, long-term energy strategy for America’s future. That strategy recognizes we need to raise domestic production of energy, both renewable and nonrenewable, to meet our dependence for energy. For oil and gas, the United States uses about 7 billion barrels a year, of which about 4 billion are currently imported and 3 billion are domestically produced. The President proposed to open a small portion of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to environmentally responsible oil and gas exploration. Now there is a new and environmentally friendly technology, similar to directional drilling, with mobile platforms, self-containing drilling units. These things will allow producers to access large energy reserves with almost no footprint on the tundra. Each day, even since I have assumed this job, our ability to minimize our effect on the environment continues to improve to where it is almost nonexistent in such areas as even in Alaska. According to the latest oil and gas assessment, ANWR is the largest untapped source of domestic production available to us. The production for ANWR would equal about 60 years of imports from Iraq. The National Energy Policy also encourages development of cleaner, more diverse portfolios of domestic renewable energy sources. The renewable policy in areas cover geothermal, wind, solar, and biomass. And it urges research on hydrogen as an alternate energy source. To advance the National Energy Policy, the Bureau of Land Management and the DOE’s National Renewable Energy Lab last week announced the release of a renewable energy report. It identifies and evaluates renewable energy resources on public lands. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit this for the record.\* This report, which has just come out, assess the potential for renewable energy on public lands. It is a very good report that we hope will allow for the private sector, after working with the various other agencies, to where can we best use renewable resource, and how do we take this assessment and put it into the land use planning that we are currently going, so that right-of-ways and understanding of what renewable resources can be done in the West can, in fact, have a better opportunity. The Department completed the first of an energy inventory this year. Now the EPCA report, which is laying here, also, Mr. Chairman, is an estimate of the undiscovered, technically recoverable oil and gas. Part one of that report covers five oil and gas basins. The second part of the report will be out later this year. Now this report, it is not—there are people who have different opinions of it. But the fact is we believe it will be a good guidance tool, as we look at where the oil and gas potential is and where we need to do land use planning. And as we update these land use plannings and do our EISs, that will help guide further the private sector, the public sector, and all stakeholders on how we can better do land use planning and develop oil and gas in a sound fashion. Also, I have laying here in front of me the two EISs that have been done on the two major coal methane basins in the United States, San Juan Basis and the Powder River Basin. Completing these reports, which are in draft, will increase and offer the opportunity for production of natural gas with coal bed methane. Now these reports are in draft and, once completed, will authorize and allow for additional exploration and development. It has taken 2 years to get these in place. It has taken 2 years to get some of these in place. This planning process that Congress has initiated under FLPMA and other statutes allows for a deliberative, conscious understanding of what the impacts are. We believe that when these are finalized, that is in fact what will occur. One of the areas which we believe that the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Land Management is and is going to engage in is coordination with landowners. Mr. Chairman, the private sector in the oil and gas industry must be good neighbors with the ranchers in the West. The BLM is going to be addressing the issues of bonding requirements that will assure that landowners have their surface rights and their values protected. BLM is working to make the consultation process with the landowners, with the States and local governments and other Federal agencies more efficient and meaningful. But we must assure that the surface owners are protected and the values of their ranches are in fact assured. And by being good neighbors, we can do that. In the BLM land use planning process, we have priorities, ten current resource management planning areas that contain the major oil and gas reserves that are reported out in the EPCA study. Once this process is completed, then we can move forward with consideration of development of the natural gas. We are also working with the Western Governors’ Association and the Western Utilities Group. The purpose is to identify and designate right-of-way corridors on public lands. We would like to do it now as to where right-of-way corridors make sense and put those in our land use planning processes, so that when the need is truly identified, utilities, energy companies, and the public will know where they are Instead of taking two years to amend a land use plan, hopefully this will expedite and have future opportunity so that when the need is there, we can go ahead and make that investment through the private sector. It should speed up the process of right-of-way permits for both pipelines and electric transmission. Now let me switch to the offshore, the Outer Continental Shelf. It is a huge contributor to our Nation’s energy and economic security. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, everything you have talked about so far is onshore. Mr. GRILES. That is correct. The CHAIRMAN. You now will speak to offshore. Mr. GRILES. Yes, sir, I will. Now we are keeping on schedule the holding lease sales in the areas that are available for leasing. In the past year, scheduled sales in several areas were either delayed, canceled, or put under moratoria, even though they were in the 5-year plan. It undermined certainty. It made investing, particularly in the Gulf, more risky. We have approved a 5-year oil and gas leasing program in July 2002 that calls for 20 new lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico and several other areas of the offshore, specifically in Alaska by 2007. Now our estimates indicate that these areas contain resources up to 22 billion barrels of oil and 61 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. We are also acting to raise energy production from these offshore areas by providing royalty relief on the OCS leases for new deep wells that are drilled in shallow water. These are at depths that heretofore were very and are very costly to produce from and costly to drill to. We need to encourage that exploration. These deep wells, which are greater than 15,000 feet in depth, are expected to access between 5 to 20 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and can be developed quickly due to existing infrastructure and the shallow water. We have also issued a final rule in July 2002 that allows companies to apply for a lease extension, giving them more time to analyze complex geological data that underlies salt domes. That is, where geologically salt overlays the geologically clay. And you try to do seismic, and the seismic just gets distorted. So we have extended the lease terms, so that hopefully those companies can figure out where and where to best drill. Vast resources of oil and natural gas lie, we hope, beneath these sheets of salt in the OCS in the Gulf of Mexico. But it is very difficult to get clear seismic images. We are also working to create a process of reviewing and permitting alternative energy sources on the OCS lands. We have sent legislation to Congress that would give the Minerals Management Service of the Department of the Interior clear authority to lease parts of the OCS for renewable energy. The renewables could be wind, wave, or solar energy, and related projects that are auxiliary to oil and gas development, such as offshore staging facilities and emergency medical facilities. We need this authority in order to be able to truly give the private sector what are the rules to play from and buy, so they can have certainty about where to go.

#### And, removing restrictions key – alters market dynamics

Medlock, 8 [Medlock is a fellow in Energy Studies at Rice University's James A Baker III Institute for Public Policy and an adjunct assistant professor in the [Economics Department](http://www.chron.com/?controllerName=search&action=search&channel=opinion%2Foutlook&search=1&inlineLink=1&query=%22Economics+Department%22) at Rice, “Open outer continental shelf”, http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/Open-outer-continental-shelf-1597898.php]

A confluence of factors is responsible for the recent price run-up at the pump. One important factor behind the strength of oil prices is the expectation of inadequate oil supply in the future. This has led to a debate regarding the removal of drilling access restrictions in the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). According to the Department of Interior's Minerals Management Service (MMS), the OCS in the Lower 48 states currently under moratorium holds 19 billion barrels of technically recoverable oil. Some analysts claim that opening the OCS will not matter that much, as the quantity of oil is only about two years of U.S. consumption. But a more appropriate way to look at the issue is this: If the OCS could provide additional production of 1 million barrels per day of oil, our import dependence on Persian Gulf crude oil would be reduced by about 40 percent. Moreover, at 1 million barrels per day, the currently blocked OCS resource would last about 50 years. Of course, opening the OCS will not bring immediate supplies because it would take time to organize the lease sales and then develop the supply delivery infrastructure. However, as development progressed, the expected growth in supply would have an effect on market sentiment and eventually prices. Thus, opening the OCS should be viewed as a relevant part of a larger strategy to help ease prices over time because an increase in activity in the OCS would generally improve expectations about future oil supplies. Lifting the current moratorium in the OCS would also provide almost 80 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable natural gas that is currently off-limits. A recent study by the Baker Institute indicates that removing current restrictions on resource development in the OCS would reduce future liquefied natural gas import dependence of the United States and lessen the influence of any future gas producers' cartel.

#### And, that sustains low prices and ensures adequate supply

Hastings, 12 [House Representative Doc, Republican Washington, President Obama's offshore drilling plan must be replaced, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-a-environment/239529-president-obamas-offshore-drilling-plan-must-be-replaced]

Though President Obama uses lofty rhetoric to claim support for American oil and natural gas production, the administration chose to bury the announcement of this plan under mountains of news coverage. It’s no surprise that during an election year the president doesn’t want to hype a plan that represents a giant step backwards for American energy production and keeps 85 percent of our offshore areas off-limits. Fortunately, Congress now has the responsibility to act and make clear that the president’s plan is inadequate to meet the United States’ energy needs. Under current law, the president must submit the five-year plan to Congress for a mandatory 60-day review before it goes into effect. While in the past, this 60-day review has been treated as just a formality, it is an opportunity to reject the president’s plan and offer a better alternative for job creation and energy production. H.R. 6082, the Congressional Replacement of President Obama’s Energy-Restricting and Job-Limiting Offshore Drilling Plan, would replace President Obama’s plan with an environmentally responsible, robust plan that supports new offshore drilling. This plan passed out of the House Natural Resources Committee with bipartisan support and will be considered by the full House this week. It sets up a clear choice between the president’s drill-nowhere-new plan and the Congressional replacement plan to responsibly expand offshore American energy production. President Obama’s plan doesn’t open one new area for leasing and energy production. The Atlantic Coast, the Pacific Coast and most of the water off Alaska are all placed off-limits. This is especially frustrating for Virginians who had a lease sale scheduled for 2011, only to have it canceled by President Obama. The president added further insult to injury by not including the Virginia lease sale in his final plan, meaning the earliest it could happen is late 2017. The president’s plan only offers 15 lease sales limited to the Gulf of Mexico and, very late in the plan, small parts of Alaska. It doesn’t open one new area for leasing and energy production. According to the non-partisan Congressional Research Service, President Obama’s 15 lease sales represent the lowest number ever included in an offshore leasing plan. President Obama rates worse than even Jimmy Carter. Thanks to President Obama, it’s as if the bipartisan steps to lift the drilling moratoria in 2008 never happened. Crippling $4 gasoline prices sparked Americans’ outrage and pressured the Democrat-controlled Congress to allow legislation to pass opening up new offshore areas to drilling. Unfortunately, four years later, American families and small businesses are experiencing the pain of higher gasoline prices and yet no progress has been made to expand production of our offshore resources. The Congressional moratorium on drilling has simply been replaced by the “Obama moratorium” on drilling. Gasoline prices were $1.89 when President Obama took office, and prices today are nearly double. Americans will continue to face volatile price spikes as long as we continue to keep the United States’ energy resources under lock-and-key. In stark contrast to the president, the Congressional replacement plan includes 29 lease sales and opens new areas previously under moratoria. It’s a targeted effort towards those areas where we know we have the most oil and natural gas resources – like the mid-Atlantic, the Southern California Coast and Alaska. This is a drill smart plan that would create thousands of new American jobs, help lower prices at the pump and strengthen our national and economic security. Congress has a choice – to either support the president’s plan that re-imposes the drilling moratorium and places the vast majority of offshore areas off-limits, or support using American energy to create American jobs and strengthen America’s economy.

#### And, only offshore development can keep domestic prices down

Pirog, 12 [Robert Pirog Specialist in Energy Economics CRS, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40645\_20120210.pdf]

Natural gas markets differ from the oil market in that they are not global, but regional. As shown¶ in Table 6, above, virtually all U.S. natural gas consumption comes from U.S. or Canadian¶ sources. The only link between regional natural gas markets is through LNG, but the rapidly¶ growing market for LNG predicted earlier in this decade has failed to materialize. LNG is still¶ largely characterized by long-term, two-party supply and purchase agreements. In the North¶ American market, LNG plays the role of making up marginal short-falls in the demand and¶ supply balance. As production from domestic onshore shale gas deposits increases, the role of¶ LNG in the U.S. market will likely be small.¶ In this regional market structure, the development of **new, offshore** U.S. **supplies could have a**¶ **significant impact on the domestic price** of natural gas, as well as contributing to U.S. energy¶ independence of this fuel. Although the price of natural gas has not shown the same degree of¶ volatility as oil, the United States has been among the highest-priced regions in the world. High¶ prices have caused residential consumers to allocate a greater portion of their budgets to home¶ heating expenses. Industrial users either lose sales to overseas competitors, or cease U.S.¶ production when domestic natural gas prices rise too much beyond those observed in other¶ regions of the world.¶ The development of offshore natural gas resources is likely to further retard the development of a¶ growing LNG system in the United States. Terminals for the re-gasification of LNG have proven¶ to be difficult to site and permit, and expensive to build. If domestic natural gas resources, close¶ to existing collection and distribution systems, at least in the Gulf of Mexico, could be developed,¶ the LNG terminals might prove to be redundant, depending on the volumes of natural gas that¶ ultimately might be recovered. Offshore natural gas development, though commonly associated with offshore oil production, will likely be less competitive in a market environment dominated¶ by onshore shale gas development.

#### Plan expands production – kick starts nearly 100 new projects

Paul Hillegeist et al (President and COO at Quest Offshore Resources, Inc, Sean Shafer, Project Director, Andrew Jackson, Project Manager, Leslie Cook , Senior Research Consultant) December 2011 “The State of the Offshore U.S. Oil and Gas Industry” http://energytomorrow.org/images/uploads/Quest\_2011\_December\_29\_Final.pdf

If drilling permits going forward were to be issued at pre‐moratorium rates, the number of shallow water projects delayed could be significantly reduced from 85 under the current path to 37 over the 2012 to 2015 period, and from 48 to 9 for the deepwater. The increased number of projects would increase investment in the Gulf of Mexico offshore oil and gas industry by over $15.6 billion dollars from 2012‐2015. This additional investment would increase average annual U.S. employment between 17,000 and 49,000 thousand jobs per year over that time period. Offshore oil production would be higher over the next decade, for example, by 2017 offshore oil production would rise by approximately 13 percent relative to its current projected path. A regulatory environment that eliminates unnecessary permitting delays and maintains competitiveness with development opportunities in other regions of the world would provide a first step to revitalizing the offshore oil and gas industry. Additional access to offshore areas currently off‐limits remains a key missing component of U.S. energy policy, and would provide substantial additional gains to the nation in terms of energy security, employment and government revenue.

#### That could double our capacity

Baker Institute, ‘8 (Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, Baker Institute Policy Report, January 2008, “Natural Gas in North America: Markets and Security,” http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/30064519/study-lift-u-s-drilling-restrictions-avoid-international-lng-cartel)//CC

As might be expected, the lower requirements for LNG under this scenario stem from larger, lowcost U.S. Lower 48 natural gas production. Modeling predicts that lifting access restrictions would lead to an increase overall in Lower 48 production of about 1.5 tcf in 2015 (or a 7.5 percent increase), increasing to 3.1 tcf greater production (or a 10.1 percent increase) in every year from 2015 through 2030. More specifically, OCS production would total 5.0 tcf in 2015 and 6.1 tcf in 2025 as compared to only 3.5 tcf in 2015 and 3.9 tcf in 2025 if the restrictions remain in place. Lifting restrictions in the Rocky Mountains adds another 0.10 tcf by 2015 and 0.93 tcf by 2025.

#### Otherwise, unpredictable regulatory shifts will crush predictability and timing of projects

Curry L. Hagerty (Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy at the Congressional Research Service) June 15, 2010 “Outer Continental Shelf Moratoria on Oil and Gas Development” http://crs.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/10Jul/R41132.pdf

One legacy of congressional moratoria is their impact on the timing of possible OCS development. From a developer’s point of view, predictability in the pace, timing, and sequence of OCS development projects is key to strategic business decisions. From a regulator’s standpoint, agency discretion for OCS development is tied to program planning horizons set by statutory or regulatory timetables. Features of the annual congressional moratoria varied from year to year, and from region to region, as reflected in Table 1, and the resultant uncertainty had a disruptive effect on the pace of OCS activity, which was viewed negatively by those in favor of OCS drilling. Among those opposed to OCS drilling, the disruptive effect was considered a positive outcome.23 Changes to the specific provisions of annual moratoria measures created tensions due to the unpredictability of the bans on leasing activities, timeframes, and locations.24 It was not uncommon for developers to engage in litigation against the federal government and to claim damages related to reliance on leases and federal OCS policies that were disrupted by the annual congressional moratoria.25 Although observers agreed that appropriations measures were out of sync with the timetable used to coordinate federal OCS planning functions, proponents of annual congressional moratoria provisions countered that restrictions were defensible in the absence of more permanent alternatives for similar leasing prohibitions

### 2ac yes cyberterror

#### Cyber-attack is coming —-actors are probing grid weaknesses

Reed 12 John, Reports on the frontiers of cyber war and the latest in military technology for Killer Apps at Foreign Policy, "U.S. energy companies victims of potentially destructive cyber intrusions", 10/11, [killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/11/us\_energy\_companies\_victims\_of\_potentially\_destructive\_cyber\_attacks](http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/11/us_energy_companies_victims_of_potentially_destructive_cyber_attacks)

Foreign actors are probing the networks of key American companies in an attempt to gain control of industrial facilities and transportation systems, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta revealed tonight. ¶ "We know that foreign cyber actors are probing America's critical infrastructure networks," said Panetta, disclosing previously classified information during a speech in New York laying out the Pentagon's role in protecting the U.S. from cyber attacks. "They are targeting the computer control systems that operate chemical, electricity and water plants, and those that guide transportation thorough the country." ¶ He went on to say that the U.S. government knows of "specific instances where intruders have gained access" to these systems -- frequently known as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (or SCADA) systems -- and that "they are seeking to create advanced tools to attack these systems and cause panic, destruction and even the loss of life," according to an advance copy of his prepared remarks. ¶ The secretary said that a coordinated attack on enough critical infrastructure could be a "cyber Pearl Harbor" that would "cause physical destruction and loss of life, paralyze and shock the nation, and create a profound new sense of vulnerability." ¶ While there have been reports of criminals using 'spear phishing' email attacks aimed at stealing information about American utilties, Panetta's remarks seemed to suggest more sophisticated, nation-state backed attempts to actually gain control of and damage power-generating equipment. ¶ Panetta's comments regarding the penetration of American utilities echo those of a private sector cyber security expert Killer Apps spoke with last week who said that the networks of American electric companies were penetrated, perhaps in preparation for a Stuxnet-style attack. ¶ Stuxnet is the famous cyber weapon that infected Iran's uranium-enrichment centrifuges in 2009 and 2010. Stuxnet is believed to have caused some of the machines to spin erratically, thereby destroying them. ¶ "There is hard evidence that there has been penetration of our power companies, and given Stuxnet, that is a staging step before destruction" of electricity-generating equipment, the expert told Killer Apps. Because uranium centrifuges and power turbines are both spinning machines, "the attack is identical -- the one to take out the centrifuges and the one to take out our power systems is the same attack." ¶ "If a centrifuge running at the wrong speed can blow apart" so can a power generator, said the expert. "If you do, in fact, spin them at the wrong speeds, you can blow up any rotating device." ¶ Cyber security expert Eugene Kaspersky said [two weeks ago](http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/28/what_keeps_eugene_kaspersky_up_at_night) that one of his greatest fears is someone reverse-engineering a sophisticated cyber weapon like Stuxnet -- a relatively easy task -- and he noted that Stuxnet itself passed through power plants on its way to Iran. "Stuxnet infected thousands of computer systems all around the globe, I know there were power plants infected by Stuxnet very far away from Iran," Kaspersky said.

### 2ac counterplan

#### 1. permute – do the counterplan. It’s not severance:

#### a. the plan just says USFG and is not a commitment to any particular branch which means the counterplan is an EXAMPLE of the USFG acting

#### Executive will circumvent court rulings

The Examiner, 7/8/2012 (The Examiner, 7 July 2012, “Obama’s imperious presidency may trigger another contempt charge,” http://washingtonexaminer.com/examiner-editorial-obamas-imperious-presidency-may-trigger-another-contempt-charge/article/2501567)//CC

In the wake of the BP oil spill in 2010, Interior Secretary Ken Salazar attempted to impose an official moratorium on oil and gas drilling off the Gulf Coast. As justification for his policy, he offered up a government report that he claimed had the endorsement of several respected scientists. As it turned out, this claim was a lie. The scientists came forward immediately to deny they had ever supported a blanket moratorium -- in fact, the idea had not even been presented to them for review. A federal judge subsequently blocked the moratorium on the grounds that it was scientifically unjustified. In defiance of that court order, Salazar simply reimposed the moratorium, leading the same judge to find him and the U.S. government in contempt of court in February 2011. Salazar may soon face another contempt charge -- this time from Congress. If it goes that far, he would become the second Cabinet official ever to suffer this ignominy, the first being President Obama's attorney general, Eric Holder. Salazar has refused for three months now to comply with a subpoena issued by the House Natural Resources Committee, seeking information that would show how the Interior Department came to provide this fake science as if it were fact. The trail leads straight through the White House, where Obama administration officials edited the original report to give a more resounding endorsement to their desired moratorium. In a letter delivered Friday to Salazar, Natural Resources Chairman Doc Hastings, R-Wash., also raised the disturbing possibility that the Interior Department's acting inspector general, Mary Kendall, may have misled the committee about her own involvement in producing the false moratorium report. Salazar's disrespect for a court and the Congress are part of a larger pattern in the Obama administration. Recall Obama's egregiously inappropriate browbeating of the Supreme Court justices present at his 2010 State of the Union Address over their Citizens United decision. Consider also the rhetorical campaign that he and his political allies launched in advance, to delegitimize the Supreme Court when most analysts expected the justices to overturn Obamacare. Then there is Obama's "We Can't Wait" campaign to bypass Congress's constitutional authority on matters of immigration, "kinetic military action" in Libya, educational standards and "recess" appointments that occurred when the Senate was actually in session. Along with Holder's refusal to provide the House Oversight Committee with crucial information about last year's cover-up of Operation Fast and Furious, these incidents suggest a presidential administration that believes itself above the Constitution. Sadly, the U.S. Congress has been defanged by decades of executive usurpation by presidents of both parties. For this reason, Hastings must press this case to the limit, even if it means a second Obama Cabinet official must be found in contempt. Unless Congress pushes back as hard as possible, the Obama administration will continue to show contempt for the constitutional authority of the people's elected representatives.

#### Court decisions are heavily politicized, will trigger a Congressional backlash

**Calabresi, 2008**

[Massimo, TIME, 6-26, “Obama's Supreme Move to the Center Washington” Thursday, http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1818334,00.html]

When the Supreme Court issues rulings on hot-button issues like gun control and the death penalty in the middle of a presidential campaign, Republicans could be excused for thinking they'll have the perfect opportunity to paint their Democratic opponent as an out-of-touch social liberal. But while Barack Obama may be ranked as one of the Senate's most liberal members, his reactions to this week's controversial court decisions showed yet again how he is carefully moving to the center ahead of the fall campaign. On Wednesday, after the Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty was unconstitutional in cases of child rape, Obama surprised some observers by siding with the hardline minority of Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts and Alito. At a press conference after the decision, Obama said, "I think that the rape of a small child, six or eight years old, is a heinous crime and if a state makes a decision that under narrow, limited, well-defined circumstances the death penalty is at least potentially applicable, that that does not violate our Constitution." Then Thursday, after Justice Scalia released his majority opinion knocking down the city of Washington's ban on handguns, Obama said in a statement, "I have always believed that the Second Amendment protects the right of individuals to bear arms, but I also identify with the need for crime-ravaged communities to save their children from the violence that plagues our streets through common-sense, effective safety measures. The Supreme Court has now endorsed that view." John McCain's camp wasted no time in attacking, with one surrogate, conservative Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas, calling Obama's gun control statement "incredible flip-flopping." McCain advisor Randy Scheunemann was even tougher in a conference call Thursday. "What's becoming clear in this campaign," Scheunemann said, is "that for Senator Obama the most important issue in the election is the political fortunes of Senator Obama. He has demonstrated that there really is no position he holds that isn't negotiable or isn't subject to change depending on how he calculates it will affect his political fortunes." Politicians are always happy to get a chance to accuse opponents of flip-flopping, but McCain's team may be more afraid of Obama's shift to the center than their words betray. Obama has some centrist positions to highlight in the general election campaign on foreign policy and national security, social issues and economics. His position on the child rape death penalty case, for example, is in line with his record in Illinois of supporting the death penalty. He is on less solid ground on the gun ban as his campaign said during the primary that he believed the D.C. law was constitutional. A top legal adviser to Obama says both cases are consistent with his previous positions. "I don't see him as moving in his statements on the death penalty or the gun case," says Cass Sunstein, a former colleague of Obama's at the University of Chicago. Sunstein says Obama is "not easily characterized" on social issues, and says the Senator's support for allowing government use of the Ten Commandments in public, in some cases, is another example of his unpredictability on such issues. On the issue of gun control, he says Obama has always expressed a belief that the Second Amendment guarantees a private right to bear arms, as the court found Thursday. But Obama's sudden social centrism would sound more convincing in a different context. Since he wrapped up the primary earlier this month and began to concentrate on the independent and moderate swing voters so key in a general election, Obama has consistently moved to the middle. He hired centrist economist Jason Furman, known for defending the benefits of globalization and private Social Security accounts, to the displeasure of liberal economists. On Father's Day, Obama gave a speech about the problem of absentee fathers and the negative effects it has on society, in particular scolding some fathers for failing to "realize that what makes you a man is not the ability to have a child — it's the courage to raise one." Last week, after the House passed a compromise bill on domestic spying that enraged liberals and civil libertarians, Obama announced that though he was against other eavesdropping compromises in the past, this time he was going to vote for it. Whether Obama's new centrist sheen is the result of flip-flopping or reemphasizing moderate positions, the Supreme Court decisions have focused attention again on the role of the court in the campaign season. McCain himself is vulnerable to charges of using the Supreme Court for political purposes. Earlier this month, when the court granted habeas corpus rights to accused terrorist prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, McCain attacked the opinion in particularly harsh language, though advisers say closing the prison there is high on his list of actions to rehabilitate America's image around the world. Liberals are hoping that despite Obama's moderate response to the Supreme Court decisions, the issues alone will rally supporters to him. "What both of these decisions say to me is that the Supreme Court really is an election-year issue," says Kathryn Kolbert, president of People For the American Way. "We're still only one justice away from a range of really negative decisions that would take away rights that most Americans take for granted," she says. And Obama's run to the center surely won't stop conservatives from using the specter of a Democratic-appointed Supreme Court to try to rally support. "Its pretty clear that if he's elected and Justice Scalia or Kennedy retires that he's going to appoint someone who's very likely to reverse [the gun control decision]," says Eugene Volokh, a professor at the UCLA School of Law. Given how Obama has been responding to the recent Supreme Court decisions, however, you're not likely to hear him talking about appointing liberal justices much between now and November.

#### Perm – do both. Solves the link

Perine 8 (Katherine, Staff – CQ Politics, “Congress Unlikely to Try to Counter Supreme Court Detainee Ruling”, 6-12, http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=news-000002896528&cpage=2)

Thursday’s decision, from a Supreme Court dominated by Republican appointees, gives Democrats further cover against GOP sniping. “This is something that the court has decided, and very often the court gives political cover to Congress,” said Ross K. Baker, a Rutgers Universitiy political science professor. “You can simply point to a Supreme Court decision and say, ‘The devil made me do it.’ ”

#### Congress will roll it back

Mikva and Bleich 91 (Abner J., Chief Judge – US Court of Appeals for DC, and Law Clerk, “When Congress Overrules the Court”, California Law Review, May, 79 Calif. L. Rev. 729, Lexis)

Our intention, here, is to understand these recent struggles between Congress and the Court and place them in historical context, relying upon similar struggles that occurred at the dawn of the New Deal. There are, of course, many instances in which Congress has overruled decisions of the Court, most of which have innocent, constitutionally unexceptional, explanations. One of the authors served as a law clerk to Justice Minton, when his decision in a contracts case, Wunderlich v. United States, [1](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b0e4148c2461740fd8d4c29455d069f9&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAz&_md5=9c38151b077c95107c1da1da6dc96be3&focBudTerms=there%20are%2C%20of%20course%2C%20many%20instances%20in%20which&focBudSel=all#n1) was overturned by Congress with record-breaking speed. But, as the New Deal era has shown, not all the deeds of the Court and Congress can be innocently explained. There have, for example, been periods of political upheaval or turmoil in which the Court's erroneous interpretations appear to reflect deliberate attempts to frustrate the policy objectives of Congress. Under these circumstances, the dialectic between the  [\*730]  Court and Congress has represented not a healthy, respectful effort to clarify their respective obligations and objectives in a particular area, but rather an attempt by one branch to politicize the Constitution in order to accomplish its policy objectives.

#### **No solvency for natural gas court rulings – they cause uncertainty**

Neese 5 – Angela Neese is a Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Colorado School of Law, 2005; B.S.B.A., University of Denver, 2005, ““THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE COLORADO OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION COMMISSION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: A CALL FOR A NEW AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH” 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 561, lexis nexis

C. Case-by-Case Analysis These two leading Colorado Supreme Court decisions, Bowen/Edwards and Voss, were decided over a decade ago, and yet these cases "leave many questions unanswered." n185 For example, the court did not adequately define "operational conflict," n186 and "it left to speculation the type of local regulation which will offend the principles articulated in those cases." n187 What these Colorado Supreme Court decisions did, in effect, was create a regime in which each occurrence of stringent local regulation of the oil and gas industry must be examined by the courts on a case-by-case basis. Because the court held that state preemption of local regulation is not total, "each provision of a local oil and gas regulation must be examined to determine whether it presents a conflict." n188 For the past decade, the Colorado Supreme Court has declined to hear any further cases on the issue of state preemption of local government oil and gas regulation, thereby foreclosing any possibility of providing more direct guidelines for the COGCC and local governments. As a result, this case-by-case system of preemption analysis has **led to more than a decade worth of costly litigation**, with no end in sight. The case-by-case regime leads to a high degree of unpredictability and puts **natural gas developers and local governments constantly at odds**. n189 The litigation that often results, when the industry and the local governments are forced to look to the courts to determine which regulations are controlling, is costly to the industry (and thus to natural gas consumers) and to local governments (and thus to the taxpayers). n190 The lack of predictability, the high costs of litigation, and the resulting delays in production are proof that the Colorado Supreme Court has done the state a disservice by not providing a workable framework on the issue of state preemption of oil and gas regulation. n191 Bowen/Edwards is considered the determinative case as to preemption, yet both sides cite this case in their briefs and point to the same language as suggestive that they will prevail. n192 The lack of clear guidelines under the current Colorado [\*585] case law results in a number of unanswered questions that will likely lead to future legal battles.

### 2ac a2 renewables da

#### Oceans resilient

**Kennedy 2** (Victor, Coastal and Marine Ecosystems and Global Climate Change, http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/marine.cfm)

There is evidence that marine organisms and ecosystems are resilient to environmental change. Steele (1991) hypothesized that the biological components of marine systems are tightly coupled to physical factors, allowing them to respond quickly to rapid environmental change and thus rendering them ecologically adaptable. Some species also have wide genetic variability throughout their range, which may allow for adaptation to climate change.

#### Warming irreversible - past the tipping point

Spaeth, 12/5/12 [“Why it's probably too late to roll back global warming”, Ryu,The Week News, <http://theweek.com/article/index/237392/why-its-probably-too-late-to-roll-back-global-warming>]

Two degrees Celsius. According to scientists, that's the rise in global temperature, measured against pre-industrial times, that **could spark** some of **the** most **catastrophic effects of** global **warming**. Preventing the two-degree bump has been the goal of every international treaty designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, including a new one currently being [hammered out](http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ap-interview-un-chief-says-rich-countries-caused-climate-change-must-take-lead-in-fixing-it/2012/12/05/e7f5be46-3eb9-11e2-8a5c-473797be602c_story.html) at a United Nations summit in Doha, Qatar. But a new study published by the journal Nature Climate Change [shows](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/02/climate-change-study-emissions_n_2228646.html) that it's incredibly unlikely that global warming can be limited to two degrees. According to the study, the world in 2011 "pumped nearly 38.2 billion tons of carbon dioxide into the air from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil," [says Seth Borenstein at The Associated Press](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/02/climate-change-study-emissions_n_2228646.html): The total amounts to more than 2.4 million pounds (1.1 million kilograms) of carbon dioxide released into the air every second. Because emissions of the key greenhouse gas have been rising steadily and most carbon stays in the air for a century, it is not just unlikely but "rather optimistic" to think that the world can limit future temperature increases to 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit), said the study's lead author, Glen Peters at the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, Norway. What happens when the two-degree threshold is crossed? Most notably, that's when the polar ice caps will begin to [melt,](http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/it-s-already-too-late-to-stop-climate-change-20121129) leading to a dangerous rise in sea levels. Furthermore, the world's hottest regions will be unable to grow food, setting the stage for mass hunger and global food inflation. The rise in temperature would also likely exacerbate or cause extreme weather events, such as hurricanes and droughts. There is a very small chance that the world could pull back from the brink. The U.N. could still limit warming to two degrees if it adopts a "radical plan," [says Peters' group](http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2012/12/can-we-still-limit-warming-to-two-degrees). According to a PricewaterhouseCoopers study, such a plan would entail cutting carbon emissions "by 5.1 percent every year from now to 2050, essentially slamming the breaks on growth starting right now," [says Coral Davenport at The National Journal](http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/it-s-already-too-late-to-stop-climate-change-20121129), "and keeping the freeze on for 37 years." However, the U.N. has set a deadline of ratifying a new treaty by 2015, and implementing it by 2020, which means the world is already eight years behind that pace. There are still major [disagreements](http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ap-interview-un-chief-says-rich-countries-caused-climate-change-must-take-lead-in-fixing-it/2012/12/05/e7f5be46-3eb9-11e2-8a5c-473797be602c_story.html) between the U.S. and China over whether the developed world, which industrialized first, should bear the bulk of the cost of reducing carbon emissions. And there is, of course, a large contingent of Americans who don't even believe climate change exists, putting any treaty's ratification at risk. Climate change is so politically toxic in America that Congress has prioritized the [fiscal cliff](http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=19D2674D-7D85-4BDC-B63E-E75C9D26AA3A) over — no exaggeration — untold suffering and the end of the world as we know it. In other words, it isn't happening. And if that's not bad enough, keep in mind that the two-degree mark is just the beginning, [says Davenport](http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/it-s-already-too-late-to-stop-climate-change-20121129): Michael Oppenheimer, a professor of geosciences and international affairs at Princeton University and a member of the Nobel Prize-winning U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, says that a 2-degree rise is not itself that point, but rather the beginning of irreversible changes. "It starts to speed you toward a tipping point," he said. "It's driving toward a cliff at night with the headlights off. We don't know when we'll hit that cliff, but after 2 degrees, we're going faster, we have less control. After 3, 4, 5 degrees, you spiral out of control, you have even more irreversible change." Indeed, at the current emissions rate, the world is expected to broach the four-degree mark by [2100](http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2012/12/can-we-still-limit-warming-to-two-degrees) — at which point, we can expect even worse environmental catastrophes.

**No renewables now**

**Seeking Alpha 12**

[“ Why Alternative Energy Will Never Achieve Widespread Use In Our Lifetime”, 8/13/12, <http://seekingalpha.com/article/802141-why-alternative-energy-will-never-achieve-widespread-use-in-our-lifetime>]

The biggest issue comes with adapting these new resources. Aside from the fact that it would be a major pain for companies to make the switch, cost is the real problem. Building fossil fuel plants and resources, as well as actually using them, is a cheaper option for most big businesses. Alternative energy costs more to install and maintain, and with natural gas prices sitting so low and the supply growing by the day, you would be hard pressed to convince corporate America (or anywhere else in the world for that matter) that switching to clean energy is better for their business. It may help the environment, but it often hurts bottom line returns. Our addiction to fossil fuels is worse than that of our addiction to quantitative easing. Weening off natural gas and oil will take decades if not longer. Another major issue is the need for government subsidies to keep these programs going, as we all saw what happens when those programs run dry a la Solyndra. That brings us to the investing side of the equation, as many have utilized alternative energy in long-term portfolios in hopes of racking up strong gains.

#### Natural gas investment doesn’t tradeoff with renewables

Lacey 12 (Stephen, “Top Three Reasons Cheap Natural Gas Won’t Kill Renewable Energy”, 2/21, http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/02/21/421319/top-three-reasons-cheap-natural-gas-wont-kill-renewable-energy/?mobile=nc)

Over the years, the conversation around gas has changed dramatically in renewable energy circles. For example, up until 2008 when gas prices were at their peak and wind development was soaring, the industry’s message was simple: We’re a far more cost-effective, reliable investment than gas. But the tide turned in 2009, when gas prices started their precipitous drop. I remember the American Wind Energy Association’s annual conference in 2010, when shale gas dominated the CEO roundtable discussion. “Our single biggest challenge is improving technologies to compete with these low prices,” said one executive. The industry clearly took the challenge seriously. Today, due to bigger turbines, more reliable equipment and better materials, the cost of wind has dropped to record lows. In fact, some developers are even signing long-term power purchase agreements in the 3 cents a kilowatt-hour range. And last fall, Bloomberg New Energy Finance projected that wind would be “fully competitive with energy produced from combined-cycle gas turbines by 2016″ under fair wind conditions. The same technological improvements and maturation in project development in wind are driving down the cost of solar PV as well. For example, in California, solar developers have signed contracts for power below the projected price of natural gas from a 500-MW combined cycle power plant. (That projection does include a carbon price). These trends are driving record levels of interest from investors. In 2011, for the first time ever, global investments in renewable energy **surpassed investments in fossil fuels**. The bottom line: the price of renewable energy continues to come down while the projected price of natural gas is only expected to rise. We do have to be realistic about the situation: assuming gas prices stay near record low levels for a long period of time — which they likely won’t — renewables deployment won’t grow at the rate we need it to. But if you look at the where large-scale renewables stack up with the cost of energy from peaking gas plants and combined cycle plants (chart above), you can see that the industry is still nipping at the heels of gas — even with a “revolution” underway in accessing shale resources. That’s something that can’t be ignored.

#### Natural gas acts as a bridge fuel—spurring broad renewable development

Ju 12 (Anne Ju – senior science writer for the Cornell Chronicle) July 17, 2012 “Study Proves Natural Gas Can Bridge the Gap to a Clean Energy Economy” http://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/Study-Proves-Natural-Gas-Can-Bridge-the-Gap-to-a-Clean-Energy-Economy.html)

**Natural gas is a good transition step on the road to greener energy sources like wind, solar, and nuclear power**, says a new study. Lawrence M. Cathles, Cornell University professor of earth and atmospheric sciences, says natural gas is a smart move in the battle against global climate change. Published in the most recent edition of the journal Geochemistry, Geophysics and Geosystems, Cathles’ study reviews the most recent government and industry data on natural gas “leakage rates” during extraction, as well as recently developed climate models. He concludes that regardless of the time frame considered, substituting natural gas energy for all coal and some oil production provides **about 40 percent of the global warming benefit** that a complete switch to low-carbon sources would deliver. “From a greenhouse point of view, it would be better to replace coal electrical facilities with nuclear plants, wind farms, and solar panels, but replacing them with natural gas stations will be faster, cheaper, and achieve 40 percent of the low-carbon-fast benefit,” Cathles writes in the study. “Gas is a natural transition fuel that could represent the biggest stabilization wedge available to us.” Cathles’ study includes additional findings about expanding the use of natural gas as an energy source, as well as the climate impact of “unconventional” gas drilling methods, including hydraulic fracturing in shale formations. They include the following: • Although a more rapid transition to natural gas from coal and some oil produces a greater overall benefit for climate change, the 40 percent of low-carbon energy benefit remains no matter how quickly the transition is made, and no matter the effect of ocean modulation or other climate regulating forces. • Although some critics of natural gas as a transition fuel have cited leakage rates as high as 8 percent or more of total production during drilling—particularly hydraulic fracturing extraction—more recent industry data and a critical examination of Environmental Protection Agency data supports leakage rates closer to 1.5 percent for both conventional and hydrofractured wells. • Even at higher leakage rates, using natural gas as a transition to low-carbon energy sources is still a better policy than “business as usual” with coal and oil, due to the different rates of decay (and hence long-term global warming effect) of carbon dioxide released in greater amounts by burning coal and oil and any methane released during natural gas extraction. • Using natural gas as a transition fuel supports the push to low-carbon sources **by providing the “surge capacity” when needed, or a buffer when solar and wind production wanes.** “The most important message of the calculations reported here is that substituting natural gas for coal and oil is a significant way to reduce greenhouse forcing, regardless of how long the substitution takes,” Cathles writes. “A faster transition to low-carbon energy sources would decrease greenhouse warming further, but the substitution of natural gas for other fossil fuels is equally beneficial in percentage terms no matter how fast the transition.”

#### Renewable fail – even doubled production isn’t enough

Hughes 11 (J. David, Fellow in Fossil Fuels – Post Carbon Institute, Geoscientist – Geological Survey of Canada, and Team Leader – Canadian Gas Potential Committee, “Will Natural Gas Fuel America in the 21st Century?” Post Carbon Institute, May, http://www.postcarbon.org/reports/PCI-report-nat-gas-future-plain.pdf)

Electricity generation is the primary use for renewable energy sources such as wind and solar; yet these sources, including geothermal energy, generated only 2.7% of U.S. electricity in 2009, with biomass generating a further 1%. Even if these renewable sources more than double through 2035, as projected by the EIA, they will still constitute only 8% of forecast U.S. electricity demand. Proponents of wind and solar and other renewable sources of generation will argue that this forecast is far too conservative. Perhaps it is, but the scale of the problem of replacing hydrocarbons in electricity generation is simply daunting. Moreover, renewables have wellknown issues with intermittency and unpredictability, which compromise their ability to make up a major proportion of electricity supply, especially at current rates of consumption and necessary supply reliability.

**Their impact is overstated—resilience and adaptation check**

**Farrell et al, 02 -** research engineer in the Department of Engineering and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon University and the executive director of the Carnegie Mellon Electricity Industry Center (Alexander, “Bolstering the Security of the Electric Power System,” Issues in Science and Technology, Spring, http://www.issues.org/18.3/farrell.html)

Turning out the lights

Many terrorism scenarios involve disruption of electric service, or "turning out the lights." Whether this would allow terrorists to create widespread fear and panic is open to question. In the United States, households lose power for an average of 90 minutes per year. For the most part, individuals and society cope with these outages well, and power companies respond rapidly to restore service. Facilities that have special needs for reliability, such as hospitals and airports, typically have backup generators.

The local distribution system is the source of most outages; these affect relatively small numbers of people. The bulk power (generation and transmission) system causes only a few outages each year. In its most recent report on failures in this part of the electric power system, the North American Electricity Reliability Council (NERC) identified 58 "interruptions, unusual occurrences, demand and voltage reductions, and public appeals" in 2000. Of these events, almost half (26) were due to weather, mostly thunderstorms. Operator or maintenance errors accounted for 12 events, another 12 were due to faulty equipment, and 2 (including the largest single event) were due to forest fires. Six outages occurred simply due to failure to have sufficient power to meet demand. Not all of these 58 events caused the lights to go out, but when they did, many customers were affected. Even so, recovery was typically swift. The largest single outage in 2000 affected more than 660,000 customers in New Mexico but lasted for less than four hours.

Natural challenges of even larger scale have been met. For example, in January 1998 an ice storm struck Southern Canada and New York State, felling 1,000 transmission towers and 30,000 distribution poles while sending thousands of tree branches into power lines. This event left 1.6 million people without power, some for more than a month. Almost a quarter-million people were forced to leave their homes. Insurance claims reached about $1 billion (Canadian). This event was disruptive and costly, but it did not create terror or significant loss of life.

#### Plan solidifies US nanotech lead – that Sweezey – independent extinction impact

**Lev Navrozov 2k4** (Winner of the Albert Einstein Prize for Outstanding Intellectual Achievements, “The Center for Responsible Nanotechnology ‘Plans Ahead’)

“We at the Center for the Survival of Western Democracies, Inc., believe that **the West being what it is at present, there is only one scenario.** Two countries could develop nuclear weapons by 1945: the United States and Germany. The latter did not launch a Manhattan Project, since no one could vouch to Hitler in 1939 that nuclear weapons were possible within a few years, and he committed all available resources to the conventional war for world domination. The U.S. Manhattan Project started up, and finally, in 1942, came into its own for fear that Germany would develop nuclear weapons ahead of the United States. Similarly, two countries can develop molecular nano assemblers: the United States and China. The latter launched in 1986 Project 863, a Manhattan Project for the development of post-nuclear superweapons in seven fields, and, at the close of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st, molecular nano technology became the eighth field. The United States has not launched a Manhattan Project for the development of any post-nuclear superweapons, and certainly not, of molecular nanoweapons. In 1969 President Nixon announced the U.S. termination of development of post-nuclear weapons, and it has been terminated, according to my research, not my benevolence. Just as Lloyd George in England up to 1939 dreamed aloud about having a statesman as great as Hitler at the head of the British government, the Western political establishment has been in love with the dictatorship of China. So, the United States has no need for molecular nano assemblers and the defense against them. In 1939 Hitler made a fatal mistake: he grabbed Òthe rump of Czechoslovakia,Ó and the democratic West woke up. Imagine the dictatorship of China suddenly invading Mexico! But the Chinese strategists regard such a war as purely Western and old-fashioned (see ÒUnrestricted WarfareÓ). In a modern war (which, ironically, the United States initiated by using nuclear weapons against Japan in 1945), a geostrategist confronts the enemy with annihilation or unconditional surrender. Let us now look at the article ÒResponsible Nanotechnology.Ó At the CSWD, Inc., we believe that the only responsible molecular nanotechnology is for the U.S. government to launch a nanotech Manhattan Project on the basis of the Foresight Institute, with Eric Drexler, the founder of nanotechnology, at the head of the Project. Incidentally, the Advisory Board of the Center for Responsible Nanotechnology consists of distinguished, gifted individuals who might become the core of the nanotech Manhattan Project. Great was my shock when I had read the article posted by or on behalf of CRN. Here are its eight ÒscenariosÓ of the future of mankind (which the article presents out of numerical sequence): Scenario 6. ÒMolecular manufacturingÓ develops Òquickly enough,Ó but mankind lives happily ever after. But what about the possibility of a molecular nano attack, launched by the dictatorship of China on the West? What? Don't you know that China is as peaceful as the democratic West thought Germany was peaceful in 1938? Scenario 5. The same as Scenario 6 but Òmolecular manufacturing technologyÓ develops slowly, which is even better. Scenario 4. The leading world powers take a close look at the first three scenarios we've described [the article describes 4 after 6 and 5], decide to avoid them at all costs, and agree to work together to avoid geopolitical meltdown. We at CRN believe that sovereign nations ultimately may cooperate in this way, since the alternatives appear to suck! Again, China is no problem Ñ even if China gets molecular manufacturing capability first. Surely China will not annihilate the West even in this case, but will Òwork together.Ó What about the United States? Even [!] if the United States gets molecular manufacturing capability first, and certain elements inside the government intend to oppress the rest of the world with it, we can hope that other powerful entities in the U.S. will be more sensible and influential. The above suggests that the form of government in the United States is much more dangerous for the world than that in China, the largest dictatorship in world history. Inside the U.S. government Òcertain elementsÓ may Òintend to oppress the rest of the world.Ó Not inside the government of China, which presumably consists of American liberal Democrats and peaceniks only. Scenario 3. Two or more competent nations develop molecular manufacturing capability at about the same time. Fearing the potential military advantage this could provide for their adversary, they each begin rapid and massive development of hideously powerful new weaponry. The resulting arms race is almost certain to be highly unstable, for several reasons. This scenario can be considered an existential risk for the human race. Can you imagine the dictators of China, hearing of Òexistential risk for the human raceÓ? They will develop a severe depression, and the American doctors talking depression on TV will have to treat them. Scenario 2 A major Asian nation achieves robust molecular nanotechnology manufacturing ahead of anyone else, and as a result the U.S. becomes something of a backwater. As I was reading this, I could imagine only China in this role. I guessed right! But never mind, for China (if it's them) could turn increasingly open/democratic as they continue to develop economically and scientificallyÊ.Ê.Ê.Ê isn't it? Of course! Remember how increasingly open/democratic Germany turned as it developed economically and scientifically after 1933? If one knows nothing about a foreign country, he or she can well daydream about its being open/democratic. Remember how President Roosevelt's spouse and his ambassador in Moscow admired and extolled openness and democracy in Stalin's Russia? **Scenario 1. The United States of America is the first to develop molecular technology manufacturing, and as a result can rule the world. Surely this is better than the** nano annihilation**..”**

#### 1ac Pirog and carey say the plan ramps up the manufacturing sector - extinction

**Baum, ’99** Founder of Chemical and Engineering News Washington (Rudy Baum, C&EN Washington, 6 December 1999, “Millennium Special Report,” <http://pubs.acs.org/cen/hotarticles/cenear/991206/7749spintro2.html)//CC>  
Computers and the Internet are clearly one of the driving forces shaping all aspects of society at the turn of the millennium. But despite the stock market's insistence that "tech stocks" equal "computer stocks," we here at C&EN believe that chemistry in all its permutations remains a vital component of high technology. Which brings me to this "Millennium Special Report: Chemistry In The Service Of Humanity." The pace of change in today's world is truly incomprehensible. Science is advancing on all fronts, particularly chemistry and biology working together as they never have before to understand life in general and human beings in particular at a breathtaking pace. Technology ranging from computers and the Internet to medical devices to genetic engineering to nanotechnology is transforming our world and our existence in it. It is, in fact, a fool's mission to predict where science and technology will take us in the coming decade, let alone the coming century. We can say with finality only this: We don't know. We do know, however, that we face enormous challenges, we 6 billion humans who now inhabit Earth. In its 1998 revision of world population estimates and projections, the United Nations anticipates a world population in 2050 of 7.3 billion to 10.7 billion, with a "medium-fertility projection," considered the most likely, indicating a world population of 8.9 billion people in 2050. According to the UN, fertility now stands at 2.7 births per woman, down from 5 births per woman in the early 1950s. And fertility rates are declining in all regions of the world. That's good news. But people are living a lot longer. That is certainly good news for the individuals who are living longer, but it also poses challenges for health care and social services the world over. The 1998 UN report estimates for the first time the number of octogenarians, nonagenarians, and centenarians living today and projected for 2050. The numbers are startling. In 1998, 66 million people were aged 80 or older, about one of every 100 persons. That number is expected to increase sixfold by 2050 to reach 370 million people, or one in every 24 persons. By 2050, more than 2.2 million people will be 100 years old or older! Here is the fundamental challenge we face: The world's growing and aging population must be fed and clothed and housed and transported in ways that do not perpetuate the environmental devastation wrought by the first waves of industrialization of the 19th and 20th centuries. As we increase our output of goods and services, as we increase our consumption of energy, as we meet the imperative of raising the standard of living for the poorest among us, we must learn to carry out our economic activities sustainably. There are optimists out there, C&EN readers among them, who believe that the history of civilization is a long string of technological triumphs of humans over the limits of nature. In this view, the idea of a "carrying capacity" for Earth—a limit to the number of humans Earth's resources can support—is a fiction because technological advances will continuously obviate previously perceived limits. This view has historical merit. Dire predictions made in the 1960s about the exhaustion of resources ranging from petroleum to chromium to fresh water by the end of the 1980s or 1990s have proven utterly wrong. While I do not count myself as one of the technological pessimists who see technology as a mixed blessing at best and an unmitigated evil at worst, I do not count myself among the technological optimists either. There are environmental challenges of transcendent complexity that I fear may overcome us and our Earth before technological progress can come to our rescue. Global climate change, the accelerating destruction of terrestrial and oceanic habitats, the catastrophic loss of species across the plant and animal kingdoms—these are problems that are not obviously amenable to straightforward technological solutions. But I know this, too: Science and technology have brought us to where we are, and only science and technology, coupled with innovative social and economic thinking, can take us to where we need to be in the coming millennium. Chemists, chemistry, and the chemical industry—what we at C&EN call the chemical enterprise—will play central roles in addressing these challenges. The first section of this Special Report is a series called "Millennial Musings" in which a wide variety of representatives from the chemical enterprise share their thoughts about the future of our science and industry. The five essays that follow explore the contributions the chemical enterprise is making right now to ensure that we will successfully meet the challenges of the 21st century. The essays do not attempt to predict the future. Taken as a whole, they do not pretend to be a comprehensive examination of the efforts of our science and our industry to tackle the challenges I've outlined above. Rather, they paint, in broad brush strokes, a portrait of scientists, engineers, and business managers struggling to make a vital contribution to humanity's future. The first essay, by Senior Editor Marc S. Reisch, is a case study of the chemical industry's ongoing transformation to sustainable production. Although it is not well known to the general public, the chemical industry is at the forefront of corporate efforts to reduce waste from production streams to zero. Industry giants DuPont and Dow Chemical are taking major strides worldwide to manufacture chemicals while minimizing the environmental "footprint" of their facilities. This is an ethic that starts at the top of corporate structure. Indeed, Reisch quotes Dow President and Chief Executive Officer William S. Stavropolous: "We must integrate elements that historically have been seen as at odds with one another: the triple bottom line of sustainability—economic and social and environmental needs." DuPont Chairman and CEO Charles (Chad) O. Holliday envisions a future in which "biological processes use renewable resources as feedstocks, use solar energy to drive growth, absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, use low-temperature and low-pressure processes, and produce waste that is less toxic." But sustainability is more than just a philosophy at these two chemical companies. Reisch describes ongoing Dow and DuPont initiatives that are making sustainability a reality at Dow facilities in Michigan and Germany and at DuPont's massive plant site near Richmond, Va. Another manifestation of the chemical industry's evolution is its embrace of life sciences. Genetic engineering is a revolutionary technology. In the 1970s, research advances fundamentally shifted our perception of DNA. While it had always been clear that deoxyribonucleic acid was a chemical, it was not a chemical that could be manipulated like other chemicals—clipped precisely, altered, stitched back together again into a functioning molecule. Recombinant DNA techniques began the transformation of DNA into just such a chemical, and the reverberations of that change are likely to be felt well into the next century. Genetic engineering has entered the fabric of modern science and technology. It is one of the basic tools chemists and biologists use to understand life at the molecular level. It provides new avenues to pharmaceuticals and new approaches to treat disease. It expands enormously agronomists' ability to introduce traits into crops, a capability seized on by numerous chemical companies. There is no doubt that this powerful new tool will play a major role in feeding the world's population in the coming century, but its adoption has hit some bumps in the road. In the second essay, Editor-at-Large Michael Heylin examines how the promise of agricultural biotechnology has gotten tangled up in real public fear of genetic manipulation and corporate control over food. The third essay, by Senior Editor Mairin B. Brennan, looks at chemists embarking on what is perhaps the greatest intellectual quest in the history of science—humans' attempt to understand the detailed chemistry of the human brain, and with it, human consciousness. While this quest is, at one level, basic research at its most pure, it also has enormous practical significance. Brennan focuses on one such practical aspect: the effort to understand neurodegenerative diseases like Alzheimer's disease and Parkinson's disease that predominantly plague older humans and are likely to become increasingly difficult public health problems among an aging population. Science and technology are always two-edged swords. They bestow the power to create and the power to destroy. In addition to its enormous potential for health and agriculture, genetic engineering conceivably could be used to create horrific biological warfare agents. In the fourth essay of this Millennium Special Report, Senior Correspondent Lois R. Ember examines the challenge of developing methods to counter the threat of such biological weapons. "Science and technology will eventually produce sensors able to detect the presence or release of biological agents, or devices that aid in forecasting, remediating, and ameliorating bioattacks," Ember writes. Finally, Contributing Editor Wil Lepkowski discusses the most mundane, the most marvelous, and the most essential molecule on Earth, H2O. Providing clean water to Earth's population is already difficult—and tragically, not always accomplished. Lepkowski looks in depth at the situation in Bangladesh—where a well-meaning UN program to deliver clean water from wells has poisoned millions with arsenic. Chemists are working to develop better ways to detect arsenic in drinking water at meaningful concentrations and ways to remove it that will work in a poor, developing country. And he explores the evolving water management philosophy, and the science that underpins it, that will be needed to provide adequate water for all its vital uses. In the past two centuries, our science has transformed the world. Chemistry is a wondrous tool that has allowed us to understand the structure of matter and gives us the ability to manipulate that structure to suit our own purposes. It allows us to dissect the molecules of life to see what makes them, and us, tick. It is providing a glimpse into workings of what may be the most complex structure in the universe, the human brain, and with it hints about what constitutes consciousness. In the coming decades, we will use chemistry to delve ever deeper into these mysteries and provide for humanity's basic and not-so-basic needs.

### 2ac debt ceiling

#### Debt ceiling not key to it

#### The treasury will executive fiat budgeting – solves debt ceiling independent of congress

J.D. Foster (PhD, is Norman B. Ture Senior Fellow in the Economics of Fiscal Policy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation) January 3, 2013 “A New, Extra-Extraordinary Debt-Ceiling Tool” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/01/debt-ceiling-and-extraordinary-measures-to-fund-budget-shortfall

Geithner&rsquo;s missive lists and describes Treasury&rsquo;s &ldquo;extraordinary measures&rdquo; used in similar past episodes to preserve the current level of deficit spending after reaching the debt ceiling. These measures, essentially cash and debt management techniques, normally provide Treasury with about a $200 billion cushion. With trillion-dollar budget deficits, this cushion might be expected to last about two months before available resources would be insufficient to cover all government obligations. Geithner&rsquo;s list of extraordinary measures is missing one item that has never before been employed: prioritizing federal spending. It is the item behind the sign &ldquo;Break Glass Only in Case of Emergency.&rdquo; According to Administration projections, the government is expected to take in an average of $230 billion per month in 2013 while spending an average of $300 billion. Suppose the government were to reach the debt limit and exhaust the tools that Treasury acknowledges. The last emergency financial management tool Geithner could use would be to prioritize federal spending so as to allocate incoming receipts to the government&rsquo;s highest priorities&mdash;what might be called real-time executive fiat budgeting or, perhaps more accurately, a forced balanced budget. Interest on outstanding debt, amounting to roughly $19 billion per month, would have first claim on incoming receipts. As the Administration would surely make these interest payments a top priority regardless of its budgeting strategy, warnings about &ldquo;default&rdquo; on the nation&rsquo;s debt obligations do not hold water. Next in order of immediate priority would be national security, followed by Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid payments. Funding these in full with available resources would leave roughly $22 billion per month to apply to the other $92 billion a month in legislated spending across domestic discretionary and all other mandatory spending programs. In this eventuality, one way or another, $70 billion of obligated spending per month would go unspent.

#### Trillion dollar platinum coin solves if Republicans push too hard (lol)

Huffington Post January 3, 2013 “Can We Avert The Coming Debt Ceiling Crisis With A Magic Coin?” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/03/debt-ceiling-coin\_n\_2404653.html

Because of the deal made on New Year's Day that averted the immediate impact of the so-called fiscal cliff, America will face a sequel to the debt ceiling hostage crisis that led to the super committee and the sequester and the fiscal cliff and the fiscal cliff solution and the sequel to the debt ceiling hostage crisis that led to the super committee and the sequester and the fiscal cliff and the fiscal cliff solution, et cetera, ad infinitum. The best of all possible fiscal cliff deals would have included a guaranteed de-weaponization of the debt ceiling. Since the fiscal cliff deal did not include any such de-weaponization, America's credit and the global economy are still very much jeopardized by the dangerous lunatics who have threatened another round of hostage-taking. What can be done about it? Well, what about a magic trillion-dollar coin, wrought from platinum? Would that help? Actually, in an interview with Capital New York's Reid Pilifant, Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-N.Y.) suggests that it is possible to mint just such a coin, stick it in the Treasury, and stick a fork in the coming debt ceiling crisis before it begins. "I'm being absolutely serious," Nadler told Pilifant, adding, "It sounds silly but it's absolutely legal. And it would normally not be proper to consider such a thing, except when you're faced with blackmail to destroy the country's economy, you have to consider things."

#### Compromise is impossible – GOP obstructionism intensified after the fiscal cliff

**Sargent 1-2** – Greg, writes The Plum Line blog, a reported opinion blog with a liberal slant (The Morning Plum: GOP can’t put Tea Party genie back in bottle, Wvashington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/01/02/the-morning-plum-gop-cant-put-tea-party-genie-back-in-bottle/)

By any measure, the fiscal deal that finally passed the House yesterday should have been something House Republicans could have enthusiastically supported. After all, as Jonathan Weisman put it, the bill “locks in virtually all of the Bush-era tax cuts, exempts almost all estates from taxation, and enshrines the former president’s credo that dividends and capital gains should be taxed equally and gently.”

Yet in order to get this through the House, we had to go through endless drama, histrionics, threats, and theatrics. And in the end, only 85 of 236 House Republicans voted for it — barely more than a third — meaning it passed largely because of Democratic support.

This perfectly captures what has become of today’s Republican Party. And it doesn’t bode well for the coming debt ceiling battle, or indeed, for key chunks of Obama’s whole second term agenda.

The story is being widely reported today as proof the GOP finally broke from decades of anti-tax orthodoxy. And that’s true, at least in the sense that Senate Republicans overwhelmingly supported the final deal. But the more important point is that a majority of House Republicans didn’t break from it — despite the action of their Senate counterparts — signaling that literally any kind of compromise with them may simply be impossible.

This is the inevitable result of the GOP’s collective decision to organize itself for years around the idea that even the tiniest of tax rate increases on the smallest minority of super rich Americans is nothing short of apostasy. If yesterday’s events were such a horrific defeat for the GOP, as many conservatives are telling us, it’s only because Republican leaders have spent months or years drumming it into GOP base voters’ heads that the most modest of tax increases on the very richest among us would constitute a sellout of deeply sacred principles. Remember when every GOP presidential nominee vowed not to accept even a 10 to one ratio of spending cuts to tax increases? Such stuff is not just bombastic primary rhetoric designed to feed the true believers. For many House Republicans, this idea — and the broader refusal to compromise at any cost — seems to have become a deeply held and guiding governing principle.

What does that tell us about what’s next? Last night Obama reiterated his vow not to negotiate if Republicans hold the debt ceiling hostage. That’s good. But I’m skeptical it will make any difference. Yesterday’s compromise has unleashed total fury among conservatives, and the pressure on Republicans to mount a sustained confrontation over the debt ceiling — and not to back down until they win major entitlement cuts — will be intense. Individual Republicans in safe districts are isolated from the currents of national opinion and have plenty of incentives to continue acting exactly as they are.

The other day I speculated that House conservatives may simply no longer be capable of playing a constructive or meaningful role in the conversation over how to put the country on a stable economic and fiscal footing. The events of the last few days do little to dispel that impression. With the debt ceiling battle looming, the only chance of future governing compromises may reside in the ability to build coalitions weighted towards House Democrats that also include crossover Republicans. The worst is yet to come.

\* White House didn’t buy conventional wisdom about deal: The above leads to the next big question: Did Obama cost himself leverage in the coming debt ceiling fight by giving some ground on tax rates and encouraging Republicans to hold it hostage? Politico has a deep dive into the behind-the-scenes negotiations over the fiscal deal, and reports Obama calculated that the view from the left about giving away leverage was all wrong:

The president did not believe the dynamic would suddenly shift in his favor after Jan. 1, rejecting the conventional wisdom in Washington that all sides would have more flexibility after higher tax rates took effect. Republicans were no more likely to compromise after the deadline than before it, the White House concluded. And there was a very real fear that a resolution wouldn’t come for weeks, perhaps not before the country hit the debt limit in late February — a nightmare scenario that the president believed would destroy not only his leverage but also the still-fragile economy.

That dovetails with what I speculated the other day: Even without a deal, Republicans might not (contrary to expectations) have felt any more pressure to cooperate with the White House. Given the conduct of House Republicans yesterday, it’s not clear anything can stave off a debt ceiling battle.

\* All of a sudden, a tax “hike” becomes a tax “cut”: One amusing side note to House passage of the Senate deal: Republicans, now that they agreed to support it, are hailing the arrangement as “the largest tax cut in history.”

As you’ll recall, Republicans criticized the Dem push to continue the tax cuts on the middle class as a “tax hike” by Republicans for months, because it allowed taxes to go up on the wealthiest top two percent. But now, because all the cuts had expired, Republicans can now allow that this is, indeed, a tax cut. Of course, it always was a middle class tax cut, or at least the continuation of one.

\* Tax vote to become issue in 2016 GOP primary? An interesting subplot to the tax vote: Senator Marco Rubio conspicuously voted against the compromise in the Senate; but last night, Rep. Paul Ryan, to demonstrate to colleagues the seriousness of the moment, voted for it. Given that both are expected to run for president, it’ll be interesting to see whether this vote looms large in the primary as a litmus test issue similar to the ones that drove last year’s GOP battle.

\* Conservatives won’t forgive this vote: The Tweet of the day, from Erick Erickson, reacting to Paul Ryan’s vote for the compromise, says it all:

Thus ends the Paul Ryan 2016 Presidential Exploratory Committee.

\* By voting against House Republicans avoid primaries: Josh Barro notes a key reason so many House GOPers had to vote against yesterday’s compromise:

Voting for Plan B, or for the Senate fiscal cliff deal, or even for an amended version of the Senate deal, can open a Republican incumbent to attacks from conservative primary challengers and anti-spending groups like FreedomWorks and the Club for Growth.

Yes — another reason House conservatives may not be able to participate meaningfully in the conversation over how to move the country forward.

\* Fiscal cliff deal leaves threats to economy in place: A must read from Zachary Goldfarb detailing that for all the hoopla, the compromise leaves in place a series of very real threats to the economy, from the expiration of the payroll tax cut to the prospect for another debt ceiling showdown. However, as Goldfarb notes, the deal may have prevented a slide into recession by putting off spending cuts and extending tax cuts for almost all taxpayers.

What all this really illustrates is how much more remains to be resolved, and how high the stakes remain — the battles ahead aren’t just political; the fate of the fragile recovery still remains uncertain.

#### PC not key – can’t overcome Republican obstructionism

**Marcus 1-2** – Ruth, opinion writer for the Washington Post (On the fiscal cliff, a no-big-deal deal, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ruth-marcus-on-the-fiscal-cliff-a-no-big-deal-deal/2013/01/02/d98f84e0-5511-11e2-bf3e-76c0a789346f\_story.html)

The moment called for a grand bargain. It yielded a pathetic punt.

No one should feel good about this outcome. Washington proved, as if more proof were needed, that it is good at dispensing benefits with money it doesn’t have, bad at making the hard choices it so solemnly vows to pursue.

Judging the merits of the cliff deal depends on what problem you were hoping to solve.

If the goal was to avoid inflicting immediate pain, and that’s a worthy aim, the agreement succeeded. The middle class — indeed, nearly all Americans — will not see income taxes rise. Benefits will continue for the long-term unemployed. The blunderbuss impact of across-the-board spending cuts has been postponed.

Yet the goal was, or should have been, larger: not only to prevent instant fiscal shock but also to help avoid future fiscal catastrophe. By this metric, the deal was a flop.

First, it failed to raise anywhere near enough tax revenue. Recall, President Obama sought $1.6 trillion over 10 years. House Speaker John Boehner offered $800 billion. So they compromised . . . on $620 billion ($737 billion with interest).

Yes, this was the first vote for a tax increase in umpty-ump years. But the Bush tax rates are now locked in for nearly everyone, as are lower rates on capital gains and dividends and a gallingly generous, permanent estate tax break.

Second, the agreement did nothing about spending — specifically, nothing about the entitlement programs, primarily Medicare, driving the debt. Instead, that discussion was, surprise, put off.

Recall: The debt-ceiling debate begat the supercommittee, which was supposed to produce $1.2 trillion in cuts. The supercommittee failed, which begat the sequester — or was supposed to.

“I will veto any effort to get rid of those automatic spending cuts to domestic and defense spending,” Obama proclaimed in November 2011, after the supercommittee fizzled. “There will be no easy off-ramps on this one.”

With the sequester about to hit, this week’s deal featured, yes, an off-ramp, in the form of a two-month delay — paid for, yes, but in part with a tax gimmick that helps better-off taxpayers and ultimately loses billions of dollars.

There were two avenues available for the president and Congress in crafting a deal: big/big, maximizing both tax increases and spending cuts, and small/small. In the end, the negotiators chose the route of small/nonexistent — insufficient tax revenue coupled with no spending cuts.

Whose fault is this? You could lament a failure of presidential leadership. Where was the cliff during the campaign? What was the president’s plan — not just eliminating tax cuts for the wealthy but reforming entitlements as well?

Still, the ultimate blame lies with the House Republican caucus, which spurned two deals (the collapsed Obama-Boehner plan during the debt-ceiling fight in 2011 and the collapsed Obama-Boehner plan to avoid the cliff) that were far better, from the point of view of debt reduction, than what ended up passing.

The most effective communicator wielding the bulliest of pulpits could not prevail with a crowd this entrenched in anti-tax craziness.

History offers scant basis for optimism about the prospects for success with the coming cliffs: the postponed sequester, the return of the debt ceiling, the expiration of the continuing resolution to fund the government.

The White House theory is these forcing mechanisms will provide the spur for additional tax revenue, obtained through tax reform, coupled with spending cuts in the form of changes to entitlement programs. Hence, if not a grand bargain, a good-enough one, just down the road.

But where does the deal leave the administration’s leverage to obtain more in tax increases? Certainly not increased from where it was before.

The cliff just dodged represented a point of maximum power to extract new revenue. Why would an already irrationally intransigent House be more compliant under less pressure?

More likely, the administration’s bargaining power for more taxes is significantly reduced — or, looked at another way, Republicans’ ability to extract painful entitlement cuts as a price of new revenue has been significantly enhanced. Emphasis, here, on the word painful. Entitlement reform is necessary, but it should be done with care for the most vulnerable.

The president can say all he wants that he will not negotiate over the debt ceiling. But there are more negotiations to come — over the sequester and expiring spending bills, and those discussions will be taking place during precisely the same period as the debt-ceiling non-negotiations. If this doesn’t make you nervous, you haven’t been paying attention.

#### Obama won’t spend PC on the Debt Ceiling

**Montgomery and Helderman 1-2** – Lori, covers U.S. economic policy and the federal budget, focusing on efforts to tame the national debt and Rosalind, reporter for WP Politics (U.S. markets surge after Congress approves ‘cliff’ deal, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/us-markets-surge-after-congress-approves-cliff-deal/2013/01/02/8752863e-54e7-11e2-a613-ec8d394535c6\_story.html)

But Obama warned again that he would not negotiate with Republicans over the $16.4 trillion debt limit, which must be raised in the coming weeks. “While I will negotiate over many things,” he said, “I will not have another debate with this Congress over whether they will pay the bills they’ve already racked up.”

#### Congressional dysfunction prevents any deal from solving the economy – fighting breeds uncertainty

**Wiseman and Rugaber 1-2** – Paul and Christopher, AP Economic Writers (US still faces political fights on spending, debt, The Seattle Times, http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2020038169\_apusfiscalcliffeconomy.html)

A last-minute deal will keep the U.S. from driving off the so-called "fiscal cliff," but higher taxes and continued political fighting in Washington threaten to shake the fragile economy well into 2013.

A bill passed by Congress late Tuesday averts widespread tax increases and delays deep spending cuts that had threatened to return the country to recession.

Investors around the world breathed a collective sigh of relief after the biggest near-term stumbling block for the world economy had been cleared.

At midday Wednesday on Wall Street, the Dow Jones industrial average was up a hefty 223 points, or 1.7 percent. Broader stock averages also jumped.

In Europe, the FTSE 100 index of leading British shares closed up 2.2 percent to 6,027.37, its first time above 6,000 since July 2011. The CAC-40 in France rose 2.6 percent, and Germany's DAX ended 2.2 percent higher.

Earlier, in Asia, Hong Kong's Hang Seng index shot up 2.9 percent to close at 23,311.89, its highest finish since June 1, 2011. Australia's S&P/ASX 200 surged 1.2 percent to close at 4,705.90, its best finish in 19 months.

Some economists were disappointed that Congress and the White House couldn't reach agreement on a broader deal to significantly reduce the deficit over the next 10 years. That could have boosted business and consumer confidence and accelerated growth.

"Nothing really has been fixed," said Joseph LaVorgna, an economist at Deutsche Bank. "There are much bigger philosophical issues that we aren't even addressing yet."

Lawmakers postponed tough decisions on government spending, giving themselves a reprieve from cuts that were scheduled to start taking effect automatically Jan. 1. That just sets the stage for more hard bargaining later. Spending cuts could hurt growth even more.

Another standoff is likely to arrive as early as February, when Congress will need to raise the $16.4 trillion federal borrowing limit so the government can keep paying its bills. House Republicans, who objected strongly to the latest fiscal deal Tuesday before the chamber finally voted to approve it, probably won't agree to raise the debt limit without offsetting spending cuts that Democrats are sure to resist.

President Barack Obama warned Republicans late Tuesday that "if Congress refuses to give the United States government the ability to pay these bills on time, the consequences for the entire global economy would be catastrophic, far worse than the impact of a fiscal cliff."

Meanwhile, the economy doesn't have much growth to give. Mark Vitner, senior economist at Wells Fargo, predicts it will expand just 1.5 percent in 2013, down from a weak 2.2 percent in 2012. Unemployment stands at 7.7 percent.

Ben Schwartz, chief market strategist for Lightspeed Financial, said unemployment was still likely to edge up and retail sales growth was likely to be weaker than last year.

"Regardless of a deal getting done, people on Wall Street are not going to run around giving high fives" in celebration, Schwartz said. "The federal government is obviously dysfunctional, to say the least."

The months-long political standoff over fiscal policy has already taken its toll, adding uncertainty that has discouraged consumers from spending and businesses from hiring and investing.

The fiscal cliff, with its Jan. 1 deadline to reach a deal over taxes and spending, was created to force Democrats and Republicans to compromise, and it barely succeeded. Without a deal, more than $500 billion in tax increases would hit the economy in 2013 alone, along with $109 billion in cuts from the military and domestic spending programs.

Negotiations to avert catastrophe have highlighted once again how far apart the two parties are on taxes (Republicans don't want to raise them) and spending (Democrats are reluctant to cut government programs).

"What induces the two sides to stop fighting and start compromising?" asked Ethan Harris, co-head of global economics at Bank of America Merrill Lynch.

Political gridlock has been rattling financial markets and shaking consumer and business confidence the past two years.

After a fight over raising the debt limit last year, the credit rating agency Standard & Poor's yanked the U.S. government's blue-chip AAA bond rating because it feared that America's dysfunctional political system couldn't deliver a credible plan to reduce the federal government's debt. S&P warned that "the differences between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to bridge."

The Dow dropped 635 points in panicked selling the first day of trading after the S&P announcement.

Outside Washington, the economy has been getting some good news. Europe's financial crisis appears to have eased. And the U.S. real estate market finally appears to be recovering from the housing bust.

But partisan divide has left businesses and consumers wondering what's going to happen to their taxes and to federal contracts.

Companies have plenty of cash. But they reduced spending on industrial equipment, computers and software from July to September, the first quarterly drop since mid-2009 when the economy was still in recession. And hiring has been stuck at a modest level of about 150,000 new jobs per month this year.

Consumer confidence fell in December for the second straight month, according to a survey by the Conference Board, which blamed the drop on worries about the fiscal cliff. The uncertainty is also believed to have hurt holiday shopping, which grew at the slowest pace this year since 2008.

2ac link turns

#### Plan is popular---key to bipartisan bargain.

Coral Davenport 12 is Energy and Environment Correspondent for National Journal. “How Obama and Congress Could Find Common Ground on Energy,” December 6, 2012, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/how-obama-and-congress-could-find-common-ground-on-energy-20121206>, Accessed date: 12-30-12 y2k

Meanwhile, the partisan impasse may be about to end. Quietly, lawmakers and lobbyists say they can envision a grand bargain on energy and climate change—cutting fossil- fuel use and investing in clean energy in exchange for new offshore drilling or approval of the controversial Keystone XL pipeline. The biggest if, and the heaviest lift, will be getting Congress to enact the policy that economists say would do the most to transform the nation’s energy economy: taxing or pricing fossil carbon pollution. A price on carbon, say economists across the ideological spectrum, will increase the price of fossil fuels and decisively drive the free market toward clean energy. Yet any lawmaker who supports the plan could be accused of supporting an energy tax. Still, a combination of events—including more droughts, floods, and extreme weather like superstorm Sandy—has increased the sense of urgency. The recent explosion in domestic oil and natural-gas production has helped to create jobs and prop up the recovery while bringing together oil companies and the Obama White House in alliances that could pave the way for new agreements on energy policy. And as Washington grapples with the deficit, many in the capital are more open to the carbon tax as a way to raise revenue.

#### Plan popular---trumps ideology.

Barry Russell 12 is President of the Independent Petroleum Association of America, “Energy Must Transcend Politics”, 8-15-12, <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php#2238176>, Accessed date: 12-10-12 y2k

There have been glimpses of great leadership, examples when legislators have reached across the aisle to construct and support common-sense legislation that encourages American energy production. Recent legislation from Congress which would replace the Obama administration’s five-year offshore leasing plan and instead increase access America’s abundant offshore oil and natural gas is one example of such bipartisanship. The House passed legislation with support from 25 key Democrats. The support from Republicans and Democrats is obviously not equal, but this bipartisan legislative victory demonstrates a commitment by the House of Representatives to support the jobs, economic growth and national security over stubborn allegiance to political party. The same is happening on the Senate side. Democratic Senators Jim Webb (VA), Mark Warner (VA), and Mary Landrieu (LA) cosponsored the Senate’s legislation to expand offshore oil and natural gas production with Republican Senators Lisa Murkowski (AK), John Hoeven (ND), and Jim Inhofe (OK). Senator Manchin (WV) is another Democratic leader who consistently votes to promote responsible energy development.

#### Graham likes the plan.

Sammy Fretwell 12 is Miami Herald Staff. “Sen. Lindsey Graham's plan would open S.C. coast to offshore drilling,” 6-12-12, <http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/06/12/v-fullstory/2845120/sen-lindsey-grahams-plan-would.html>, Accessed date: 12-30-12 y2k

U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham revealed his plan Monday to open South Carolina’s coast to offshore oil and natural gas drilling — and have the state share in any profits from strikes of fossil fuels. Graham, R-S.C., said at a news conference in Columbia’s Five Points he has introduced a bill giving South Carolina the option to allow for oil and gas exploration from 10 to 50 miles offshore. No drilling would be allowed within 10 miles of the coast. Gov. Nikki Haley and U.S. Rep. Jeff Duncan, R-S.C., endorsed his proposal, but the plan drew plenty of criticism Monday from environmentalists, a small business group and a coastal geologist. Environmentalists called the plan an election year stunt in a state with little offshore oil and hard-to-extract natural gas deposits. Critics said Graham’s plan would unnecessarily threaten the environment, and the state’s multibillion-dollar coastal tourism industry, in the search for small quantities of the fossil fuels. A small band of protesters waved signs outside the news conference before heavy rains sent them indoors. Conservationists say oil spills could hurt resorts, such as Myrtle Beach and Hilton Head Island. They also say exploration could kill thousands of whales and dolphins. But Graham — who in the past opposed offshore oil drilling — said looking for oil and gas is worth a try to gain energy independence from hostile nations. He said his plan would be sensitive to the environment, although Graham acknowledged that drilling has risks. “I can’t promise America that we can get out of this mess without ... taking some risks,’’ Graham said. “The risk we’re trying to avoid is perpetual energy dependence.” If federal policies change for oil and gas exploration, “we could become more (energy) independent literally in a matter of years,’’ he said. The governor and the S.C. Legislature would determine whether exploration for oil and gas could occur within the 10-to-50-mile area, as well as where it would occur. He introduced legislation later Monday in the U.S. Senate. Monday’s announcement occurred at the same time big business groups released a report showing offshore drilling could create thousands of jobs and annually produce $87.5 million from sales, income and royalty taxes. The 18-page report was produced by Miley and Associates for the Palmetto Agribusiness Council, S.C. Citizens for Sound Conservation and the S.C. Energy Forum, a group with ties to the American Petroleum Institute. The Graham bill would allow South Carolina to keep 37.5 percent of revenues from oil and gas that is found off the coast. Another 50 percent would go to reduce the federal debt and 12.5 percent would go to a federal fund that protects land for conservation, according to Graham’s plan. Duncan said he plans to introduce similar legislation in the U.S. House. The state of Virginia already has such a plan, but that was halted by the Obama administration after the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill. Critics said Graham’s plan focuses on the use of dwindling fossil fuels, when the nation needs to look more aggressively at alternative energy sources, including non-polluting wind and solar power. “We’re not trying anything but fossil fuels in this state,” state Sierra Club representative Susan Corbett said. “There has been virtually no investment in any alternative energy or energy efficiency that are the true home-grown, independent sources of energy.” Mitchell Colgan, a College of Charleston geologist, and the S.C. Coastal Conservation League’s Hamilton Davis said the legislation seems politically motivated. Exploration off the coast in the 1970s and 1980s revealed little oil. The amount of oil that could be squeezed from the ocean would be a tiny percentage of what states like Alaska and Texas produce, Colgan said. Natural gas that does exist is in a form that is hard to extract, he said. “The only people clamoring for offshore drilling in South Carolina are the politicians,’’ said Colgan, who formerly worked for the Shell oil company. “You don’t see Shell or Exxon or the other major oil companies interested in what we have offshore. For South Carolina to talk drilling for oil, it’s political and not scientific.’’ Officials with the S.C. Small Business Chamber of Commerce also voiced reservations. But Graham, who said he also backs alternate energy development, said his idea only makes sense. He blamed President Barack Obama for failing to move aggressively to pursue offshore oil and gas reserves. He said the oil and gas industry could provide thousands of jobs, more than the Boeing aircraft plant in North Charleston and the BMW car manufacturer in the Greenville area. “Off the coast of South Carolina, we have oil and gas deposits ... that will allow this nation to become more energy independent, that would create more jobs in South Carolina than Boeing and BMW combined, and would because of the nature of the legislation create a revenue stream for the state of South Carolina.” Those backing the Graham plan include representatives of some of the state’s biggest business organizations, including the S.C. Chamber of Commerce. An estimated 150 people attended a luncheon at Saluda’s restaurant to discuss the plan after Graham’s news conference.

#### Key to agenda

Scott Horton 10 is Contributing Editor of Harper's Magazine. “The All-Powerful Lindsey Graham and the Principle of Freedom,” 2-17-10, http://harpers.org/archive/2010/02/hbc-90006565 accessed date: 7-14-2011 y2k

Two recent articles examining the legal policy of the Obama White House have concluded that one man wields unprecedented power and influence: Lindsey Graham, a Republican senator from South Carolina who first gained national attention as one of the managers of the impeachment effort against President Bill Clinton. He went on to win a Senate seat and aligned himself tightly with Senator John McCain. An Air Force reserve JAG, Graham was a champion for lawyers inside the Defense Department as they battled Bush Administration efforts to introduce torture. But he was simultaneously a champion of other aspects of Bush-era war-on-terror policy, including the notion of military commissions to try prisoners held at Guantánamo. Both the New York Times and the New Yorker found that presidential chief of staff Rahm Emanuel relied heavily on Graham and his views, seeing in them a possible bridge to a bipartisan consensus on thorny legal policy issues. As Glenn Greenwald puts it, Lindsey Graham has become “all powerful.”

#### There’s no specific legislation and vote won’t happen till June---means no trade-off.

Elise Foley and Sam Stein 1/2 are Huffington Post Staff Writers. “Obama's Immigration Reform Push To Begin This Month,” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/02/obama-immigration-reform_n_2398507.html>, Accessed date: 1-2-13 y2k

It remains unclear what type of immigration policies the White House plans to push in January, but turning them into law could be a long process. Aides expect it will take about two months to write a bipartisan bill, then another few months before it goes up for a vote, possibly in June. A bipartisan group of senators are already working on a deal, although they are still in the early stages. Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.) will likely lead on the Democratic side in the House. While many Republicans have expressed interest in piecemeal reform, it's still unclear which of them plan to join the push.

#### Nat gas lobbies support the plan.

Brian Wingfield 8 is Forbes Staff Writer. “Clean Skies Forever,” 09.02.08, <http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/02/rnc-natural-gas-biz-beltway-cx_bw_0902rnc-gas.html>, Accessed date: 12-30-12 y2k

Perched on a rooftop just blocks from the Republican National Convention's main arena is an outpost for the natural gas industry. You can't tell so immediately. The American Clean Skies Foundation's chief executive officer, Denise Bode, describes the group as a "think tank" with a focus "on communicating and educating on clean energy, particularly natural gas, wind and renewables, as well as energy efficiency." But natural gas billionaire and Chesapeake Energy (nyse: CHK - news - people ) boss Aubrey McClendon provided much of the seed money for the foundation, and serves as its chairman. The organization's Web site, cleanskies.org, touts the benefits of natural gas as the "natural partner" for renewable fuels and its potential as a vehicle fuel. It arrives amid the conventions during a banner year for natural gas. Industry advocates now say the U.S. has supply to last at least 100 years. This is a big year for lobbying, and natural gas producers could indeed benefit from a cap-and-trade bill because it would create an incentive to rely less on electricity generated by traditional coal-fired power plants. All of which explains their presence in St. Paul, though Bode says Clean Skies does not take a position on legislation. "We just try to illuminate the facts and figures and impact so policymakers can make a decision for themselves." But while Clean Skies says it's not pushing an agenda, the gas industry sure is. It wants to see the Congressional ban on offshore drilling in much of the coastal U.S. lifted (a stance supported by John McCain). It opposes laws that might restrict onshore drilling on federal lands. It wants the government to lower the dividends and capital gains tax rates. And, of course, it wants to see any climate change bill Congress might consider be favorable to natural gas.

#### Key to agenda---outweighs their link.

Dan Froomkin 11 is senior Washington correspondent for the Huffington Post. “How The Oil Lobby Greases Washington's Wheels,”

04/06/11, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/06/how-the-oil-lobby-greases_n_845720.html?view=print&comm_ref=false>, Accessed date: 12-31-12 y2k

Clout in Washington isn't about winning legislative battles -- it's about making sure that they never happen at all. The oil and gas industry has that kind of clout. Despite astronomical profits during what have been lean years for most everyone else, the oil and gas industry continues to benefit from massive, multi-billion dollar taxpayer subsidies. Opinion polling shows the American public overwhelmingly wants those subsidies eliminated. Meanwhile, both parties are hunting feverishly for ways to reduce the deficit. But when President Obama called on Congress to eliminate about $4 billion a year in tax breaks for Big Oil earlier this year, the response on the Hill was little more than a knowing chuckle. Even Obama's closest congressional allies don't think the president’s proposal has a shot. "I would be surprised if it got a great deal of traction," Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.), chairman of the Senate energy committee, told reporters at the National Press Club a few days after Obama first announced his plan. Rep. Earl Blumenauer (D-Ore.), co-author of a House bill that closely resembles Obama's proposal, nevertheless acknowledges that it has slim chances of passing. "It will be a challenge to get anything through the House that includes any tax increase for anyone under any circumstance," he told The Huffington Post. The list goes on: "It's not on my radar," said Frank Maisano, a spokesman for Bracewell Giuliani, a lobbying firm with several oil and gas industry clients. "It's old news and it's never going to happen in this Congress. It couldn't even happen in the last Congress." Indeed, the oil and gas industry's stranglehold on Congres is so firm that even when the Democrats controlled both houses, repeal of the subsidies didn't stand a chance. Obama proposed cutting them in his previous two budgets as well, but the Senate -- where Republicans and consistently pro-oil Louisiana Democrat Mary Landrieu had more than enough votes to block any legislation -- never even took a stab at it. Now that the House is controlled by the GOP, Obama's proposal is deader than an oil-soaked pelican. Over the last decade in particular, the Republican Party's anti-tax policies and pro-drilling campaign rhetoric have become nearly indistinguishable from those of Big Oil. "Obama's been proposing to get rid of these subsidies since his first budget in February 2009," said Tyson Slocum, director of the energy program for the consumer watchdog group Public Citizen. "The obstacle has been the petroleum industry. The American Petroleum Institute has dug in their heels and is fighting tooth and nail to retain these subsidies." The American Petroleum Institute (API) is the industry's enormously powerful lobbying and trade association. "API is very focused on making sure that we have a voice in policy debates," said Martin Durbin, the organization's executive vice president for government affairs. "Certainly I hope we're having some role in the debate here." Is he pleased at the industry's success in heading off this particular debate? "I feel that we are successfully getting the point across, successfully educating policy-makers about the importance of our industry throughout the economy," he said. Even before Obama's 2011 State of the Union address, API president Jack Gerard used his "State of American Energy" speech to cast the repeal attempt as a tax increase and a job-killer. "The way I see it, our policy-makers are at a crossroads," Gerard said. "They face two choices: One leads us forward and promotes jobs, investments, revenue and growth -- or one that takes us backward, threatening the progress we've made and closing the door on future opportunities." Gerard was speaking to a receptive audience. As Time noted, "Republican Fred Upton, the new chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, was in the front row of the audience for Gerard's speech." Upton did not return calls for comment. A PAMPERED INDUSTRY In January, Obama previewed his 2012 budget proposal during his State of the Union address. "I'm asking Congress to eliminate the billions in taxpayer dollars we currently give to oil companies," he said. "I don't know if you've noticed, but they're doing just fine on their own." The line got a laugh, and then Obama pointed out the trade-offs of giving public support to a powerful private interest: "Instead of subsidizing yesterday's energy, let's invest in tomorrow's." he said. With the actual budget proposal came more details: a list of tax breaks that, if eliminated, would generate $43.6 billion of additional revenue over the next 10 years. Two of the biggest breaks date back nearly a century, to a time when a young, untested industry needed incentives to drill. The API, after adding in the cost of some other proposed measures (including reinstating Superfund taxes and repealing two accounting gimmicks that would affect other industries as well), concluded that Obama's FY 2012 proposed budget could cost the oil and gas industry $90 billion over the next decade. The loss of subsidies would affect the industry's bottom lines, but would hardly, as Rep. Joe Barton (R-Tex), recently suggested, start driving companies out of business. That's because Obama was right; the oil companies are doing just fine. The big five -- BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil and Shell -- made a combined total profit of nearly $1 trillion over the past decade, with ExxonMobil clearing $31 billion in profits this past year alone. And it's hardly the case that the oil industry needs added incentives to drill. Former oilman George W. Bush made that point as clearly as anyone when he leveled with members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in a 2005 address: "I will tell you with $55 [a barrel] oil we don't need incentives to oil and gas companies to explore," he said. "There are plenty of incentives." Slocum, of Public Citizen, concurs: "With prices around $100 a barrel, it is asinine to suggest that $4 to $6 billion a year collectively is driving decisions about whether or not to pursue extraction opportunities in the U.S.," he said. "It is market prices that are driving investment decisions." While the oil industry warns that repealing the subsidies -- in addition to costing jobs -- would lead to higher gas prices, that too is hardly evident. Fuel costs largely reflect the price of oil, and that price has little to do with how much it costs to produce it. According to a U.S. Energy Information Administration survey, between 2007 and 2009, major U.S.-based oil companies spent an average of $29.31 to produce a barrel of oil. About one third of that amount went for extraction and taxes, and two thirds for exploration and development -- precisely why those companies are making such a killing when prices are $100 a barrel or more. Rather than production costs, the price of oil is set by the global market, and is affected by multiple factors. Those can include financial speculation and geopolitical fears that lately have been causing wild price swings. The repeal of a few billion dollars in subsidies isn't enough to make more than a small ripple in an approximately $3 trillion-a-year global market. Blumenauer argues that subsidies aren't appropriate for any well-established industry. Instead, he says, they should be used to support developing ones. "What's happened over the years, as the oil industry matured, as the giants consolidated into global players, and as the price of oil has been on a pretty steady upward trajectory -- with some hiccups along the way -- is that there ceased to be any rationale for providing these tax subsidies other than they were in the code and they benefited some of these companies." By contrast, he points out: "The rationale for providing tax subsidies for emerging technologies and energy sources now makes perfect sense for solar, wind, and geothermal -- where helping them come to scale would help provide a better balance to our energy choices." Oil and gas subsidies don't appear to wash with the general public, either. In a February NBC/Wall Street Journal poll that proffered suggestions for things that might be cut or eliminated as a way to reduce the current federal budget deficit, "eliminating tax credits for the oil and gas industries" was considered acceptable by a whopping 74 percent of Americans. Nearly 50 percent called it "totally acceptable." The only policy proposals that were more popular were raising taxes on the rich, eliminating earmarks, and canceling unnecessary weapons systems. The API says it has gotten very different signals from people.. Durbin said API's own polls show otherwise. "If you ask people, 'Should we take away unfair advantages to Big Oil,' then of course they'll say yes," he said. "If you ask a straight question, as we do... you get a much different answer." API's poll question asked "Do you support or oppose increased taxes on America's oil and natural gas industry?" ENERGY GIANTS ANTE UP With so much public opposition, why do subsidies remain? You might as well ask why there is no carbon tax, or why there was no significant reform legislation passed after the BP oil spill. The answer is that one of the many things the industry can do with its fat pocketbook is hire a veritable army of sharp lobbyists and back them up with big wads of cash in the form of campaign donations and spending. The end result is that the industry has a remarkable ability to get its way on Capitol Hill. According to the Center for Responsive Politics' website, the oil and gas industry has spent more than $1 billion on lobbying since 1998, including a jaw-dropping $147 million just last year. For comparison's sake, $147 million is about equivalent to the total budget of 100 congressional offices. That's more than the $103 million spent in 2010 by the financial service industry, another potent lobbying force -- but considerably less than the $240 million spent by the pharmaceutical industry. Among major industries, Opensecrets.org ranked Big Oil fifth in terms of lobbying dollars spent, behind only Big Pharma, electric utilities, business associations and insurance. The oil and gas industry used its $147 million to employ 788 individual lobbyists in 2010 -- some 500 (or almost two thirds) of whom, according to Opensecrets.org, are former federal employees who came through the revolving door particularly well versed in the ways of government. All told, that's well more than one oil and gas lobbyist per member of Congress out there on the Hill arming allies with talking points and briefing books, spinning the undecided and pressuring the opposition. And there's more of them every year. Consider the trendlines. As recently as 2004, the oil and gas industry spent about $52 million a year in lobbying; by 2009, that figure was up to $175 million -- or a 300 percent increase in just five years. The industry backs up its extraordinary lobbying effort with lavish spending on political campaigns. Candidates associated with oil and gas companies made about $15 million in direct campaign donations during the 2010 mid-term election cycle ($26 million during the 2008 presidential cycle). The industry was also responsible for more than $10 million in donations through its political action committees, or PACs, in the 2010 cycle. The trendlines are notable here, as well. In the early ’90s, oil and gas campaign spending favored Republicans over Democrats by about a 2 to 1 margin: For every $1 the industry gave to Democrats, it gave Republicans $1.78. But starting in the 1996 election cycle (think Al Gore), that changed dramatically. Now, for every $1 the industry gives Democrats, it gives Republicans about $3.35. Among the top oil and gas industry donors in the 2010 cycle, Koch Industries and ExxonMobil head the list. And Opensecrets.org's top 20 list of oil and gas money recipients is 4 to 1 Republican. In addition to contributions to individuals and PACs, there's the whole new world of spending opportunities opened up by recent Supreme Court rulings that essentially blew a hole through the post-Watergate campaign finance laws. Super PACs are groups that can now accept unlimited contributions, though they must disclose their contributors. Opensecrets.org calculates that companies with interests in the energy sector combined to give more than $5.6 million to Super PACs in the 2010 cycle. Former Bush political guru Karl Rove's American Crossroads group, for one such Super PAC. It spent $21 million on political advertising in the 2010 cycle; oil and gas interests contributed just over $3 million of that amount. The recent court rulings also opened the way for nonprofit groups to spend unlimited amounts of money on political campaigns -- and unlike the Super PACs, they don't have to disclose their donors. All they have to do is report how much they spent. These groups, led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, reported $140 million in campaign spending in the 2010 cycle, the vast majority of which went to support conservative causes. There's no way to know how much of that money came from Big Oil. Adding yet more firepower to its lobbyists’ arsenal, API announced last month that it will start funding political campaigns directly through a new PAC of its own -- in addition to what its member organizations give already. "API is very focused on making sure that we have a voice in policy debates," said its spokesman, Durbin. "We're always looking at ways to improve the way we do our jobs here. This just adds one more tool to leverage our ability to get the point across about the critical nature of this industry." One more thing: According to another study by the Center for Responsive Politics, oil and gas industry holdings are some of the most popular investments among lawmakers and their spouses, and in recent years have grown in value, offering a bundle of potential conflicts of interest problems. "Without question, among all the different industries that lobby the federal government, that make campaign contributions, oil and gas is right at the top of the top," said CRP's Dave Levinthal. "They can invest incredible resources into the political process that make so much of a difference in Washington, at the cost of a fraction of a faction of their haul." And it's not just the breadth of their efforts -- it's the ferocity and the effectiveness. Last month, one of the House's nine freshmen Democrats, Rep. William Keating of Massachusetts, tried to tack a subsidy repeal onto a continuing budget resolution. He failed, by a 73 vote margin, with not a single Republican voting in favor and 13 Democrats voting against the measure. Keating said he considers that vote a testament to the power of the oil and gas lobby. "It's incredible to me. It would be my Exhibit A," he said. "Because we're sitting here in the midst of a budget deadlock, we're sitting here cutting Head Start programs, police, fire, border security, reading teachers -- we're sitting here cutting the basics, and there's just this refusal to even consider subsidies for the oil companies." There's no business or economic argument for them, Keating said. "These are profitable businesses right now. This isn't a situation where you're trying to provide capital for businesses that need it, or trying to provide assistance to get a small business off the ground. It's not for economic development. It's not for job creation. It's not to enhance the middle class. So why is it there?" The answer, Keating said, has to be the industry's political clout. "I used to be a district attorney. Many times you begin an investigation by eliminating everything else. So I've been trying to eliminate every other possible reason, and I'm left with that." The money the industry spends influencing legislation and elections looks enormous -- until you compare it with what it buys. "If you look at $4 billion [in subsidies] annually, compared to say $200 million for lobbying and campaign spending," said Daniel J. Weiss, director of climate strategy for the Center for American Progress Action Fund, "that is a 20-to-1 payoff." And maintaining subsidies is only a small part of what the oil industry lobby has accomplished. Last session, the industry also blocked cap-and-trade legislation and staved off any action in response to the BP oil spill. Right now, it's fully occupied trying to defund the Environmental Protection Agency and roll back regulations across the board.

#### 8% risk of an internal link

**Beckman et al 11** [Matthew Professor of Political Science at UC Irvine, Opportunism in Polarization, Presidential Studies Quarterly; Sep 2011; 41, 3]

The final important piece in our theoretical model—presidents' political capital— also finds support in these analyses, though the results here are less reliable. Presidents operating under the specter of **strong economy** and **high approval ratings** get an important, albeit moderate, increase in their chances for prevailing on "key" Senate roll-call votes (b = .10, se = .06, p < .10). Figure 4 displays the substantive implications of these results in the context of polarization, showing that going from the lower third of political capital to the upper third increases presidents' chances for success by **8 percentage points** (in a setting like 2008). Thus, political capital's impact does provide an **important boost** to presidents' success on Capitol Hill, but it is **certainly not potent enough to overcome basic congressional realities**. Political capital is just strong enough to put a presidential thumb on the congressional scales, which often will not matter, but can in close cases.

#### Systematic research proves

**Edwards, 9** [Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University, holds the George and Julia Blucher Jordan Chair in Presidential Studies and has served as the Olin Professor of American Government at Oxford [George, “The Strategic President”, Printed by the Princeton University Press, pg. 149-150]

Even presidents who appeared to dominate Congress were actually facilitators rather than directors of change. They understood their own limitations and explicitly took advantage of opportunities in their environments. Working at the margins, they successfully guided legislation through Congress. When their resources diminished, they reverted to the stalemate that usually characterizes presidential-congressional relations. As legendary management expert Peter Drucker put it about Ronald Reagan, "His great strength was not charisma, as is commonly thought, but his awareness and acceptance of exactly what he could and what he could not do."134 These conclusions are consistent with systematic research by Jon Bond, Richard Fleisher, and B. Dan Wood. They have focused on determining whether the presidents to whom we attribute the greatest skills in dealing with Congress were more successful in obtaining legislative support for their policies than were other presidents. After carefully controlling for other influences on congressional voting, they found no evidence that those presidents who supposedly were the most proficient in persuading Congress were more successful than chief executives with less aptitude at influencing legislators.135 Scholars studying leadership within Congress have reached similar conclusions about **the limits on personal leadership**. Cooper and Brady found that institutional context is more important than personal leadership skills or traits in determining the influence of leaders and that there is no relationship between leadership style and effectiveness.136 Presidential legislative leadership operates in an environment largely **beyond the president's control** and must compete with other, more stable factors that affect voting in Congress in addition to party. These include ideology, personal views and commitments on **specific policies,** and the interests of constituencies. By the time a president tries to exercise influence on a vote, most members of Congress have made up their minds on the basis of these other factors. Thus, a president's legislative leadership is likely to be critical only for those members of Congress who remain open to conversion after other influences have had their impact. Although the size and composition of this group varies from issue to issue, it will almost always be a minority in each chamber.

#### advanced manufacturing technology will make war IMPOSSIBLE

**Paone 2k9** (Chuck, 66th Air Base Wing Public Affairs for the US Air Force, 8-10-09, “Technology convergence could prevent war, futurist says,” http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123162500)

The convergence of "exponentially advancing technologies" will form a "super-intelligence" **so formidable that it could avert war**, according to one of the world's leading futurists. Dr. James Canton, CEO and chairman of the Institute for Global Futures, a San Francisco-based think tank, is author of the book "The Extreme Future" and an adviser to leading companies, the military and other government agencies. He is consistently listed among the world's leading speakers and has presented to diverse audiences around the globe. He will address the Air Force Command and Control Intelligence, Survelliance and Reconnaissance Symposium, which will be held Sept. 28 through 30 at the MGM Grand Hotel at Foxwoods in Ledyard, Conn., joining Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz and a bevy of other government and industry speakers. He offered a sneak preview of his symposium presentation and answered various questions about the future of technology and warfare in early August. "**The superiority of convergent technologies will prevent war,"** Doctor Canton said, claiming **their power would present an overwhelming deterrent to potential adversaries**. While saying that the U.S. will build these super systems faster and better than other nations, he acknowledged that a new arms race is already under way. "It will be a new MAD for the 21st century," he said, referring to the Cold War-era acronym for Mutually Assured Destruction, the idea that a nuclear first strike would trigger an equally deadly response. It's commonly held that this knowledge has essentially prevented any rational state from launching a nuclear attack. Likewise, Doctor Canton said he believes rational nation states, considering this imminent technology explosion, will see the futility of nation-on-nation warfare in the near future. Plus there's the "socio-economic linking of the global market system." "The fundamental macroeconomics on the planet favor peace, security, capitalism and prosperity," he said. Doctor Canton projects that nations, including those not currently allied, will work together in using these smart technologies to prevent non-state actors from engaging in disruptive and deadly acts. As a futurist, Doctor Canton and his team study and predict many things, but their main area of expertise -- and the one in which he's personally most interested -- is advanced and emerging technology. "I see that as the key catalyst of strategic change on the planet, and it will be for the next 100 years," he said. **He focuses on six specific technology areas: "nano, bio, IT, neuro, quantum and robotics;"** those he expects to converge in so powerful a way. Within the information technology arena, Doctor Canton said systems must create "meaningful data," which can be validated and acted upon. "Knowledge engineering for the analyst and the warfighter is a critical competency that we need to get our arms around," he said. "Having an avalanche of data is not going to be helpful." Having the right data is. "There's no way for the human operator to look at an infinite number of data streams and extract meaning," he said. "The question then is: How do we augment the human user with advanced artificial intelligence, better software presentation and better visual frameworks, to create a system that is situationally aware and can provide decision options for the human operator, faster than the human being can?" He said he believes the answers can often be found already in what he calls 'edge cultures.' "I would look outside of the military. What are they doing in video games? What are they doing in healthcare? What about the financial industry?" Doctor Canton said he believes that more sophisticated artificial intelligence applications will transform business, warfare and life in general. Many of these are already embedded in systems or products, he says, even if people don't know it.

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#### The coal industry’s clout in Appalachia fuels mountain top removal (MTR) practices—these are devastating for local communities to such an unprecedented extent that they call for targeted resistance no matter where you’re from

Evans, 09 [Law Clerk, United States Magistrate Judge; J.D., University of Tennessee College of Law, 2009, Copyright (c) 2010 President and Fellows of Harvard College¶ Harvard Environmental Law Review¶ 2010¶ The Harvard Environmental Law Review¶ 34 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 521¶ LENGTH: 29523 words¶ ARTICLE: VOICES FROM THE DESECRATED PLACES: A JOURNEY TO END MOUNTAINTOP REMOVAL MINING, p. lexis]

On January 11, 2009, I woke up at Adam Wells's home in Wise County, Virginia. Adam's family has lived there for generations. Looking out Adam's window, the scene was idyllic: a narrow strip of farmland nestled between the two long ridges that form the Guest River Valley, a dusting of snow on the spruce trees and the windowsills of the ancient log cabin where Adam's grandfather and great-grandfather were born. But with a closer look, it was clear that something was wrong; something smelled wrong. The water from Adam's tap smelled of rotten eggs, and the washbasin and tub were stained with dark streaks. A carpet of tiny black crystals was growing on the basement floor where water from the hot water heater had been leaking. Adam's pickup truck was full of the empty plastic jugs he uses to carry drinking water home for himself and his grandmother.¶ We rode from Adam's house to the headwaters of his valley, where the ridgeline was missing and there was a deep gash in the earth -- a "high wall." The scene gave me a feeling of vertigo: the horizon had been flattened and lowered; the rest of the world tilted awkwardly toward the piles of orange rubble where the mountaintops had once been. When we reached the apex of the road, the scene stretched as far in either direction as we could see. The mountains were simply gone.¶ What took eons to form had taken only a few years to destroy. In the 1990s, a new form of surface mining called MTR became "the dominant [\*524] driver of land-use change" in Kentucky, southwest Virginia, and West Virginia. n6 It has now claimed over 470 mountains n7 and nearly 2000 miles of streams, n8 and it is expanding into Tennessee. n9 MTR is the most destructive form of coal mining ever imagined -- both to the natural environment and to local communities. Such a superlative should mean something to anyone familiar with the history of exploitation in the Appalachian coalfields. n10¶ To expose a seam of coal, the tops of the mountains are denuded and blasting holes are drilled in a grid. The holes are filled with as much as ten times the explosives used in the Oklahoma City bombing, n11 then detonated in series. n12 Every day in West Virginia, nearly four million pounds of explosives are used. n13 MTR operators have blasted over 380,000 acres of mountains, n14 or over 4.85 billion cubic yards, n15 and dumped them into countless headwater streams. n16 It is terrifying to see a mountaintop mine. It is terrifying to know that man has the power to unmake the oldest mountains on the [\*525] continent -- even more, to know that his conscience would allow it. Of our propensity to alter our environment, Wendell Berry writes:¶ ¶ Praise, in knowing this,¶ The genius of the place,¶ Whose ways forgive your own,¶ And will resume again¶ In time, if left alone. n17¶ ¶ But some bells cannot be unrung, n18 and the mountains and streams erased by MTR will never resume their rich biological commerce. n19 Though the mountains can forgive most of man's missteps, they cannot forgive this desecration. Their ecologies are forever altered, n20 the land, and our place in it, made forever poorer by the change. To use Berry's word, MTR is ecologically unforgiveable.¶ Still, the impact of MTR mines on the natural environment is outpaced by its impact on the people who live nearby. Every afternoon in Rock Creek, West Virginia, at about 3:00, the valley shakes and rumbles as if from a thunderstorm, and each peal threatens the communities in the mountains' shadows. Every hollow in these mountains has a history and a community with deep roots of place, n21 but they are being systematically erased. Communities disintegrate when Big Coal is their neighbor: the noise, dust, vibrations, and "fly rock" from blasting make them uninhabitable, and make the land worthless. n22 The coal companies buy out the residents, the community dies, and no one is left to complain. n23¶ Blasting is not the only threat. Incessant coal truck traffic makes living near the mines almost intolerable. n24 Additional runoff from denuded mountains [\*526] and silt-filled river channels increases the damage from flooding, though it is difficult to place a price tag on the costs. n25 Valley fills occasionally give way, creating massive mudslides. n26 In addition, coal is washed of impurities before being sold, producing a "sludge" containing high levels of carcinogens and heavy metals. n27 Although there is a practical (and only slightly more expensive) way to turn the sludge into solid waste, n28 regulations allow it to be stored in ponds at the heads of valleys or injected into old underground mines. n29 Those living below the sludge dams -- of which there are approximately 650 in the coalfields n30 -- know that they are unstable. Residents in Mingo and Wyoming Counties, West Virginia, are literally afraid for their lives, displaying an "overriding concern" about the dangers of sludge. n31 Their fears are not unfounded: the dams leak and accidental spills are common. n32 For those living below the sludge ponds, it is hard to forget the 1972 Buffalo Creek disaster that killed 125 people. n33 Although sludge spills can be ecologically catastrophic, even large spills receive little media attention. n34 Compared to the media blitz following the recent coal fly [\*527] ash spill in Kingston, Tennessee, n35 it is easy to get the impression that nobody cares what happens in the coalfields.¶ Sludge is a byproduct of coal processing whether the coal was mined underground or by MTR, but MTR multiplies the risks associated with sludge. For example, one leaking dam sits a quarter-mile above Marsh Fork Elementary School, and holds back 2.8 billion gallons of sludge. n36 Blasting recently began on the same ridge that has, so far, kept this sludge from burying the valley below. n37 Catastrophic dam failures aren't common, but blasting from MTR can also cause fractures that allow sludge in ponds or injection wells to seep into the groundwater, n38 and most residents in the coalfields, like Adam and his family, are dependent on wells for their water. n39 The obvious effects on the water -- rotten egg smells and dark stains -- are not merely inconveniences; they are health hazards. n40 The day I met Mat Louis-Rosenberg of Coal River Mountain Watch, he had been in nearby Prenter Hollow, delivering drinking water by truck to residents who can't drink from their taps anymore. In Prenter, over two billion gallons of slurry have been injected into abandoned underground mines, n41 and some of [\*528] it has migrated into residents' wells. n42 A recent health survey revealed that ninety-eight percent of adults in Prenter have gallbladder disease or kidney problems. n43 Children's teeth are dissolving from the acid in the water, too: a five-year old girl who lives in Prenter already has a full set of dentures. n44 Not surprisingly, cancer rates are also disproportionately high: on one 500-yard stretch of road, there have been six new cases of brain cancer. n45 Prenter Hollow may be unusually well-documented, but it is not unusual: there are untold numbers of injection wells that may be contaminating drinking water supplies. n46¶ Even breathing the air near MTR mines carries a significant health risk. Coal dust and silica from the blasts and the processing facilities fall on the towns near active mine sites every day. n47 The same dust that causes black lung settles on the playgrounds of elementary schools; the tattered American flag above the playground at Marsh Fork Elementary is stained coal-gray. n48 In 2004, one firsthand account of the school "sign-out" book found that "15 to 20 students [at Marsh Fork] went home sick every day because of asthma problems, severe headaches, blisters in their mouths, constant runny noses, and nausea." n49 Whether residents are exposed to coal contaminants by water, air, or a combination of both, it is beyond dispute that residents of areas where MTR is prevalent have much poorer health than those living in areas where it is not. n50¶ Big Coal argues that this is an acceptable price to pay for cheap energy. n51 In essence, coal producers argue that Appalachia's health and history are worth less than some marginal, short-term savings in energy costs. And [\*529] for too long, lawmakers in Washington have agreed. The November 2008 election, however, symbolized the idea that the voices that haven't mattered before can make all the difference. The bike ride was my way of helping to make those voices heard, by physically delivering them to the policymakers who have the power to stop this "assault" on Appalachia. n52¶ So, I left Knoxville and rode into the coldest winter snap in many years. Eleven days and 750 miles later, I crossed the Potomac into Washington, D.C., carrying my petition with signatures, letters, pictures, and stories from the people I met in the coalfields of Virginia, Kentucky, and West Virginia. The people who signed the petition are grassroots opponents of MTR. They are retired miners, schoolteachers, and deans of universities. Some trace their roots in the area to the 1600s, and others have lived in the coalfields for only a few years. But all of them are fighting the most environmentally and socially devastating practice that we allow in the United States. They are, as Larry Gibson calls them, "the forgotten people of Appalachia." n53 They are now my friends.

#### MTR is not inevitable because legal measures impact coal industry practices—this is a unique area where broad coalitions are key because otherwise disparate groups can agree on the need to curb mountain top removal. We can’t undo history, but that shouldn’t discourage conversation on how to respond to what’s happening

Evans, 09 [Law Clerk, United States Magistrate Judge; J.D., University of Tennessee College of Law, 2009, Copyright (c) 2010 President and Fellows of Harvard College¶ Harvard Environmental Law Review¶ 2010¶ The Harvard Environmental Law Review¶ 34 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 521¶ LENGTH: 29523 words¶ ARTICLE: VOICES FROM THE DESECRATED PLACES: A JOURNEY TO END MOUNTAINTOP REMOVAL MINING, p. lexis]

But with the passage of only a year, the outlook for Appalachia has never been more hopeful. Leaders in Congress have proposed bills in both [\*573] houses that would undo the fill rule and restore the original meaning of the CWA. n334 Failing legislative action, the Supreme Court has indicated it may be interested in hearing a challenge to the current fill rule. n335 Most promising, EPA has recently shown a willingness to exercise aggressive and meaningful oversight over the section 404 program. Though its first steps were tentative, n336 and Administrator Jackson expressed regret at the agency's hesitance, n337 EPA announced in September 2009, that it would conduct "enhanced" review of seventy-nine Corps permits. n338 Based on that review, EPA proposed to veto one large permit, n339 and less than a week later issued a new guidance memorandum intended to address toxic conductivity levels downstream from valley fills. n340 The new guidance was hailed (or condemned, depending on the source) as "sharply curtailing" MTR. n341¶ Still, however encouraging EPA's latest steps may be, they do not go far enough. The guidance will not put a stop to valley fills. n342 It applies only to future permits, n343 and even then, it contemplates that valley fills will continue to be constructed. The guidance goes so far as to offer a roadmap to mine operators to reduce conductivity levels below valley fills and promises that, by utilizing EPA's recommended "best management practices," multiple [\*574] valley fills can still be permitted for individual MTR mines. n344 Still more troubling, EPA acknowledges the failures in oversight by the Corps and the state agencies, yet leaves those same agencies with the keys to the henhouse. n345 The guidance sets a numeric "benchmark" for conductivity levels, but enforcement of the new benchmark may be only as effective as state monitoring. n346 Most important, even if the new benchmark for conductivity is adequately enforced, the other ecological harms from valley fills will remain unaddressed. The guidance pays lip service to ecological losses caused by deforestation, unstable hydrologic regimes, sedimentation, reduced organic matter inputs, and altered thermal regimes, while stressing the ecological viability of Appalachian watersheds, n347 but provides no teeth to stop these losses. The guidance merely rearticulates the authority that EPA already had to object to state agency decisions or veto Corps' decisions; n348 it doesn't actually change the legal landscape. n349¶ That is not to say, however, that EPA's crackdown on conductivity is not worthwhile. The guidance accomplishes two purposes immediately: although it will not increase EPA's enforcement authority, it will reduce the costs of enforcing water quality standards in one narrow but useful area, n350 and it will therefore increase the cost of MTR at the margins. n351 As the costs associated with MTR and valley fills are internalized, coal producers will incrementally shift toward other methods of mining. n352 Furthermore, the "sequencing" of valley fills should slow down the permitting process. n353 These changes give EPA some breathing room to consider a more fundamental [\*575] solution to the "pervasive and irreversible" effects of valley fills. n354 And there are indications EPA is doing just that: according to an interview Administrator Jackson gave to Rolling Stone magazine, EPA is reviewing the fill rule. n355 If the administration has the will to follow through, EPA can act on our petition and turn the page on this poorly conceived and legally indefensible rule.¶ We have known for a long time that one day the coal will run out. n356 One day, we will be forced to turn to other sources of energy. The question for our generation, then, is what will remain when that time comes. When we are finished -- when Appalachia's coal mines have given up their last lumps -- what will be left? Wilma Steele, a schoolteacher and the wife of a retired miner in Meador, West Virginia, answered that question: "Unanchored trees and people and a way of life that is gone with the winds of destruction and greed." n357 We will have lost one of the world's most biologically diverse ecological subregions. But more than that, we will have lost our way home.¶ Perhaps we have forgotten what home means. Maybe we have forgotten the stories that tied us to the places that nurtured us. And perhaps, one day, we'll understand the depths of our exile and we'll want to go back. But as Wendell Berry wrote of MTR, "nobody who ever wanted to go home would ever get there now, for every remembered place had been displaced." n358 The places that we have lost, we have lost not only from our maps, but also from our heritage. Appalachian poets -- writers of "old time" mountain music -- sing about the mountains and hollows of Appalachia. Matt Richardson, who accompanied me on the ride, is an old time musician, and he expressed dismay at the thought of trying to play music written about a mountain or a creek erased by an MTR mine. He said, "actually, I wouldn't even see a purpose in playing that song anymore." n359¶ Appalachia's heritage and its future remain at stake, but the plans of those who would spoil the land for short-term profit are anything but inevitable. Change in Washington is now being driven by the voices of those who know the value of what has been lost. Broad grassroots coalitions, from [\*576] long-time environmentalists to faith-based organizations, are speaking out. n360 The Obama Administration, by all indications, is listening. Even the national media, for so long uninterested in the destruction of rural Appalachia, is finally showing an interest. n361 And most importantly, people everywhere are becoming aware of what is happening on the other end of their power lines.¶ We may not be able to remove the valley fills or rebuild the mountains we have lost, but having lost them, we may yet rise to defend what remains.

#### Coal mining is a unique case study on identity. Appalachians occupy an uneasy middle ground because of the material impacts of mining—bringing this to light is necessary to disrupt totalizing accounts of whiteness that overlook the particularity of their experiences

Scott, 10 [Rebecca R, Removing Mountains : Extracting Nature and Identity in the Appalachian Coalfields. U of Minnesota Press]

Just as industry supporters reiterate the discourse of colonization in justifying MTR, middle-class coalfield residents use metaphors of racialization to explain white poverty. Horace’s disidentification from poor and workingclass people affected negatively by coal mining is also represented in the remarks of the DEP agent Steve. Here, it is worth considering the race and class-coded conversation that framed those remarks. In our discussion of the area’s history, Steve’s wife, Laura, called the area “Little Australia” as a way of describing the people who lived in the area “before coal.” In other words, Appalachia was like a penal colony— inhabited by the dregs of the Empire. As the conversation continued, she described coal miners as “a special breed.” Steve, who was not born into a coal mining family, as Laura was, frequently referred to a “coal mining mentality” and a “coalfield mentality,” by which he meant that coal miners were prone to spending their money carelessly on the things they desired and getting into debt instead of saving their money or using it responsibly. Laura more sympathetically described the perceived local culture of poverty as “learned helplessness.” The slippage in these comments reveals something about the complex articulations between race and class in American culture, where differences of culture and ancestry are metonyms for ostensibly economic distinctions. Laura, whose father was a coal miner, told a story that illustrates how coal mining has particular symbolic signification. She described the diversity of the coal-mining community where she grew up and compared this to a later encounter across difference: I went to school with the Japanese, with the Hungarians, with the Italians, with blacks, with different cultures, and we didn’t know a lot of discrimination. I mean it was all just families there that were trying to make a living. A couple summers ago, [I took] a multicultural psychology class, and we were talking about race, and you know, all that, and our professor was a black woman [with a] very, very, [big] chip on her shoulder . . . But anyway . . . I said, “I haven’t had your experiences, I don’t know how you were discriminated against, and all of that,” and I said, “but where I was born and raised, you know, everybody was different, it seemed like, everybody, and we just all tolerated each other, we all got along, we all played together.” . . . There was a black preacher in the class, and he started laughing, and he said, “Yeah, Laura, down there where you’re from . . . when everybody comes out of the mines, they’re all black, ain’t they?” (Laughter.) And I said, “Yeah!” Here Laura describes a situation in which the “native whites,” or white Appalachians, hold the place of the unmarked center of the diverse coalfield community, and she attributes her own experience of not knowing discrimination to the community as a whole. This assumption elides the perspective of the black families and families of other ethnicities whose experiences were potentially different from Laura’s (Frankenberg 1993, 56). The statement claims an innocent white identity and naturalizes cultural and racial difference. As a part of a poor white family that didn’t know privilege, she also couldn’t know discrimination (Wiegman 1999). Strikingly, it is the black preacher who brings up the symbolic association of coal mining and blackness. Because of the specific material nature of coal mining, “they’re all black.” This could be interpreted as a support of her plea of racial innocence, or, reading against the grain, it is possible that the preacher’s comment might have been a reaction to Laura’s statement of innocent whiteness. Most interesting, however, is how Laura’s comments move from a discussion of the diversity of her childhood community to a joke about mining and blackness. Even when most coal miners are white, as they are today in southern West Virginia, coal mining is difficult to reconcile withwhiteness because it so clearly reflects the abject body of labor**.** Phil Cohen argues that labor has two “phantasmagoric body images” that contribute to the production of laboring subjects (1997, 250). One of these is an idealized community of connection through labor; this is the site of masculine working-class pride in hard work that valorizes the whole community. The other is the embodied, abject condition of exploitation— the laboring body that is ultimately destroyed by the repetitive processes of work. The racialization of labor identifies the first, idealized, body with whiteness; white labor can and does read itself as the productive force behind the nation. At the same time, Cohen argues, black labor is identified entirely with the body. The labor process in this case is read as a disciplining of unruly carnal desires, instead of a creative or productive activity (250– 51). Whiteminers occupy an uneasy middle ground between these two images. While coal miners see themselves as essential contributors to the well-being of the nation and many proudly claim, “Coal is in my blood,” at the same time, underground coal miners are lucky to make it to retirement with their bodies unbroken and able to breathe. Coal miners’ pleasures— sodas, ATVs, video games— are portrayed as an undisciplined mismanagement of funds by critics of the “coal miner mentality.” The environmental effects of mining on communities further the abjection of the workers and their families. The feudal-like living conditions of the coal company towns, the almost unimaginable hardships of working underground in the “hand loading” era, the iconic image of the black-faced coal miner, and the epidemic of black lung all contribute to making coal mining particularly difficult to reconcile withwhite liberal citizenship. It is hard to think about independence when the house you live in is owned by the company you work for, hard to think about political liberty when the industry controls local and national politics, hard to feel modern and empowered when your body is bent and sickened by working underground. Even property ownership, the hallmark of American citizenship, is ambiguous when your lot is too small for a sewage system or is subject to damages caused by nearby mining. 7 In these regards, the historical conditions of coal mining serve as a clear example of the contradictions between democracy and capitalism. The articulation of coal miners with the body and a lack of discipline is reflected in the analogies that some respondents drew between coal mining and concepts associated with blackness. For instance, in our conversation, Laura and Steve noted the trend toward “political correctness.” Steve remarked, “There seems to be a phenomenon, you know, political correctness in this nation; you can’t talk about lesbians, you can’t talk about black people, you can’t talk about ethnic groups . . . all that’s politically incorrect. Got to be careful about what you say. But for some reason, it seems to be safe for states to talk about other states. . . . If you changed the label, if instead of ‘West Virginia’ it was, well, ‘this black guy,’ people would be upset.” Steve referred to the national stereotype of welfare-dependent Appalachians and noted, “There’s people in every state that live on the dole. . . . West Virginians are normal people.” Laura added, “That mentality exists everywhere, but here it’s just a coal miner mentality. Everywhere else, it’s the inner-city mentality.” Laura also noted that some of Appalachian specificity has its roots in historical facts. Describing historical coal mining conditions, she said, “I mean, the companies owned you.” Discussing the famed Appalachian insularity, she argued, “When coal mining was established, people became suspicious of outsiders because they didn’t know who they could trust, because the coal companies treated people so poorly. And if you talked about the coal officials, then you could lose your job. You could be thrown out and your family out of the company housing.” For Laura and Steve, stereotypical Appalachian behaviors result not only from poor Appalachians’ welfare dependency, as expressed in the comparison of the coal miner with the inner-city resident, but also from a healthy distrust of the industry that so ruthlessly exploited its workers.

#### Appalachian identity occupies a conflicted space in racial politics—positing race as a universal force makes it impossible to understand intersecting identity formations and the role that coal miners play as “white trash”

Scott, 10 [Rebecca R, Removing Mountains : Extracting Nature and Identity in the Appalachian Coalfields. U of Minnesota Press]

Appalachian identity is tricky. This trickiness has something to do with the historical permutations of racial formations in the United States, as well as relating to the complex intersections of these with gender and class formations and the ways that people relate to nature. These intersections and cultural articulations help explain both the flexibility and the intransigence of social categories. Race, gender, and class, along with other cultural formations like region and the human/nature relation, interact in ways that are mutually reinforcing yet overdetermined in their possibilities. These complications enmesh Appalachian whiteness in a number of contradictory stories that both complement and trouble the racial project of whiteness (Omi and Winant 1994). In one, Appalachian whites are the most “pure” in America. According to this story, white hillbillies are descended from unadulterated Scotch-Irish stock and are relatively innocent of the troubled race relations of the South or the northern cities (Inscoe 1999). In this way, they are articulated with idealized notions of America’s past and with the pious and devoted nationalism of the heartland. In another story, Appalachian whiteness is often defined by references to Native America, sometimes via claims of Native ancestry, sometimes through the trope of the frontier, as epitomized in a proliferation of place-names and legends. And in yet another contradiction, hillbillies are portrayed as degenerate whites: inbred, violent, and backward. Traditionalism here represents irrationality and brutality, including violent racism, deviant sexuality, and oppressive gender relations. The story of degeneracy resonates strongly with the American national narrative of differential worthiness, as it accounts for coalfield poverty in terms of a pathological hillbilly or “white trash” culture. The poverty and disempowerment of the coalfields belie the dominant American cultural narrative of the rewards of productivity, as well as the idealization of “white 1 and these contradictions must be accounted for. For coalfield activists, coal dust is a sign of the oppressive environmental, economic, and social conditions of coal mining. This black dust signifies the association between the industrial process of mining coal and the poverty, hardship, and suffering of the coal camps. But the symbolic association of coal mining and blackness carries other connotations as well. In its currently hegemonic form, whiteness is articulated with things like property, progress, and hygiene. Coal mining, poverty, and underdevelopment undercut this story. In the coalfields, as elsewhere, whiteness is haunted by the specter of “white trash”; failures of ideal whiteness are explained by metaphors of racial Others and the places they live. MTR happens in a “doubly occupied place” (K. Stewart 1996); Appalachia is economically occupied by the coal industry, by its marginalization in the national culture, and at the same time occupied by the people who live there, who must find ways to negotiate their lives within these other forms of occupation. This chapter examines one aspect of this double occupation, the negotiation of white American identity in the coalfields. In the national imagination, Appalachia is a “white” space, and hillbillies, whether idealized or demonized, are imagined as white people. This reflects the centrality of racialization to American national culture. It is not my intention to determine the racial attitudes of coalfield residents. Rather, the point is that race and racial distinctions are fundamental symbolic categories in American culture, and the logic of differential worthiness that they reflect is deeply ingrained in other, seemingly unrelated areas, such as how we understand the economy and the human relationship to nature. Because we live in a social formation shaped by inequalities of gender, race, and class, these categories frequently inform our ways of interpreting the world, even when the concepts themselves are not part of a group or individual’s discursive repertoire (Johnson et al. 1982, 252; Bettie 2003). The comments I analyze in this chapter are not interesting because they reveal some “truth” about particular individuals’ racial attitudes; in fact they do not. Their interest lies in the way that these oblique references to race make visible some of the articulations between divergent cultural categories. Whiteness is frequently experienced as a nonidentity by whites because of its role as the unmarked center of American racial formations (Dyer 1997; Frankenberg 1993; Perry 2002; Twine 1997). As the unmarked center, part of whiteness’s power comes from its invisibility and its claims to universality (Goldberg 1993). However, there are specific valorized qualities associated with white identity, involved in American cultural citizenship, which come to light in the context of MTR. MTR is an extreme example of how the human relationship to land is structured by cultural formations like race and gender. The cultural politics of MTR reinscribe the logic of differential worthiness in a context that is nominally race-free. At the same time as Otherness is reaffirmed, white coalfield residents desirous of unmarked American citizenship are preoccupied with whiteness.

#### Whiteness is not a universal force—rather, it fluctuates in judgments of differential worthiness. We realize race is important to understand oppression, but we shouldn’t let physical difference keep us from addressing an issue that is bad for everyone

Scott 2k7 (Rebecca, prof sociology @ Missouri, Journal of Appalachian Studies THE SOCIOLOGY OF COAL HOLLOW: SAFETY, OTHERING, AND REPRESENTATIONS OF INEQUALITY)

In United States racial formations, whiteness is associated with wealth, blackness with poverty (Omi and Winant 1994). Poor whites are therefore matter out of place (Douglas 2002 (1966)). Some have suggested that the marked whiteness of "white trash" represents a distinct social category (Wray 2006). I argue that rather than representing a separate category, the marked whiteness of the hillbilly and other white Others increases the ability of the category "white" to expand and contract according to the historical and social context (Ignatiev 1995; Jacobson 1998). In addition, this marked whiteness, in John Hartigan's words, is a "rhetorical identity," (Hartigan 2005, 135) which offers an opportunity for the expression and reaffirmation of the racializing logic of differential worthiness in putatively race-free contexts (Mills 1997; Newitz 1997). By seeming not to refer to race at all, the unproblematic invocation of hillbillies and "white trash," with their marked physical appearance laden with connotations of backwardness, degeneration and sloth, reaffirms the existence of basic hierarchical difference. In other words, these tropes of marked whiteness signal an ambiguous territory in which the racial order is both challenged and defended (Scott 2009). Representations of Appalachian difference often refer to physical traits that seem to signify essential Otherness. These include illness, deformities, old, ragged clothing, dirty faces and hair, bad teeth, and other signs of poverty, as well as images of a downtrodden, oppressed femininity, and prematurely aged women, accompanied by men who seem to embody a deranged and degraded masculinity in their indolent postures and blank stares. These references to embodied differences, to deviant sexuality, are similar in structure and function to racializing discourses (Hall and Jhally 1996; Stoler 1995). According to the ideologies of white supremacy and meritocracy, which claim that social rewards are fairly distributed, the visible, physical signs of poverty reflect essential differences in people. This type of representation thus applies a quasi-racializing logic to poverty-suggesting that only people like "this" suffer from the excesses of the coal industry, not "average" people with brick houses and paved driveways. The suffering is happening, as it were, in a parallel universe. The social distance created by these images helps the middle-class viewer feel safely removed from the kind of environmental and economic disaster they depict. Many scholars have argued that patterns of environmental inequality are indicative of systematic environmental racism (Bryant and Mohai 1992; Bullard 1987, 1993; Mohai 1995; Pulido 1996b). Others have argued that class, not race, is determinant in the placement of locally unwanted land uses and in the proximity of low income neighborhoods primarily composed of people of color to urban industrial sites (Been 1994; Szasz and Meuser 2000). Whether or not there is a pattern of racial discrimination behind this unequal burden, it is clear that cultural notions of race play a part in how environmental destruction is understood (Cline-Cole 1998; Kuletz 1998; Moore, Kosek, and Pandian 2003; Pulido 1996a). Through discourses of center and margin, development and backwardness, racialization is instrumental in how some places and people become marked for capitalist industrial sacrifice (Hall 1996).

#### Investigating the contours of Appalachian identity opens space for people to form their own identities. This is especially true for the Affrilachian, coined by Frank X Walker to indicate that identity is never terminal

Taylor 2011 (Kathryn, “Naming Affrilachia: Toward Rhetorical Ecologies of Identity Performance in Appalachia” <http://enculturation.gmu.edu/naming-affrilachia>)

Dialectologist James Robert Reese contends that mountaineers are perceived by non-Appalachians not as “actual people who reside in the same world,” but as “mythic personages who represent a way of life incompatible with the essential, rational, everyday mode of behavior” exhibited by those in the mainstream (494). Even Rhetoric and Composition scholars trained in a post-colonial, post-"Students Right to Their Own Language" era fall prey to this notion.[3](http://enculturation.gmu.edu/naming-affrilachia#3) Kathy Sohn begins her Whistlin’ and Crowin’ Women of Appalachia (2006), for example, by recalling a moment at the 1994 Conference on College Composition and Communication (CCCC) in Nashville when two scholars mimicked their server’s southern dialect and then launched into a few redneck jokes (1). These hyperbolized, mythical conceptions of Appalachians are frequently attributed to the region’s geography: the vast mountain ranges that both enclose and close off the region from “mainstream” culture contribute to conceptions of Appalachians as “untrammelled” and uncontrollable, cut-off and irresponsible. From the beginnings of scholarship on the region, writers acknowledged that these traditional stereotypes position Appalachians as Others mostly misunderstood and misrepresented (Allison; Bennett; Hartigan; Higgs; Purcell-Gates; Sohn; Turner and Cabbell). Victor Villanueva has even said that “Appalachian is a color” in the sense that the group is prone to stereotypical representations that verge on racism (xiv).[4](http://enculturation.gmu.edu/naming-affrilachia#4) For African Americans of Appalachia, this Otherness is folded doubly back onto itself.[5](http://enculturation.gmu.edu/naming-affrilachia#5) In the first published collection on this topic - Blacks in Appalachia (1985) - the group is called a “racial minority within a cultural minority” (Turner and Cabbell, eds. xix).[6](http://enculturation.gmu.edu/naming-affrilachia#6) Post-colonial theorist Homi Bhabha names the space of double minority a “hybrid site of cultural negotiation” (178). In The Location of Culture (2004), Bhabha claims that people who live in the liminal spaces between cultures are in a unique position to build their own identities through present-tense performances - or lived moments that arise from immediate, raw experiences. It is through such performance that “objectified others may be turned into subjects of their history and experience” (178), and distinguished as “whole” apart from the mainstream. It is through the creation of the term Affrilachian that African American Appalachians are distinguished and “turned into subjects of their history and experience” (178). Naming plays an important role to Affrilachian identity because it works rhetorically to build a solid, identifiable name for outsiders-on-the-inside - allowing them to work beyond the flux of negotiation and towards the confidence that comes with self-identification and a larger cultural acceptance of that identification. Bhabha claims that narratives from the periphery are extremely important because they disrupt the false sense of collectivism established in traditional retellings of a group’s history. He calls such retellings “pedagogical” because they “teach” the group’s peoples to imagine themselves as homogeneous (147-8). To interrupt this pedagogical homogeneity, we perform our identities in the present-tense - changing historical conceptions. This kind of performance didn’t take hold for African Americans of Appalachia until 1991, when Frank X Walker observed that Webster’s dictionary still defined an Appalachian as a “white resident from the mountains” (Affrilachian, “History”).[7](http://enculturation.gmu.edu/naming-affrilachia#7) It was this disturbing observation that inspired him to create the term Affrilachian and draw attention to the group’s widespread invisibility. He explains the urgency and function of the term in Coal Black Voices, the first video documentary on Affrilachian art: One of the things I’ve encountered traveling outside Kentucky is having to defend the fact that people of color actually live here…. I’m trying to say that not only are we here, we’re here in a very large way. We’re part of Kentucky’s history. We’re part of the landscape. And, you know, we’re part of the lore of Kentucky that includes basketball and horses and bourbon - that all those things that are Kentucky are also us. And I don’t feel the need to separate them. I’m trying to find ways to build those connections, to let people know. It’s part of my responsibility as an artist - as a Kentucky artist - to say that out loud. To defend my place here and my writing’s place here and my family’s place here and our community and how it fits into the entire notion of what Kentucky is. Walker emphasizes connection, community, and collectivism. For him, the goal of Affrilachian poetry is to reveal, perhaps for the first time, the validity and importance of black experiences in the region. By repeating the plural pronoun “we” in the phrases “we’re here” and “we’re part of,” Walker defines himself as a member of a group that is undeniably present and connected to the region - which is not based solely in geography, but also in emotion and memory. Whether or not they look like traditional “Appalachians” - and whether or not they dwell within the geographic boundaries of the region - Walker, his family, and his poetry have a “place here” - a phrase he repeats three times in one sentence. In his repetition of “my place here,” he emphasizes a deep connection to the region, to the place where he comes from, to the place that others are surprised he comes from. It is his responsibility as an artist to show his presence - a responsibility that invokes action (or becomes rhetorical) via his poetry, especially as others read it and as he performs it: Affrilachia [8](http://enculturation.gmu.edu/naming-affrilachia#8) thoroughbred racing and hee haw are burdensome images for kentucky sons venturing beyond the mason-dixon anywhere in Appalachia is about as far as you could get from our house in the projects yet a mutual appreciation for fresh greens and cornbread an almost heroic notion of family and porches makes us kinfolk somehow but having never ridden bareback or sidesaddle and being inexperienced at cutting hanging or chewing tobacco yet still feeling complete and proud to say that some of the bluegrass is black enough to know that being ‘colored’ and all is generally lost somewhere between the dukes of hazard and the beverly hillbillies but if you think makin’ ‘shine from corn is as hard as Kentucky coal imagine being an Affrilachian poet Viewed rhetorically, “Affrilachia” disrupts traditional understandings of Appalachian identity through its content and form. Take, for instance, the last few lines of the poem. Walker gives an entire line to the word but, a coordinating conjunction that marks contradiction or contrast. His move distinguishes the concepts presented before the conjunction from the concepts presented after it. Before but, Walker notes traditional understandings of Appalachians as whites: “Being ‘colored’ and all/is generally lost/somewhere between/the dukes of hazard/and the Beverly hillbillies.” The voices and experiences of black Appalachians are silenced in traditional representations of the region. Walker interrupts this silence: “but/if you think makin’ ‘shine from corn/is as hard as Kentucky coal/imagine being/an Affrilachian/poet.” Placing but onto its own line further distinguishes traditional understandings of Appalachia from new, revolutionary ones. His message is a difficult one to preach: it is “as hard as Kentucky coal” to disrupt tradition. By linking the difficulty of writing Affrilachian poetry with more typical images of struggle in Kentucky (i.e. moonshine-making and coal-mining), Walker disrupts the traditional silence of the African American experience so that he can be comfortable “feeling/complete and proud to say/that some of the bluegrass/is black.” His line breaks are particularly revealing here. Just as he used line breaks to emphasize the conjunction but, he uses them to emphasize wholeness. Only by acknowledging that “some of the bluegrass/is black,” and by taking pride in this claim, will Affrilachians feel “complete.” According to C. Daniel Dawson, NYU professor of African Diaspora and Culture, Affrilachian poets aim “to find out who they are, to validate their backgrounds, to validate their pasts, to validate their roots” (Coal Black Voices). Walker’s method for performing validation is to simultaneously reject outsiders’ views of the region (e.g. Beverly Hillbillies) and affirm insiders’ experiences by drawing connections between them. In “Affrilachia,” these connections stem from food (“fresh greens and cornbread”), family values (“an almost heroic notion of family”), and work ethic (whether making shine or writing poetry, life is as “hard as Kentucky coal”). It is sharing - or a sense of “mutual appreciation” - that “makes us kinfolk/somehow.” By setting the word somehow - an adverb meaning “in some unspecified way” - on its own line, Walker acknowledges how strange it might seem for African Americans to claim a role in Appalachian identity. There’s little stress here on why or how this bond is created - only a sense of rhetorical urgency that the bond be recognized and valued.

#### Thus, a plan:

#### The United States Federal Government should subsidize wind power production in areas of the United States affected by mountaintop removal.

#### Having an alternative to MTR is key—wind has potential but there are financial barriers

Wershkul, 10 [August 15th, New York Times, Ben Werschkul contributed reporting from Whitesville, W.Va, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/15/business/energy-environment/15coal.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&>]

Critics say the practice, known as “mountaintop removal mining,” is as devastating to the local environment as it is economically efficient for coal companies, one of which is poised to begin carving up Coal River Mountain. And that has Ms. Scarbro and other residents of western Raleigh County in a face-off of their own. ¶ Their goal is to save the mountain, and they intend to do so with a wind farm. At least one study has shown that a wind project could be a feasible alternative to coal mining here, although the coal industry’s control over the land and the uncertain and often tenuous financial prospects of wind generation appear to make it unlikely to be pursued. That, residents say, would be a mistake.¶“If we don’t stop this,” Ms. Scarbro says, adjusting the flowers on her husband’s grave, “one day we’ll be standing on a big pile of rock and debris, and we’ll be asking, ‘What do we do now?’ ” ¶ For many renewable-energy advocates outside the region, the struggle at Coal River Mountain has become emblematic of an effort across the country to find alternatives to fossil fuels. They have lent money, expertise and high-profile celebrities like Daryl Hannah and [James Hansen](http://www.columbia.edu/%7Ejeh1/mailings/2009/20090203_CoalRiverMountain.pdf), the [NASA](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/n/national_aeronautics_and_space_administration/index.html?inline=nyt-org) climate scientist, to help residents advance their case for wind power and to make it a test case for others pursuing similar projects nationwide. ¶ The mountain, which is privately owned and leased to coal interests, is also one of the last intact mountaintops in a region whose contours have otherwise been irreversibly altered by extreme surface-mining techniques. Preserving its peaks for a wind farm, plan advocates say, could provide needed job diversification for impoverished towns that otherwise live or die by the fortunes of coal.

#### Subsidies are key—otherwise coal industry intertia makes it untenable

Wershkul, 10 [August 15th, New York Times, Ben Werschkul contributed reporting from Whitesville, W.Va, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/15/business/energy-environment/15coal.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&>]

Throw a large wind farm into the mix, Ms. Scarbro says — and perhaps even a turbine factory — and the coal-dependent economies around the mountain might diversify and thrive. ¶ “The problem is, nobody here has any choices,” Ms. Scarbro says. “The miners doing mountaintop removal don’t have any choices, because they need their jobs to provide for their families. And people like me have no choice but to fight it, because if we don’t, nothing will change.” ¶ THE idea for a wind project first surfaced in 2006, after [David Orr](http://www.oberlin.edu/envs/faculty_pages/orr.htm), a professor of environmental studies at Oberlin College in Ohio, approached researchers at the [National Renewable Energy Laboratory](http://www.nrel.gov/), part of the Department of Energy, about its analysis of wind potential around the country. ¶ “We were supporting lots of groups trying to stop mountaintop removal and to do remediation at former sites,” Professor Orr says. “But we realized that, while that’s fine, it’s hard to get something done if you’re always just against something. So we began looking for alternatives to mountaintop mining.” ¶ The lab’s wind resource maps showed West Virginia’s potential as modest compared with that of blustery states like North Dakota and Montana. And the best wind in the state tended to be in the northeast corner, far from the southern heart of coal country. ¶ Undeterred, Professor Orr reached out to [WindLogics](http://www.windlogics.com/), a St. Paul-based company that provides wind resource assessments for utility-scale projects. Using computer modeling, WindLogics produced a detailed assessment of specific sites in West Virginia — including Coal River Mountain — suggesting that the winds atop some peaks even in coal country were strong and steady enough to support a wind farm. ¶ By 2008, those models had been folded into an economic comparison between future surface mining at Coal River Mountain and the proposed placement of a 164-turbine, 328-megawatt wind farm along its spine. [The analysis](http://is.gd/e4cBI) — which Professor Orr, the [Sierra Club](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/s/sierra_club/index.html?inline=nyt-org) and other groups helped finance on behalf of [Coal River Mountain Watch](http://www.crmw.net/), a community group in the once-bustling town of Whitesville — found that the energy potential of the mountain’s coal, and the royalties that would accrue to companies owning land there, vastly outstripped anything a wind farm could replicate, at least in the short term. ¶ The longer view, however, seemed to argue strongly for a wind farm. ¶ Using wind turbine tax rules established by the state in 2007, the researchers calculated that a wind farm of the size proposed for Coal River Mountain would generate $1.74 million in annual tax revenue for Raleigh County. That’s roughly equal to the total coal taxes the county collected for the 2007-2008 fiscal year, according to the state auditor. ¶ The portion of added tax revenue that would arise from surface mining Coal River Mountain was estimated at $36,000 a year for the next 17 years, at which point the resource would be exhausted. But a wind farm could keep generating revenue indefinitely for the county. It would also generate several hundred construction jobs, and several dozen permanent maintenance jobs. ¶ Luring a turbine production plant while continuing to mine coal underground could generate more than 1,000 jobs, the report found. And Rory McIlmoil, a former member of Coal River Mountain Watch and now a project manager for the energy and climate-change practice at [Downstream Strategies](http://www.downstreamstrategies.com/), which produced the economic analysis, said that despite the coal industry’s protestations to the contrary, a decapitated Coal River Mountain would no longer be suitable for wind development. ¶ “If you decrease the elevation, you decrease the wind resource,” he said. “There would be no more utility-scale wind up there.” ¶ The real world, of course, presents other complications. Wind power, for example, currently cannot compete with cheap coal without substantial subsidies. And if one aim of wind development is to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, even the authors of the Coal River economic study noted that there were more economical ways to do it. A 2008 study found that at some Texas wind projects, the cost of the subsidies exceeded the value of the emissions that were being offset.

#### Principled opposition alone isn’t enough—the plan is a necessary part of any strategy to break coal’s monopoly

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In spite of mounting opposition, from court cases to protests, the environmentally destructive practice of mountaintop removal (MTR) mining continues in the Central Appalachian coalfields. By numerous indicators, MTR is not sustainable: its environmental impacts include water pollution, stream ecosystem degradation, deforestation, and the leveling of mountaintops; coal mining pollution has been linked to birth defects and increased rates of mortality and chronic disease; the wealth derived from coal extraction has historically been taken out of the region rather than reinvested to promote local prosperity; and mining substantially depletes coal reserves, causing projections to indicate that only a short lifespan remains for the industry (and the jobs it provides) in the region. Despite these indicators that the current trajectory is unsustainable, there are currently few economic alternatives to coal mining for these rural areas. Given this situation, what is the equitable and effective policy response? Further, and in line with the topic for this journal's issue, how could growth of the "green economy" in the region address these problems?¶ The campaign against MTR is multi-pronged and diverse. In fact, calling it a single campaign is misleading, because participants seek varying degrees of change. Some opponents critique MTR narrowly but still support other forms of coal mining, while others more broadly question whether any coal extraction is beneficial to the region. n1¶ Amidst the more traditional calls for the end of MTR, or even for the complete end to coal mining, has arisen another approach whose theory of change relies not on regulatory or legislative amendments to prohibit the mining technique but rather a strategy that attempts to diversify the economy beyond coal and thus indirectly end MTR. This approach circumvents the "jobs versus environment" dichotomy commonly raised in environmental politics by creating new "green collar" jobs. It relies on an assumed causal mechanism whereby economic dependence has led to political dependence, and this political dependence inhibits policy change to restrict MTR, despite the practice's [\*116] damaging consequences. n2 Under this causal model, diversifying the economy beyond coal would trigger a decrease in political support for the coal sector and thus lead to policy change.¶ Still, there are different strategies for promoting green energy opportunities within a coal-dominated environment. One possibility is to campaign for abolition of surface mining in the region, in conjunction with advocating for and nurturing sustainable economic alternatives. A second option is to accept the economic and political position of coal and collaborate with the coal sector to make it more responsible, and from that platform create value-added industries that introduce diversified options. This article describes two case studies that typify each approach: the Kentuckians for the Commonwealth's (KFTC) Renew East Kentucky campaign follows the first approach, and West Virginia's JOBS Project and its pyrolysis proposal follows the second. n3 The analysis of these cases indicates the barriers and opportunities encountered by each, though it stops short of determining the more effective route.¶ This article begins with a historical overview of coal, in particular the rise of MTR mining in Central Appalachia and the development of a public policy framework to govern its operations. Next, this paper describes its position that the coal sector is not sustainable for the Central Appalachian region and justifies this position using economic, environmental, and other trends. The contrasting cases of KFTC's Renew East Kentucky campaign and the JOBS Project's pyrolysis proposal are then reviewed against this background. The article concludes by considering the underlying theories of change on which these two cases are based.

#### The aff is a prereq to aligning incentives in favor of diversification—it’s unethical to exclude it or subsume it under an all-encompassing social theory

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B. The Need for an "Appalachian Transition"¶ This section outlines demographic, economic, environmental, and other trends pointing toward the need to change the status quo in favor of economic diversification. This "Appalachian transition" is an important step in achieving a just and sustainable future for the region.¶ Although Central Appalachia's economy has long relied on coal mining, the contribution of coal has decreased over time. The region now produces less coal than western states: by the late 1990s, coal production west of the Mississippi surpassed its eastern competitors for the first time, and the gap has continued to widen. n34 The decline in Central Appalachian coal can be explained by the various factors that affect the cost of producing coal, including: labor costs, shifts to more marginal reserves as the productive areas are mined out, environmental regulations, technological advancements, transportation costs, the demand for coal, and competition across regions and with other fuel sources. n35 The average price of Appalachian coal increased from $ 1.27 per million BTU in 2000 to $ 2.56 per million BTU in 2009. n36 With the average cost of U.S. coal in 2009 resting at $ 1.67 per million BTU, n37 the decline in the region's competitiveness is clear.¶ Data analyses across a range of sources, including government and industry consultants, show that coal in Central Appalachia is running out. n38 More specifically, the remaining reserves are those that are more costly to mine, due to higher stripping ratios (the ratio of coal to overburden) caused by thin seams buried beneath hundreds of feet of mountain. n39 For instance, a consensus report by researchers at West Virginia University summarized that "the depletion of low-cost reserves in the southern part of the state leads to increased mining costs that can make the [sic] southern West Virginia too expensive for the market." n40 Similarly, the U.S. Energy Information Administration, projecting coal production until 2035, reports substantial expected declines from current levels, "as coal produced from the extensively mined, higher cost reserves of Central Appalachia is supplanted by lower cost coal from other supply regions." n41 While these reports have centered recent public attention on the decline of the region's coal reserves, it is noteworthy that these warnings have been made since at least the early 1980s. n42 For instance, a 1988 Coal Week article begins,¶ [\*122] ¶ ¶ despite current bargain prices and an apparent abundance of compliance and low-sulfur coals from Pike County KY and Mingo County WV, an Annapolis MD-based consulting firm has warned that low-cost Kentucky reserves are wearing thin and even the new Mingo County properties have only about 30 years of economic life. n43¶ ¶ The viability of mines in this region has been extended beyond the article's grim outlook especially due to technological advancements that reduce the costs of mining, such as the draglines discussed above, as well as changes to the regulations and policies governing the mines, which also improve profit margins. n44 Both Kentucky and West Virginia, for example, have tax incentives for mining thin-seam coal. n45¶ In addition to the mining trends suggesting the need to move beyond surface coal mining, mining's negative impacts on the environment and human health suggest legal and ethical reasons to constrain it. A range of scientific researchers, government agencies, and environmental groups have documented and asserted the significant environmental and human-health challenges associated with MTR. The EPA estimated that between 1985 and 2001, MTR buried 724 miles of streams and adversely affected an additional 1,200 miles of them, n46 and it resulted in "fundamental changes to the region's landscape and [\*123] terrestrial wildlife habitats." n47 Since Appalachia is one of the most biodiverse regions in North America and home to several endangered species, these findings give scientific justification to the argument in favor of protecting these forests from mining impacts.¶ A defining characteristic of MTR and large-scale surface mining in the region is that they create a large amount of overburden that is then deposited in adjacent valleys atop streams creating valley fills. Burial of headwater streams causes permanent loss of ecosystems, whose key biological function is to decompose organic matter into fine particulate and dissolved organic matter, whose nutrients are utilized further downstream. n48 Valley fills thus impair the quality of the entire run of the river. Scientists have found an inverse relationship between concentration of metals and stream biological health. n49 Other studies have measured higher pH levels, electrical conductivity, and total dissolved solids in the water below the valley fills. n50¶ The human health effects in the communities surrounding mining sites are also notable and gaining increased public attention. Chemicals and toxins are found in the drinking water in areas near the mining sites as well as in hazardous airborne dust. n51 Rates of mortality, lung cancer, and chronic heart, lung, and kidney disease are all elevated as a function of county-level coal production. n52 Another study has found that birth defects are significantly higher in mountaintop mining counties compared to other counties in the region, n53 though this study conflates mountaintop mining with other underground and surface mining that occurs in many of the counties. This pattern remains even after controlling for risks associated with socioeconomic disadvantage, such as a mother's health and education, prenatal care, and race**.** n54 Moreover, immediate dangers from the mine site also remain and impact the local community. The removal of vegetation, compaction of soil, and other impacts at the mined sites cause greater storm runoff and increased frequency and magnitude of downstream flooding. n55¶ Additionally, while recognizing that some data point in positive directions, the overall economic status of Central Appalachian residents reinforces the [\*124] argument that coal production has not created prosperity for the region. In a study of county-level economic conditions in Central Appalachia from 1960 to 2000, researchers concluded that economic distress is a product of the region's continued dependence on extractive industries, particularly coal, as well as of geographical conditions such as its isolation from major urban areas and its rugged terrain. n56 Notably, they find that economic dependence on coal has limited the options for a diversified economy in the region. n57¶ The study also points to the negative impacts of the "boom and bust" cycle of economic prosperity that is typical of extractive industries, particularly in rural areas. For instance, while a number of counties emerged from distress following the spike in coal production and prices during the oil crises by 1980, the counties fell back to distressed status by 1990 when coal prices subsequently dropped. n58 Many other coal counties fared even worse: seventy-five percent of mining-dependent counties were persistently distressed. n59 The poor incentives coal provides for investing in the region, even at the individual level, may be one possible causal mechanism linking historical dependence on coal with poverty and economic distress. One study suggests that negative socioeconomic conditions such as unemployment, high school drop-out rates, and unequal income distribution discourage residents from making human capital investments that could potentially improve their futures. n60 This reasoning, however, places responsibility and even blame on the individual rather than on the initial determinants of those structural conditions. Alternatively, these same research conclusions can be viewed as evidence that wise public policy changes arerequired to realign the incentives for human capital investments and reverse negative socioeconomic trends.¶ Nevertheless the coal industry contributes significantly to the regional economies. In West Virginia, for instance, the state collected $ 417.2 million in severance taxes in 2010. n61 Severance taxes are disbursed to the coal-producing counties according to the various tax arrangements of each state. In West Virginia, for instance, most is deposited in the State General Revenue Fund (slightly more than eighty-six percent in fiscal year 2011), with approximately five percent going to the State Infrastructure Fund and nine percent to local governments. n62 However, the overall impact of the sector's economic contribution is uncertain. Various reports argue that coal mining results in an overall cost - rather than profit - to the states' budgets. A research and economic development non-profit, Mountain Association for Community Economic [\*125] Development (MACED), concluded that for the 2006 fiscal year Kentucky subsidized the coal industry with nearly $ 115 million, due particularly to state spending on its coal haul road system and the state's expenditures to support people directly and indirectly employed by the coal industry. n63 Similar reports produced for West Virginia and Tennessee also indicate that state expenditures exceeded state revenues, n64 although some state politicians and other researchers have responded critically to these reports. n65 Regardless of their acceptance, these reports serve the important function of prompting public discussion that critically assesses whether and how the coal industry contributes to the states.

#### And, that discussion is a spring board – scaling up the discussion to focus on the malleability of institutions solves – once a problem has been identified creating avenues of change is the best response

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V. Theories of Change in the Coalfields¶ By promoting alternative energy systems, the projects in both case studies seek to reduce the amount of electricity ultimately derived from coal. They can therefore both be viewed as contributing to a decline in surface mining and MTR. Can they do so equally effectively? Concluding one way or the other is not the purpose of this article. However, it is possible to compare the implicit "theories of change" underlying each of the two projects against the conditions under which each would contribute more effectively toward this end.¶ Comparing the approaches of both case studies highlights the initial questions of whether and when the status quo serves to promote or inhibit change. Under some circumstances, it may serve as a springboard to greater economic diversification by creating new industries based on the raw materials, trained workforce, or other inputs already existing in the traditional sector. The pyrolysis project is premised on the status quo functioning in this manner, with the existing surface-coal mining sector providing the support and resources on which to develop the alternative energy project. Alternatively, existing [\*138] conditions may inhibit efforts for diversification, either by shaping incentives so as to bias decision-makers in favor of the status quo, n157 or by entrenching power in a way that suppresses alternative viewpoints and proposals from reaching the political agenda. n158 KFTC's approach assumes the latter role of the coal-dominated status quo, as it views supplanting the coal sector with more attractive economic options as a necessary prerequisite to lessening the political power of coal.¶ What does this suggest for the viability of each of the projects? Working alongside the existing conditions may assist the JOBS Project in its goal to promote alternative energy programs. Yet the initial success may not expand beyond incremental change, as that expansion may be constrained by the very factors that allowed for its initial success. That is, the strategy of working in collaboration with the coal sector is only viable as long as it aligns with the interest of that sector.¶ On the other hand, efforts like KFTC's approach face a conundrum in which they cannot work in collaboration with the coal sector, and yet by not working with it, the new projects gain little traction. This is exactly the situation that the indirect pathway attempts to upend, wherein coal interests dominate the political and economic spheres and inhibit change. One possible way out of this infinite regress problem could be to focus efforts on pockets of energy policy and infrastructure where the coal sector lacks influence or substantial interest. This is indeed what appears to be taking place with Renew East Kentucky and similar efforts, where they find the greatest success in developing energy efficiency programs. From here, scaling up and expanding beyond efficiency may be possible, especially if they gain new supporters (for example, those employed by new jobs created through efficiency programs).¶ For either of these pathways to lead to policy change on MTR, it is critical to scale up from niche projects to substantially alter the current economic conditions. Drawing on institutional theory suggests that to do so, the pathways must counteract the "mechanism of reproduction" that underlies the status quo conditions. One scholar explains how wider conditions serve to both stabilize and change institutions: "Institutions rest on a set of ideational and material foundations that, if shaken, open possibilities for change. But different [\*139] institutions rest on different foundations, and so the processes that are likely to disrupt them will also be different, though predictable." n159 Similarly, she and other institutionalists point to "mechanisms of reproduction" that maintain an institutional framework and patterns of development, perpetuating the status quo. n160 After identifying a mechanism that upholds the system, scholar Jacob Hacker argues that it is possible to then "specify the potential means by which institutions or policies might escape the developmental pathways of the past." n161 When applied to the case of MTR, this literature points toward identifying not only how the coal industry inhibits change, but also what maintains the coal sector's political position. n162¶

#### Wind is key—so is Appalachia

**Haltom 10** - Co-director of Coal River Muntain Watch [Vernon Haltom, “Can a Wind Farm Transform Appalachia's Energy Future?,” Solutions Journal, Volume 1 | Issue 4 | Page 71-77 | Jul 2010, pg. http://tinyurl.com/9e3fyr8

The communities of the Coal River Valley suffered a heartbreaking catastrophe on April 5, 2010, when Massey Energy's Upper Big Branch longwall mine exploded, killing 29 miners in the worst U.S. mine disaster in 40 years. The disaster at Upper Big Branch should remind the nation that with our current dependence on coal for electricity generation comes a responsibility to ensure that miners and the surrounding communities are protected from the negligence of company executives. At Coal River Mountain Watch, we want to take the debate a step further by offering an alternative vision for the community, one that has the potential to transform Coal River Valley and offer a powerful symbol of a viable energy future for the nation. In March 2008, local residents banded together to fight for a wind farm instead of a mountaintop removal coal mining site operated by Massey. Generations of residents around Coal River Mountain have seen the detrimental effects of reliance on one industry. The boom-and-bust cycles of coal have caused bustling communities to become ghost towns. With the current reliance on technology such as longwall mining and mountaintop removal, miners have largely been replaced with machines and explosives. In 1980, 55,500 miners in West Virginia extracted over 121 million tons of coal, while in 2008, only about 21,000 miners extracted nearly 166 million tons. Comparing a map of the counties that have yielded the most coal to the Appalachian Regional Commission's map of distressed counties illustrates a clear correlation. Contrary to industry claims that coal provides prosperity, economic facts indicate that it provides poverty. Presently the state has a 9.5 percent unemployment rate, while less than 4 percent of the workforce is employed by mining and logging. The plan for Coal River Mountain would destroy over 6,000 acres of the mountain, bury streams with 18 valley fills, destroy water supplies, and eliminate sustainable resources, including the commercial wind potential. The mountaintop removal operation would provide coal and temporary mining jobs for only 17 years. In contrast, a wind farm would preserve the abundant timber and non-timber forest products, protect the water, allow traditional and new sustainable economic opportunities, and provide clean energy and green jobs forever. As we call on our leaders to reduce carbon emissions and to invest in the development of clean energy sources, we must also call on them to invest in the future of the miners and the communities that have provided the energy upon which our nation was built and continues to be fueled today. This means asking the federal government to reinvigorate the original intent of the Appalachian Regional Development Initiative, strengthen the capacity and purview of the Appalachian Regional Commission, and invest in the health, education, training, entrepreneurship, and environment of Appalachian communities and residents. It means addressing the root causes of persistent poverty and unemployment in the region and not being afraid to anger the coal industry and the local and state politicians who uphold it to the detriment of the citizens and the miners. But most of all, it calls for making a commitment to a sustainable economic transition for the coalfields and supporting every means possible to achieve it. Building a Positive Vision Coal River Mountain lies at the western end of Raleigh County, in the heart of the Coal River watershed, and is bounded by the two major tributaries of the Big Coal River: Marsh Fork on the south and west of the mountain and Clear Fork on the north and east. Kayford Mountain, where thousands of acres of mountaintop have been removed, lies across the Clear Fork to the north, and Cherry Pond Mountain, likewise devastated by mountaintop removal, lies across the Marsh Fork to the southwest. Several small, unincorporated towns—Rock Creek, Naoma, Sundial, Birchton, and Pettus—lie along the Marsh Fork, and the towns of Artie, Colcord, and Dorothy are situated along the Clear Fork. Whitesville, at the eastern edge of Boone County, sits just below the convergence of the two tributaries at the western edge of the mountain. Coal River Mountain itself has long been home to underground mines, a few small, old strip mines, and, since 1995, the Brushy Fork slurry impoundment. However, most of the mountain remains relatively unspoiled and has provided generations of residents with lumber, firewood, berries, ginseng and other valuable medicinal herbs, wild game, and fish. From the air, the Coal River Mountain stands in lush contrast to its barren, dusty neighbors. The Upper Big Branch mine, the site of the recent disaster, lies beneath the expansive Twilight surface mine complex on Cherry Pond Mountain, just across from Coal River Mountain. In 2006, Massey Energy quietly received approval for the Bee Tree surface mine on Coal River Mountain. In the latter months of 2006, David Orr, a professor at Oberlin College in Ohio and a prominent environmental advocate and writer, worked with CRMW's North Carolina–based ally Appalachian Voices to commission a study of the wind potential on Coal River Mountain. WindLogics, a nationally recognized wind modeling and development firm, conducted the study and found that the ridges along Coal River Mountain exhibited strong Class 4 to Class 7 average annual wind speeds. Class 4 winds serve as a minimum threshold for industrial-scale wind development. When Massey applied for the Eagle 2 Surface Mine, the second of four planned permits on the mountain, Coal River Mountain Watch requested and was granted an informal conference in August 2007 for citizens to voice their opposition to the proposal. Nearly 100 residents attended the hearing, and over 30 spoke out against the permit. None spoke in favor of it. In 1997 and 2001, several Clear Fork residents had endured heavy flooding, exacerbated by runoff from mountaintop removal and valley fills on the opposite side of the Clear Fork. They feared the destruction of their community if both sides of the valley were dominated by streams buried under valley fills. Several citizens voiced support for a wind farm as an alternative to mountaintop removal. Dr. Matt Wasson of Appalachian Voices described the WindLogics study and provided copies to decision makers at the Department of Environmental Protection. Seizing the opportunity offered by the mountain's wind resources, members of Coal River Mountain Watch, with the support of the Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, Appalachian Voices, the Sierra Club, and the Student Energy Action Coalition, came together in March 2008 to make plans for a wind farm. Using the WindLogics wind map of the mountain, and with technical advice provided by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory and the American Wind Energy Association, CRMW's wind project coordinator, Rory McIlmoil, constructed a model wind farm utilizing ArcGIS and Google Earth software. The model suggested that Coal River Mountain had enough wind potential and land area to accommodate 220 two-megawatt wind turbines, resulting in a total generation capability of 440 megawatts. Meanwhile, CRMW's community organizer, Lorelei Scarbro, provided information about the project and hosted community meetings that generated substantial local support. The two, along with supportive community members, made presentations to elected and appointed leaders, from the city level to the governor's office, and held a rally at the state capitol that resulted in more than 10,000 signatures on a petition. The project received Co-op America's 2008 Building Economic Alternatives award. CNN reported on the project and interviewed CRMW organizer Lorelei Scarbro at her home and at the adjacent family cemetery on Coal River Mountain. To determine what was at stake, Coal River Mountain Watch commissioned Downstream Strategies, an environmental consulting firm from Morgantown, West Virginia, to conduct a comparative economic analysis of the costs and benefits of mountaintop removal and wind development on Coal River Mountain. That study concluded that a 328-megawatt wind farm, enough to power 70,000 homes, would generate more long-term jobs and significantly greater local tax revenues than the proposed mining would, while imposing far fewer costs on human health and the environment. In fact, the study estimated that the externalized costs of the proposed mining, which would be drained from the local economy, would amount to $600 million over the life of the mining and beyond. According to the Downstream Strategies executive summary, "For each scenario, the local economic benefits are quantified based on increased jobs, earnings, and economic output. In addition to these economic benefits, costs due to excess deaths and illnesses from coal production and local environmental problems are quantified and added to earnings to demonstrate how each scenario impacts the citizens of Raleigh County. Other externalities—including global environmental costs; forestry; tourism; property values; and gathering, hunting, and heritage—are not quantified in this report. However, quantification of these additional externalities would tend to favor the development of a wind farm over mountaintop removal mines." The wind farm would provide nearly 50 times the tax revenue to the county that a mountaintop removal site would: $1.74 million per year from the wind farm's property tax revenues, compared to $36,000 per year for 17 years from the mountaintop removal operation. And the wind farm would provide at least 277 temporary construction jobs and 39 permanent jobs, while the jobs provided by the Massey surface mine would fluctuate in number from 79 to 248 and continue for only 17 years. The wind farm would also allow underground mining to continue. The study also illustrated the root of the social and economic problems that have plagued coalfield communities ever since the coal industry moved in: the only beneficiaries of the mountaintop removal option would be Massey Energy and the two private land companies that own over 90 percent of the land and coal, whereas the wind farm would benefit the people—the residents of the entire county. When the wind farm project organizers presented the study results to the Raleigh County Commission, they brought as visual aids two giant checks: one for $1.74 million per year forever from a wind farm, and one for $36,000 per year for 17 years from a mountaintop removal operation. The commission refused to take a position that would pit another energy source against coal. Commissioner John Aliff said, "To be quite honest, the coal industry has been good for the commission." In the 2009 West Virginia legislative session, 41 of the state's 100 delegates co-sponsored a resolution in support of the wind project. This included four of the five delegates representing Raleigh County, where the wind farm is proposed. Again, coal lobbyist pressure and coal-friendly legislators ensured that the resolution died in committee. However, local, national, and international support rose to new levels. As the threat to the mountain increased, community members lobbied for the wind resolution and joined with other national allies like Rainforest Action Network and Citizens Lead for Energy Action Now (CLEAN) in an e-mail campaign to West Virginia's governor, Joe Manchin, the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (WVDEP), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the White House to halt mountaintop removal and valley fill permits on the mountain. The EPA has responded to the groups' concerns and is currently investigating operations on Coal River Mountain. In February 2009, NASA climate scientist James Hansen posted a short paper entitled "Tell President Obama about Coal River Mountain." He and actress/activist Daryl Hannah spoke at a June 23, 2009, rally for clean energy at the base of the mountain. Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., headlined a December 7, 2009, rally where hundreds gathered to defend Coal River Mountain. Coal River Wind put a public service announcement on hulu.com, where it can be seen by millions, and collaborated with Appalachian Voices and Google Earth to create a virtual flyover tour and description of the Coal River Wind project. The virtual flyover was shown to delegates at the 2009 international climate conference in Copenhagen and is part of a series of Google Earth "tours" that illustrate climate change issues and solutions. The series includes only a couple of projects per continent. The online petition presently has over 17,000 signatures. Citizen activists have also taken action to shut down the blasting where federal and state officials did not. For nine days in January 2010, two activists associated with the Mountain Justice movement and Climate Ground Zero campaign lived on platforms 60 feet high in trees near the blasting area. In spite of continuous air horn harassment, the two remained until voluntarily coming down in advance of an imminent winter storm. Activists engaged in dozens of other acts of nonviolent civil disobedience in 2009 and 2010 in the Coal River Valley, resulting in over 120 arrests. In addition to the tree-sit, seven actions took place on Coal River Mountain, ranging from simple trespass to activists chaining themselves to equipment. The Next Steps in the Campaign Surface mining has now begun on a small portion of Coal River Mountain. But there is still a chance to preserve the mountain for wind power. So far, the CRMW campaign's biggest problem has been the intransigence of Massey Energy. If the cloud created by the Upper Big Branch disaster has any silver lining, it is the national scrutiny brought to bear on mine safety and the belated return of government regulation. As we are finding out, loopholes in mining regulations and lax enforcement allowed Massey Energy to avoid strengthened oversight and inspection, which could have prevented that tragedy. But federal regulators in the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), and our elected politicians in Congress and the White House, allowed those loopholes to remain. For example, MSHA regulators ordered Massey to withdraw miners 61 times since the beginning of 2009. In 2009, more than 10 percent of MSHA's enforcement actions at this mine were for "unwarrantable failure" to comply with safety regulations—five times the national average of about 2 percent. In its preliminary briefing to President Obama, MSHA said, "In what is perhaps the most troubling statistic, in 2009, MSHA issued 48 withdrawal orders at the Upper Big Branch Mine for repeated significant and substantial violations that the mine operator either knew, or should have known, constituted a hazard. Massey failed to address these violations over and over again until a federal mine inspector ordered it done. The mine's rate for these kinds of violations is nearly 19 times the national rate." Massey CEO Don Blankenship tried to downplay the severity of the violations, saying that "violations are unfortunately a normal part of the mining process." A buildup of methane, and possibly coal dust, stands out as a likely cause of the explosion, and the Wall Street Journal reported that the investigation will consider the effects of mountaintop removal blasting above the mine, which may have affected seals. Politicians such as Senator Robert C. Byrd have weighed in, and New York State Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli has called for Blankenship to resign. In 2008, Massey Energy sought and received permission from the WVDEP to revise a permit on Coal River Mountain. The revision allows coal extraction on a small portion of the mountain without the need for a valley fill. However, the WVDEP did not consider the revision significant enough to allow public comment or a public hearing, and ignored the revision's effects on the remainder of the permit. On April 1, 2010, the EPA delivered the best news yet for the campaign, issuing strict guidance for limiting water pollution from valley fills. The guidance focused on conductivity, a measure of dissolved pollutants in the water. The limit is so strict that EPA Secretary Lisa Jackson said, "You're talking about no, or very few, valley fills that are going to meet standards like this…. The intent here is to tell people what the science is telling us, which is it would be untrue to say that you can have numbers of valley fills, anything more than, say, very minimal valley fills, and not expect to see irreversible damage to stream health." In addition to the impacts on stream chemistry, the guidelines consider environmental justice impacts to human communities. While they are still open for public comment, including comment from pro-coal politicians, and have not been finalized, the guidelines took effect immediately and apply to new permits and renewal permits. Along with the new guidelines, the EPA provided scientific documentation of the impacts mountaintop removal has on stream health, echoing a January 2010 study published in the journal Science by several renowned scientists that calls for a ban on mountaintop removal. This news greatly improves the odds for Coal River Mountain's survival. Massey's original proposed permits included at least 18 valley fills that would fill a total of nine miles of headwater streams with mining waste laden with toxic heavy metals. If Massey were prohibited from filling the valleys, the scale of surface mining would be drastically reduced, preserving most of the mountain for a wind farm. The new requirements could lead Massey and the land companies to renegotiate their contracts, preserving the surface for a profitable wind farm while still allowing underground mining. While citizens find encouragement in the EPA's new guidance, they also recognize the fact that mountaintop removal is still allowed and that a new administration could rescind this guidance. To make curtailment of mountaintop removal last, CRMW and other citizen groups are still pushing the Clean Water Protection Act (CWPA) in the U.S. House of Representatives and the Appalachia Restoration Act (ARA) in the Senate, which would curtail mountaintop removal.. The CWPA presently has 170 cosponsors and the ARA has 11. This progress is largely due to citizen lobby days sponsored by the Alliance for Appalachia, a 13-group regional coalition of which Coal River Mountain Watch is a core member. The Alliance conducts an annual lobby week, providing training and congressional meetings for approximately 200 citizens, and several mini-lobby events throughout the year. The Alliance also arranges meetings with government agencies, such as the EPA and the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement. Appalachian Transition We still need your help to ensure that the changes taking place through EPA regulation stick. Anyone can take action and sign our petition at [www.coalriverwind.org](http://www.coalriverwind.org). Citizens all over the country can ask the EPA to deny any valley fill permits on Coal River Mountain that may be submitted, and everyone can contact their U.S. representatives and senators and ask them to support the Clean Water Protection Act and the Appalachia Restoration Act. Coalfield communities need options for employment and livelihood beyond coal. The focus should be on giving them a choice and providing measures and incentives to support the development of those choices. It is time to turn our eyes toward Appalachia as an engine of transition and a model of sustainability, rather than a source of sorrow. If that means that the rest of the country has to pay a higher price for electricity due to a strengthening of oversight and enforcement of coal mine regulations, and if it means having more of our tax dollars go toward supporting economic transition in the coalfields, then for the sake of the miners and the future of Central Appalachian communities, that is a price we should be willing and honored to pay. Eventually, more likely sooner than the rosy estimates of the coal industry, the coal is going to run out. According to the federal Energy Information Administration, coal production in Central Appalachia is expected to decline by nearly half within the next 10 years due to the depletion of the most accessible, lowest-cost coal seams. Another report by Downstream Strategies, titled "The Decline of Central Appalachian Coal and the Need for Economic Diversification," notes that "should substantial declines occur as projected, coal‐producing counties will face significant losses in employment and tax revenue, and state governments will collect fewer taxes from the coal industry." Without a strong focus on supporting economic transition in Central Appalachia, local economies will rapidly decline along with coal production. Because of this, the report suggests that "state policymakers across the Central Appalachian region should…take the necessary steps to ensure that new jobs and sources of revenue will be available in the counties likely to experience the greatest impact from the decline. While there are numerous options available, the development of the region's renewable energy resources and a strong focus on energy efficiency offer immediate and significant opportunities to begin diversifying the economy." The decisions we make now in the region will determine whether we make the best use of those renewable resources or squander the opportunity, whether we provide for long-term sustainability for communities or ravage them, and whether we preserve a planet that can support our civilization or plummet headlong into climate catastrophe. Coal River Mountain still stands as a majestic, tangible symbol of these clear choices, but it requires the decision of more citizens to make that phone call, write that letter, make that donation, and turn off that light in order to remain standing.

#### Market mechanisms are useful—don’t make the perfect the enemy of the good

Bryant 12—professor of philosophy at Collin College (Levi, We’ll Never Do Better Than a Politician: Climate Change and Purity, 5/11/12, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/05/11/well-never-do-better-than-a-politician-climate-change-and-purity/)

However, pointing this out and deriding market based solutions doesn’t get us very far. In fact, such a response to proposed market-based solutions is downright dangerous and irresponsible. The fact of the matter is that 1) we currently live in a market based world, 2) there is not, in the foreseeable future an alternative system on the horizon, and 3), above all, we need to do something now. We can’t afford to reject interventions simply **because they don’t meet our ideal conceptions** of how things should be. We have to work with the world that is here, not the one that we would like to be here. And here it’s crucial to note that pointing this out does not entail that we shouldn’t work for producing that other world. It just means that we have to grapple with the world that is actually there before us.¶ It pains me to write this post because I remember, with great bitterness, the diatribes hardcore Obama supporters leveled against legitimate leftist criticisms on the grounds that these critics were completely unrealistic idealists who, in their demand for “purity”, were asking for “ponies and unicorns”. This rejoinder always seemed to ignore that words have power and that Obama, through his profound power of rhetoric, had, at least the power to shift public debates and frames, opening a path to making new forms of policy and new priorities possible. The tragedy was that he didn’t use that power, though he has gotten better.¶ I do not wish to denounce others and dismiss their claims on these sorts of grounds. As a Marxist anarchists, I do believe that we should fight for the creation of an alternative hominid ecology or social world. I think that the call to commit and fight, to put alternatives on the table, has been one of the most powerful contributions of thinkers like Zizek and Badiou. If we don’t commit and fight for alternatives those alternatives will never appear in the world. Nonetheless, we still have to grapple with the world we find ourselves in. And it is here, in my encounters with some Militant Marxists, that I sometimes find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that they are unintentionally aiding and abetting the very things they claim to be fighting. In their refusal to become impure, to work with situations or assemblages as we find them, to sully their hands, they end up reproducing the very system they wish to topple and change. Narcissistically they get to sit there, smug in their superiority and purity, while everything continues as it did before because they’ve refused to become politicians or engage in the difficult concrete work of assembling human and nonhuman actors to render another world possible. As a consequence, they occupy the position of Hegel’s beautiful soul that denounces the horrors of the world, celebrate the beauty of their soul, while depending on those horrors of the world to sustain their own position. ¶ To engage in politics is to engage in networks or ecologies of relations between humans and nonhumans. To engage in ecologies is to descend into networks of causal relations and feedback loops that you cannot completely master and that will modify your own commitments and actions. But there’s no other way, there’s no way around this, and we do need to act now.

#### Refusal of the state empowers its worst aspects. You don’t have to be a technocrat but you should be anti-anti-state

**Barbrook, 97 –** professor at the Hypermedia Research Centre at the University of Westminster (Richard, http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9706/msg00034.html)

I thought that this position is clear from my remarks about the ultra-left posturing of the 'zero-work' demand. In Europe, we have real social problems of deprivation and poverty which, in part, can only be solved by state action. This does not make me a statist, but rather an anti-anti-statist. By opposing such intervention because they are carried out by the state, anarchists are tacitly lining up with the neo-liberals. Even worse, refusing even to vote for the left, they acquiese to rule by neo-liberal parties. I deeply admire direct action movements. I was a radio pirate and we provide server space for anti-roads and environmental movements. However, this doesn't mean that I support political abstentionism or, even worse, the mystical nonsense produced by Hakim Bey. It is great for artists and others to adopt a marginality as a life style choice, but most of the people who are economically and socially marginalised were never given any choice. They are excluded from society as a result of deliberate policies of deregulation, privatisation and welfare cutbacks carried out by neo-liberal governments. During the '70s, I was a pro-situ punk rocker until Thatcher got elected. Then we learnt the hard way that voting did change things and lots of people suffered if state power was withdrawn from certain areas of our life, such as welfare and employment. Anarchism can be a fun artistic pose. However, human suffering is not.

#### Moral purism about institutional approaches dooms the aff—hierarchy should be deployed tactically for greater overall gains

**Grossberg, 92** [Lawrence, Morris Davis Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture”, page 388-389 //liam ]

﻿The demand for moral and ideological purity often results in the rejection of any hierarchy or organization. The question-can the master's tools be used to tear down the master's house?-ignores both the contingency of the relation between such tools and the master's power and, even more importantly, the fact that there may be no other tools available. Institutionalization is seen as a repressive impurity within the body politic rather than as a strategic and **tactical**, even empowering, necessity. It sometimes seems as if every progressive organization is condemned to recapitulate the same arguments and crisis, often leading to their collapse. 54 For example, Minkowitz has described a crisis in Act Up over the need for efficiency and organization, professionalization and even hierarchy,55 as if these inherently contradicted its commitment to democracy. This is particularly unfortunate since Act Up, whatever its limitations, has proven itself an effective and imaginative political strategist. The problems are obviously magnified with success, as membership, finances and activities grow. This **refusal of efficient operation** and the moment of organization is intimately connected with the Left's appropriation and **privileging** of **the local** (as the site of democracy and resistance). This is yet another reason why structures of alliance are inadequate, since they often assume that an effective movement can be organized and sustained without such structuring. The Left needs to recognize the necessity of institutionalization and of systems of hierarchy, without falling back into its own authoritarianism. It needs to find reasonably democratic structures of institutionalization, even if they are impure and compromised.

#### There’s no warrant for why a policy focus destroys politics—the point of our aff is that the social dynamics responsible for the squo are complex, but if we find a way to reduce some of the material impacts it’s bankrupt to discard it—this card makes the perm OFFENSE for us

**Talisse 2005** – philosophy professor at Vanderbilt (Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 31.4, “Deliberativist responses to activist challenges”) \*note: gendered language in this article refers to arguments made by two specific individuals in an article by Iris Young

Part of the response to the first challenge is offered by Young herself. The deliberative democrat does not advocate public political discussion only at the level of state policy, and so does not advocate a program that must accept as given existing institutional settings and contexts for public discussion. Rather, the deliberativist promotes an ideal of democratic politics according to which deliberation occurs at all levels of social association, including households, neighborhoods, local organizations, city boards, and the various institutions of civil society. The longrun aim of the deliberative democrat is to cultivate a more deliberative polity, and the deliberativist claims that this task must begin at more local levels and apart from the state and its policies. We may say that deliberativism promotes a ‘decentered’ (Habermas, 1996: 298) view of public deliberation and a ‘pluralistic’ (Benhabib, 2002: 138) model of the public sphere; in other words, the deliberative democrat envisions a ‘multiple, anonymous, heterogeneous network of many publics and public conversations’ (Benhabib, 1996b: 87). The deliberativist is therefore committed to the creation of ‘an inclusive deliberative setting in which basic social and economic structures can be examined’; these settings ‘for the most part must be outside ongoing settings of official policy discussion’ (115).

Although Young characterizes this decentered view of political discourse as requiring that deliberative democrats ‘withdraw’ (115) from ‘existing structural circumstances’ (118), it is unclear that this follows. There certainly is no reason why the deliberativist must choose between engaging arguments within existing deliberative sites and creating new ones that are removed from established institutions. There is no **need to accept Young’s** dichotomy; the deliberativist holds that work must be done both within existing structures and within new contexts. As Bohman argues,

Deliberative politics has no single domain; it includes such diverse activities as formulating and achieving collective goals, making policy decisions and means and ends, resolving conflicts of interest and principle, and solving problems as they emerge in ongoing social life. Public deliberation therefore has to take many forms. (1996: 53)

The second challenge requires a detailed response, so let us begin with a closer look at the proposed argument. The activist has moved quickly from the claim that discourses can be systematically distorting to the claim that all political discourse operative in our current contexts is systematically distorting. The conclusion is that properly democratic objectives cannot be pursued by deliberative means. The first thing to note is that, as it stands, the conclusion does not follow from the premises; the argument is enthymematic. What is required is the additional premise that the distorting features of discussion cannot be corrected by further discussion. That discussion cannot rehabilitate itself is a crucial principle in the activist’s case, but is nowhere argued.

#### Turn—fatalism—a priori negativity about what the USFG can do for people makes them ideological kin to the Tea Party—creates a self-perpetuating cycle of scapegoating at the expense of material improvements

Amy '7 Douglas J., Professor of Politics at Mount Holyoke College "The Case For Bureaucracy"

http://www.governmentisgood.com/articles.php?aid=20&print=1

The Role of Reform Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that we look at bureaucracy and bureaucrats through rose-colored glasses – or ignore their shortcomings. There are some inherent problems that can afflict government bureaucracies – most notably corruption and waste. And a hundred years ago, these were rampant problems. The enormously corrupt political machines that existed in many large cities during the early part of the twentieth century are examples of how badly bureaucracies can go wrong. But decades of reform efforts have greatly reduced these problems. We have rooted out large-scale corruption and are increasingly minimizing the amount of bureaucratic inefficiency, excessive paperwork, etc. These problems have not completely disappeared, and we must continue to try to improve the performance of our administrative institutions. A good example of this on-going effort was Vice-President Al Gore’s project, called the National Performance Review, which sought to reduce excess federal workers. Between 1993 and 2000, the number of civilian employees in the executive branch was reduced by 193,000. But while we must be vigilant about pursuing these kinds of reform efforts, we must not exaggerate the extent of the problems in our administrative agencies. And we should not allow the occasional failures of government bureaucracies to overshadow their achievements. A more realistic and accurate view of these institutions recognizes that on the whole they are working well and they continue to play a crucial role in administering vital programs that are improving the lives of all Americans. The Real Lessons from Katrina And yet, what are we to make of the kind of massive bureaucratic failure that occurred when hurricane Katrina when it hit New Orleans in the fall of 2005? The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s response was too little too late, and the agency was harshly criticized for its inadequate and bungling efforts. This fiasco seemed merely to confirm many peoples’ worst assumptions about the problems of bureaucracy. However, it would be a mistake to use the failures of FEMA to paint a negative picture of government bureaucracies. FEMA failed in New Orleans not because of something inherently wrong with government bureaucracies, but because of a policy of neglect by the Bush administration. First, the administration appointed Michael Brown to head the agency, a political crony with no experience in emergency response management and who was fired from his previous job for mismanagement. The agency was then downgraded and folded into the Department of Homeland Security, where its mission was re-oriented toward fighting acts of terrorism. Finally, FEMA’s budget was slashed, with Bush officials arguing that "Many are concerned that federal disaster assistance may have evolved into an oversized entitlement program..."30 As the *Washington Monthly* concluded, “FEMA was deliberately downsized as part of the Bush administration's conservative agenda to reduce the role of government.”31 In the end, then, FEMA’s failure in New Orleans was in large part a result of a conservative administration that had only contempt for the role of government in society and had little interest in ensuring the wellbeing of vital government agencies. Ironically, the real problem with many public bureaucracies today is not that they are bloated institutions who are over-staffed and spend too much money, but that they are understaffed and don’t have the funds to do their jobs. The continuing right-wing attack on government has left many agencies in a weakened state, unable to vigorously pursue their missions. There are not enough mine inspectors to protect mineworkers. The IRS lacks the personnel to detect and retrieve the billions of dollars lost every year from individuals and corporations that cheat on their taxes. Many school districts lack the teachers to keep their class size down to a reasonable level. In many cases, we have gone way past cutting “fat” out of these bureaucracies and we have begun to cut into flesh and bone. The main threat to the public interest posed by government bureaucracies these days is not that they are wasting huge amounts of our money, but that many are not healthy enough to do their job of promoting and protecting our collective wellbeing. To make matters worse, the very right-wing forces who are starving these vital agencies then turn around and cite any poor performance by these debilitated organizations as evidence of the ineptness of government. When President Obama was elected in 2008, he was committed to revitalizing important federal agencies. For example, he worked to enable the FDA to have enough inspectors to ensure that our foods are safe to eat; and the Democratic Congress acted to increase the funding for the Consumer Product and Safety Commission. These were important steps in the right direction, but much more needs to be done to strengthen the numerous bureaucracies that serve our vital public interests. Unfortunately, the Republican takeover of the House of Representatives in 2010 threatens to undermine any systematic efforts to reinvigorate many federal agencies. Beyond the Bureaucratic Stereotypes The negative stereotypes of bureaucracy that we have looked at in this article contribute to a political atmosphere that legitimizes the right-wing attack on government. The problem with these stereotypes is not simply that they are exaggerated and mistaken, but that conservatives and libertarians are able to exploit these misperceptions to justify their attempts to defund and hamstring the public sector. The more Americans believe that bureaucracies are bad, the more likely they are to agree with efforts to slash taxes and gut government programs. That is why it is increasingly important that we begin to see that most of the criticisms of government bureaucracy are based more on myth than reality, and that these administrative agencies play a central role in promoting the important missions of a modern democratic government.

### A2 Social Location

#### Attacks on social location are equal parts fallacy and discrimination. Vote for arguments, not speakers

**Kotzee, 10** – Department of Social Policy and Education, Birkbeck College, University of London (Ben, “Poisoning the Well and Epistemic Privilege,” Argumentation, SpringerLink)

In his paper “Poisoning the Well” (2006), Walton seeks to establish that the fallacy of poisoning the well is not a species of argumentum ad hominem as is commonly supposed, but can be a fallacy in its own right. Walton cites four instances of the poisoning the well in action and shows how the traditional analysis of the poisoning the well (see, for instance, Copi and Cohen 1998: 169 and Walton 1998) leaves features of this attack poorly explained. Rather than being an illegitimate attack on the person making the argument, Walton (2006) attempts to show why the poisoning the well is at once more subtle and dangerous: the poisoning the well is not a purely personal attack so much as a dialectical tactic to silence an opponent or prevent his views from being considered seriously. In this paper, a further example of the poisoning the well is outlined and a question is asked of Walton’s analysis. While in broad agreement with Walton’s approach, it is argued that a full explanation of the fallacy must take into account a body of approaches to do with the politics of identity according to which privileged social groups have a systematically distorted view on reality that will affect how they argue about social issues like race or gender. Starting from Walton’s view that the poisoning the well is a form of silencing, this paper seeks to defend and expand Walton’s analysis by establishing when making the social background of one’s opponent relevant to a debate is legitimate and when it is not. Pertinently, it is held that facts regarding someone’s gender or race can never in itself be a good ground to shift a debate’s focus in this way. 2 Walton on Poisoning the Well 2.1 The Traditional View According to Walton (2006: 288), the fallacy of poisoning the well is traditionally thought to be a sub-type of the bias form of the argumentum ad hominem (making the poisoning the well a sub-sub-type of the argumentum ad hominem on the traditional view.)1 In advancing the bias form of the argumentum ad hominem, the person employing it implies that his opponent draws his conclusions motivated not by genuine enquiry about a certain issue, but by self-interested advocacy and that the conclusions therefore should not be trusted. Whereas in an ordinary accusation of bias it is implied that someone has an interest in some discreet matter, in the poisoning the well sub-type of the bias attack, it is implied that someone is permanently or globally biased because of some fact regarding his social background. Take this (classic) example: The Cardinal Newman Argument Charles Kingsley, attacking the famous Catholic intellectual John Henry Cardinal Newman, argued thus: Cardinal Newman’s claims were not to be trusted because, as a Roman Catholic Priest, (Kingsley alleged) Newman’s first loyalty was not to the truth. (Copi and Cohen 1998: 169; Walton 2006: 275) What is wrong with Kingsley’s attack according to traditional fallacy theory is much the same as is wrong with ad hominem attacks generally: poisoning the well is fallacious, because casting aspersions on the arguer—while potentially effective in persuading an audience—is beside the point as far as the likely truth of the victim’s conclusion is concerned. According to Walton’s new analysis of the poisoning the well, however, what is the matter is something else. What is wrong with the poisoning the well is not that it is a personal attack, but that it is an illegitimate tactic deployed to silence an opponent or prevent his views being taken seriously in the first place. In offering this—new—analysis of poisoning the well, Walton not only turns accepted fallacy theory on its head, but also amends his own previously held views (see, for instance, Walton 1998) on the poisoning the well. In arguing that the dialectical analysis of the poisoning the well is to be preferred, Walton (2006: 275–82) cites a number of examples of poisoning the well attacks in action. The Abortion Argument An argument advanced by a woman during a debate on abortion in the Canadian House of Commons in 1979: I wish it were possible for men to get really emotionally involved in this question. It is really impossible for the man, for whom it is impossible to be in this situation, to really see it from the woman’s point of view. That is why I am concerned that there are not more women in this House available to speak about this from the woman’s point of view. The Black Alienation Argument An argument advanced by a black man against a white critic during a debate on black alienation: You’re not a black man, so anything you have to say on the subject of black alienation is of no interest to me. You just can’t know what you’re talking about. The Armoured Vehicles Argument An argument advanced on a message board on the world wide web regarding an academic’s views about the use of light armoured vehicles in Iraq: Just read his piece on LAVs in Iraq and… I wonder why we care what he thinks on topics of this nature. Reading his bio I saw nothing about him serving in the military. Yes, he’s a smart guy, and has some alphabet soup after his name these days, but really, what does he know about the proper uses of LAVs? I don’t see where he served as a tank/track commander or served period. Why are we wasting time listening to someone who doesn’t seem to have been there and done that? He wrote a book on Maneuver Warfare? Where did he learn how to maneuver? The Gulf War Argument An argument in the Netherlands in 1990: A retired Major General argues in front of his relatives that the Dutch government must give more substantial support for the Allied efforts in the Gulf Area. “We ought to send ground forces,” so he claims. His grandson retorts: “It’s all very well for you to talk, Grandpa! You don’t have to go there.” Using these four examples, Walton shows why the poisoning the well is not a species of ad hominem argument. To be an ad hominem argument, the argument must be an attack on an arguer’s character (Walton 2006: 288). However, in the examples that Walton highlights, there is no personal attack on an individual’s character. Take the abortion and black alienation arguments: there the attack is not directed against a specific man or against a specific white person, rather the attack is against men and white people as such or, at best, against a certain person as representative of the groups “men” and “white people”. This is most clear in the Gulf War argument: in that argument it is not that the grandson asserts his grandfather is of bad character at all—personal badness aside, the grandfather is just in no position to comment on sending Dutch troops to war, according to his grandson. For Walton, the intention in the poisoning the well cases is not so much to discredit a person’s argument by casting aspersions on his character, but to suggest that for the person in question to enter into a discussion regarding the issue in question is illegitimate. Walton holds that this “diffusion effect” is an essential characteristic of the poisoning the well and describes the dialectical situation like this:

#### Authenticity tests shut down debate—turns case and proves they turn dialogue into lecture

**Subotnik 1998** – professor of law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center (7 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 681)

Having traced a major strand in the development of CRT, we turn now to the strands' effect on the relationships of CRATs with each other and with outsiders. As the foregoing material suggests, the central CRT message is not simply that minorities are being treated unfairly, or even that individuals out there are in pain - assertions for which there are data to serve as grist for the academic mill - but that **the minority scholar** himself or herself hurts and hurts badly.

An important problem that concerns the very definition of the scholarly enterprise now comes into focus. What can an academic trained to [\*694] question and to doubt n72 possibly say to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I hurt bad"? n73 "No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"? "Other people hurt too"? Or, most dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - "What do you expect when you keep shooting yourself in the foot?" If the majority were perceived as having the well- being of minority groups in mind, these responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real conversation. But, writes Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power... to incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our lives is... ultimately obliterating." n74

"Precarious." "Obliterating." These words will clearly invite responses only from fools and sociopaths; they will, by **effectively precluding objection**, disconcert and disunite others. "I hurt," in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects. First, it demands priority from the reader's conscience. It is for this reason that law review editors, waiving usual standards, have privileged a long trail of undisciplined - even silly n75 - destructive and, above all, self-destructive arti [\*695] cles. n76 Second, by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt in a similar way, "I hurt" discourages fellow sufferers from abstracting themselves from their pain in order to gain perspective on their condition. n77

[\*696] Last, as we have seen, it precludes the possibility of **open and structured conversation** with others. n78

[\*697] It is because of this conversation-stopping effect of what they insensitively call "first-person agony stories" that Farber and Sherry deplore their use. "The norms of academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's emotional stability or veracity." n79 Perhaps, a better practice would be to put the scholar's experience on the table, along with other relevant material, but to subject that experience to the same level of scrutiny.

If through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs succeeded in limiting academic debate, why do they not have greater influence on public policy? Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race, n80 I suggest, has generated a kind of cynicism in white audiences which, in turn, has had precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs. It drives the American public to the right and ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively rejected.

In the absence of scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be sure what reasons they would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are certain. First, the kinds of issues raised by Williams are too important in their implications  [\*698]  for American life to be confined to communities of color. If the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the thoughts and actions of the majority elements in society, it would seem to be of great importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse to bring about change. Second, given the lack of engagement of CRT by the community of legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be taking place at the highest scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more generally, the streets and the airwaves.

### market bad

#### Market mechanisms are useful—don’t make the perfect the enemy of the good

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However, pointing this out and deriding market based solutions doesn’t get us very far. In fact, such a response to proposed market-based solutions is downright dangerous and irresponsible. The fact of the matter is that 1) we currently live in a market based world, 2) there is not, in the foreseeable future an alternative system on the horizon, and 3), above all, we need to do something now. We can’t afford to reject interventions simply **because they don’t meet our ideal conceptions** of how things should be. We have to work with the world that is here, not the one that we would like to be here. And here it’s crucial to note that pointing this out does not entail that we shouldn’t work for producing that other world. It just means that we have to grapple with the world that is actually there before us.¶ It pains me to write this post because I remember, with great bitterness, the diatribes hardcore Obama supporters leveled against legitimate leftist criticisms on the grounds that these critics were completely unrealistic idealists who, in their demand for “purity”, were asking for “ponies and unicorns”. This rejoinder always seemed to ignore that words have power and that Obama, through his profound power of rhetoric, had, at least the power to shift public debates and frames, opening a path to making new forms of policy and new priorities possible. The tragedy was that he didn’t use that power, though he has gotten better.¶ I do not wish to denounce others and dismiss their claims on these sorts of grounds. As a Marxist anarchists, I do believe that we should fight for the creation of an alternative hominid ecology or social world. I think that the call to commit and fight, to put alternatives on the table, has been one of the most powerful contributions of thinkers like Zizek and Badiou. If we don’t commit and fight for alternatives those alternatives will never appear in the world. Nonetheless, we still have to grapple with the world we find ourselves in. And it is here, in my encounters with some Militant Marxists, that I sometimes find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that they are unintentionally aiding and abetting the very things they claim to be fighting. In their refusal to become impure, to work with situations or assemblages as we find them, to sully their hands, they end up reproducing the very system they wish to topple and change. Narcissistically they get to sit there, smug in their superiority and purity, while everything continues as it did before because they’ve refused to become politicians or engage in the difficult concrete work of assembling human and nonhuman actors to render another world possible. As a consequence, they occupy the position of Hegel’s beautiful soul that denounces the horrors of the world, celebrate the beauty of their soul, while depending on those horrors of the world to sustain their own position. ¶ To engage in politics is to engage in networks or ecologies of relations between humans and nonhumans. To engage in ecologies is to descend into networks of causal relations and feedback loops that you cannot completely master and that will modify your own commitments and actions. But there’s no other way, there’s no way around this, and we do need to act now.